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The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to deepen theoretical understanding of 
the role that hindsight plays in foresight. The thesis argues that the past is not 
an isolated static state, but one that is intimately connected with the future. 
However, there are several biases that influence our perceptions and 
conceptions of the past. These biases act as constraints on strategic learning 
by limiting our ability to understand the driving forces that emerge from the 
past, play out through the present and become critical uncertainties in the 
future. They can result in misperceptions about events or processes, and as 
such, may impair foresight methodologies such as scenario thinking. Such 
foresightful thinking flaws are characterised by a combination of hindsight 
biases and creeping determinism, which result in searching for information 
that corresponds to people’s views about both the past and the future, logical 
path-dependencies, misaligned dominant logics, routines, recipes and 
paradigms, and over-confidence and defensive pessimism.
Drawing on received research in psychology, the role of counter-to-factual 
reasoning as a heuristic is discussed and analysed as a possible antidote to 
foresightful thinking flaws. The judicious use of such a heuristic device as 
counterfactual reasoning, both as a sense-making process and as an 
analytical reasoning tool applied to the analysis of historical data, the thesis 
concludes, is a method for investigating and discovering the past and fortifying 
foresightful strategic thinking.
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Two Roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveler, long I stood 
To where it bent in the undergrowth ...
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I- 
I took the one less traveled by.
And that has made all the difference.
The Road Not Taken 
Robert Frost
Men’s curiosity searches past and future 
And clings to that dimension. But to apprehend 
The point of intersection of the timeless 
With time, is an occupation for the saint-  
T. S. Eliot, from The Dry Salvages
1.0 Chapter Introduction
Humanity has always been fascinated with the future. From the ancient
consultations of the Oracle at Delphi, to the development of contemporary 
forecasting techniques, ways to improve foresight have been continually 
sought. But the future cannot be known. Forecasting, from simple regression 
of past data points into the future to sophisticated econometric modelling is 
frequently erroneous. The further forward forecasters try to predict, the more 
inaccurate the forecasts seem to get. To add value to management decision 
making, forecasting requires the driving elements that define the business 
environment to be continuous, so they can be known with a degree of 
certainty. If these conditions do not exist, then forecasting falls in significance 
and must be fortified or replaced by other techniques or processes. One such 
technique is scenario thinking.
Many modern organisational environments are driven by variables that are 
dynamic and move together in a complex manner. The building of scenarios
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is one technique that has been developed to cope with this complexity. 
Scenarios are different stories about how the future may evolve. One can 
imagine them as postcards that describe business conditions surrounding the 
organization in the future and sent back to you by a future analyst so that you 
can read them now. Not one of these stories will come about exactly. 
Scenarios allow for the possibility that different worlds may evolve while at the 
same time creating space for uncertainty in the future. The Economist, in 
reference to the theories proposed by paleontologist Stephen Gould (The 
Economist, 2002, p. 101), state:
"... the role of accidents in evoiution is more widely appreciated, as asteroid 
collisions and nearby supernovae are recognized as hazards that can wipe 
out whole groups of organisms arbitrarily”
The scenario building process treats the uncertain elements that drive future
conditions in an internally consistent way so that the frontiers of people’s
reality and perception can be expanded and thinking the unthinkable,
understanding the unthinkable and being prepared for the unthinkable
become a sustainable source of competitive advantage (Schoemaker, 1992).
Scenario thinking as a methodology for improving foresight recognizes that 
in dynamic environments the future cannot be known, but it can be 
understood. Traditionally scenario thinking has been referred to as scenario 
planning. There is, however, increasing recognition that the process of 
building scenarios has value that goes beyond that of a mere planning tool for 
improving foresight. For this reason, the term scenario planning has been 
changed increasingly to scenario thinking in the literature (van der Heijden, 
2000), to reflect its role in cognitive processes (Grinyer, 2000; Schoemaker, 
1992) and the importance of individual reasoning techniques in interpreting
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the past, considering the present and perceiving the future. As Pericles said: 
“There is no need to know the future, but to be prepared for the future.” 
Usually, such preparations warrant a significant commitment of resources. 
Hence, any flaws in the chronological perceptual process can lead to their 
major misallocation and concomitant strategic drift.
Scenarios are designed to surprise readers by challenging their 
assumptions about how the world works and altering their mental models. 
Scenario thinking recognizes the paramount role of sense-making in human 
understanding, behavior and action. However, as van der Heijden (van der 
Heijden, 1996, p. 41) points out, “concern about the future is related to lack of 
understanding of past/current experiences.” Understanding past and current 
experiences, whether personal experiences or experiences recorded by 
others, requires an intimate understanding of the senses making processes 
that are used for analysing and learning from them.
Despite the many successes of scenario thinking as a process for 
improving foresight, especially in the medium to long-term, scenario thinking 
failures are beginning to enter into the discourse (Hodgkinson 2002; van der 
Heijden, 2002, July), as is criticism (Economist, 2001, October 13; Hart and 
Rudman, 2000). Scenarios are not a panacea for difficulties in understanding 
the future and, as a receptor, can themselves be vulnerable to missing “weak 
signals” presaging changes to come in noisy organisational environments 
(Hart and Rudman, 2000) and resultant “big miss errors” (Weber, 1996) in 
decision making.
While the reasons for faulty reasoning are numerous and can vary 
depending on context, this doctoral research argues that one significant cause
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of faulty reasoning when generating futures is the analysis and use of 
historical data, and how assumptions, beliefs, experiences, history, ideology, 
myths, stereotypes, and symbols, analysed in hindsight and rooted in the 
past, can distort our ability to understand the future. This is not to suggest 
that one can step out one’s biographical or ontological experience, but it is to 
say that we can be reflective in engaing with these biases. In short, hindsight 
influences foresight.
1.1 Doctoral Research Purpose
The purpose of this doctoral research is to deepen understanding of the
role that hindsight plays in foresight. It draws on and synthesises debates in
history, strategy, and psychology to show that thinking about the future is
linked intimately with thinking about the past. Psychological biases that result
from poor interpretations of past experiences constrain our ability to make
sense of the future. This research proposes that counter-to-factual analysis,
which is a natural, spontaneously occurring cognitive process that involves
asking ‘what if,’ ‘if then’ .and ‘if only’ questions about the past, is a heuristic
that if left untested can lead to faulty reasoning, but if tested, can reduce the
effects of psychological biases generated through hindsight and influencing
foresight. Enhancing foresight, it is argued, requires a robust understanding
of the role played by hindsight and the ensuing biases that arise from faulty
interpretations of the past.
1.2 Doctoral Research Question and Assumption
Constructing a research problem involves the elaboration of a problematic
or question. It is a question that expresses a knowledge project (Allard-Poesi
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and Maréchal, 1999, p. 33; Thietart et al., 1999). This doctoral research 
seeks to answer the question: What role does hindsight play in foresight? The 
research question rests on the assumption that hindsight does play a role in 
foresight, but what role that is, is not very well understood.
The research question resulted from an M.Litt dissertation on scenario 
planning. When reviewing the literature on scenario planning specifically, and 
foresight and strategy more generally, it became apparent that there is little 
written on the role of hindsight in foresight. There are some fleeting 
references to research in psychology and neurophisiology, such as Ingvar 
(Ingvar, 1985) Argyris (Argyris, 1982), and Kahneman and Tversky (1982) to 
theoretically underpin lines of argument, and references to various biases that 
affect foresight (e.g. in Van der Heijden, 2002; Makridakis, 1998; 
Schoemaker, 1995), but the larger corpus of this research has not been 
written into strategy In any substantive way. This view reonates with 
Mintzberg et a/.’s (1998) observation that strategic management has not 
gained sufficiently from insights generated from psychology research.
In a similar vein, Chia (2002, May) argues that a better understanding of 
the workings of the strategic mind and the level of foresight associated with it, 
and in particular, a better understanding of the sense-making experience is 
required to improve foresight. It is, however, important to differentiate 
between the impact of cognition on scenario thinking and strategic formulation 
and the cognitive experience itself. Academic literature on the former 
abounds (Schwenk, 1984; Barnes, 1984; Porac et al., 1989; Stubert, 1989; 
Thomas et al., 1993; Grinyer, 1992; Von Krogh et al., 1994; Schwenk, 1995; 
Hodgkinson, 1997; Huff, 1997; Eden and Ackermann, 1998b; Rindova, 1999;
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Das, 1999; Grinyer, 2000; Mir, 2000), but there has been far less research on 
the latter.
The nature of this research question raises several other sub-questions. 
They include: How do biases influence foresight? Can counterfactual 
reasoning be used as an antidote to biases generated in hindsight? Can 
research in psychology and debates in history add explanatory value to 
strategy literature? How can the role of hindsight be made explicit in scenario 
thinking and building methodologies?
1.3 Doctoral Thesis Structure
This dissertation begins, in Chapter Two, with a brief history and literature
review of strategic thought. It begins with Caesar's Gallic Wars (1996)
through to Von Clausewitz's On War (1997) to contemporary, business
oriented conceptions of strategy beginning with Selznkick (1957), Chandler
(1962), and Ansoff (1965), emphasising differences between strategic schools
that have emerged. The chapter then reviews the rise and fall and rise again
of strategic planning (Whittington, 2001; Mintzberg, 1994a; Mintzberg, 1994b)
and concludes that for strategic planning to be successful in dynamic
environments, it is the adaptive processes, informal thinking and learning that
will add value to strategic thought (Mintzberg, 1994b; Senge, 1990; Senge,
1990; De Geus, 1997; De Geus, 1988).
Chapter Three reviews seminal work in the strategic learning literature.
From the Darwinian (1860) roots of the natural selection perspective
(McKelvey, 1983), to incremental learning (Johnson, 1988; Quinn, 1978;
Lindblom, 1959), to the assumptions, beliefs, experiences, cultural nuances,
and politics (Pettigrew, 1977) that affect shared paradigms (Sheldon, 1980),
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managerial recipes (Grinyer, 1979a) and dominant logics (Prahalad, 1986) in 
organisational learning, and result in bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), the 
chapter extracts key insights that pertain to the role of hindsight in foresight 
from the literature. The chapter concludes that there is sufficient consensus 
within the literature to build a model of how hindsight influences foresight, but 
there is little analytical depth to how history is used in strategic formulation.
Turning to psychology, Chapter Four begins by touching on part of the 
legacy of Freud (1905) and Jung (1994) on individual and collective learning. 
One can infer from their theories that there are various biases that will 
influence perceptions about the world, and ultimately prescience. Two biases 
in particular, the hindsight bias (Carll, 1999; Sherman and McConnell, 1995; 
Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; 
Fischhoff, 1975) and creeping determinism (Fischhoff, 1975; Florovsky, 1969), 
are focused on. A conceptual framework illustrating foresightful thinking flaws 
is developed, and experimental attempts by psychologists to control for them 
are reviewed.
Chapter Five introduces counterfactual reasoning, or the asking 'what ifs,' 
‘if thens,’ and ‘if onlys' as a learning heuristic for past experiences and future 
strategies. The chapter reviews research in psychology that suggests that 
spontaneous counterfactual generation is a simulation heuristic that affects a 
range of judgments (Miller et al., 1990; Gleicher et al., 1990, June) and has 
been shown to serve a preparative function for the future (Roese, 1994; 
Markman et al., 1993; Taylor and Schneider, 1989; Wells et al., 1987). 
However, counterfactual reasoning also has some dysfunctional implications
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for the role of hindsight in foresight (Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Dunning 
and Madey, 1995; Kruglanski and Freund, 1983), which are discussed.
Counterfactual reasoning has been found by psychologists to be a 
pervasive cognitive function (Roese and Olson, 1995b; Miller et al., 1990; 
Gleicher ef a/., 1990, June; Wells etal., 1987; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). 
In historiography, however, mainstream historians have criticized applying 
counterfactual analysis to historical events (e.g. Carr, 1961/1990; Thompson, 
1978; Croce, 1966). Advocates of applying counterfactual analysis to 
historical events in both history and the social sciences counter by arguing 
that counterfactuals, often implicitly, are frequently used to justify certain lines 
of argument and policy decisions (Lebow, 2000b; Breslauer, 1996; Herrmann, 
1996).
Chapter Six reviews the debates engulfing the use of counterfactual 
analysis as a scholastic tool, and concludes that, as an intervening tool for 
challenging path-dependencies (Booth, 2003), and de-biasing perceptions of 
the past (Hawkins, 1990; Fischhoff, 1982b), to learn for the future, a 
disciplined application of counterfactual analysis is an effective technique for 
foresightful hindsight.
Chapter Seven begins by introducing the metaphor of ‘causal fields’ 
(Einhorn, 1986; Mackie, 1965) as a diagnostic technique for assessing the 
causal relevance of causes and conditions that lead to outcomes, and for 
assessing alternative explanations for events. The chapter draws on 
interviews collected from twelve leading historians (Seaton, 2003, February 
19), who were asked to assess the usefulness of applying historical ‘what ifs’ 
to the recent conflict (2003) in Iraq. The chapter then uses Ingvar’s theories
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(1985) to develop a conceptual framework for the linkages between 
counterfactual reasoning into the past, and scenario thinking into the future. 
Finally, the chapter synthesizes the use of counterfactual reasoning as a de­
biasing technique for foresightui thinking flaws, and concludes that 
counterfactual reasoning can have dysfunctional implications for foresight 
(Roese and Olson, 1995b; Sherman and McConnell, 1995), however, if 
governed by academic rigor, can be an effective tool for improving the quality 
of hindsight, and by extension, foresight.
The thesis concludes in the final chapter by arguing that hindsight is 
intricately entwined with foresight. The reasoning processes that are used to 
analyse the past are also used to make sense of the future. Humans are 
natural scenario thinkers, whether that thinking involves the past, present or 
future. Learning heuristics, such as counterfactual reasoning, are pervasive 
parts of people's socio-cognitive functioning, and if left unregulated and 
spontaneous, can result in biases that constrain perceptions of the future by 
triggering biases. If regulated and applied in an elaborative way, however, 
they can be an effective tool for challenging foresightful thinking flaws and 
improving scenario thinking. Critics of counterfactual reasoning, in both 
history and the social sciences, miss the mark; ‘what if history is the norm, not 
the exception.
1.31 Doctoral Thesis Overview
Exhibit 1.0 visually maps out the doctoral thesis, beginning with chapter 
two and ending with chapter nine, the conclusion.
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1.32 Doctoral Thesis Map
The doctoral thesis can be conceptualised as a map, with each chapter in 
the dissertation representing a further step towards the final destination. Each 
step builds on the previous one, adding to the thrust of the argument (exhibit 
1 .1).
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The thesis is structured so that chapters two and three provide a general 
overview of strategic management literature, focusing specifically on strategy 
and strategic learning. These two chapters set the context for the thesis. 
Chapter four argues that there are certain hindsight biases that can constrain 
strategic thinking and approaches to strategic formulation and implementation, 
which haven’t been sufficiently explored in the literature. Chapters five and 
six review debates on counterfactual reasoning, a hindsight heuristic, in 
psychology and historiography, which has been proposed as a de-biasing 
cognitive technique. Chapters four through six comprise the content of the 
thesis. Chapter seven discusses and synthesises counterfactual reasoning 
processes within the context of strategic management, and chapter eight 
presents the conclusions of the thesis and research outputs.
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1.4 Doctoral Research Methodology
Strategic management Ph.D.s are generally about operationalising a
theoretical position and contributing to an external debate. Doctoral theses of
this nature are generally hermetically sealed in a particular canon of
knowledge. This thesis differs in this regard. What it seeks to do is to write
research generated in psychology and debates over the legitimacy of
counterfactual analysis in historiography into strategic management.
Consequently, it does not operationalise theoretical concepts around a
traditional empirical study to contribute to external debates, but extends the
strategic management domain by writing in two literatures from external
domains to explain phenomena in the rubric of strategic management. As
such, and within the tradition of strategic management, this dissertation draws
on a range of disciplines to give clarity to the argument.
One caveat to this dissertation is that it does not attempt to be a tour de
force of strategy literature. In spite of this, and although it draws on research
from history, political theory, psychology, and strategic management, it is in
the context of a strategy thesis.
1.41 Rationale
This dissertation is a theoretical one. It has used a qualitative as opposed 
to a quantitative research methodology. By the term “qualitative 
methodology", it takes the same meaning used by Strauss and Corbin (1998). 
Qualitative research as described by Strauss and Corbin is:
“Research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or 
other quantification. It can refer to research about person’s lives, lived 
experiences, behaviors, emotions, and feelings as well as about
::
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organizational functioning, social movements, cultural phenomena, and 
interactions between nations” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp. 11-12).
Strauss and Corbin argue that there are many valid reasons for doing
qualitative research, which depend on the orientation of the researcher; some
researchers are more temperamentally suited to conducting this sort of
research. A more valid reason for choosing qualitative methods they contend
is the nature of the research problem (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
The research problem of this dissertation is what role hindsight plays in 
foresight and can foresight generally, and scenario thinking in particular, be 
improved by making hindsight explicit? While the literature on hindsight and 
counterfactual reasoning is voluminous, little attention has been given to the 
role that hindsight and bias play in foresight and scenario thinking 
methodologies.
While there are many different types or approaches to doing qualitative 
research (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Morse and Field, 1995; Cassell and 
Symon, 1994; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Gubrium and Sankar, 1994; 
Westbrook, 1994; Gilgun et al., 1992), the nature of this research problem 
requires a hybrid between a qualitative approach using exploratory research 
in the form of an initial citation search and a documentary analysis, and an 
adaptation of the grounded theoretic approach first developed by sociologists 
Glaser and Strauss (Glaser, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; Glaser, 
1992).
1.42 Research Instruments
Exploratory research is discovery-oriented and is useful when there is little 
information in an area or the research question is vague (Hair et al., 2003). It
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is used for creating better understanding (Hair et a i, 2003) and has been 
successfully used in innovative industries by firms as diverse as Dupont, IBM, 
Microsoft and Siemens to identify new technologies (Teresko, 1997). Given 
the broad scope of the research question and the lack of literature on 
hindsight and counterfactual reasoning within strategic management, an 
exploratory approach is more suitable than descriptive research in the form of 
cross-sectional or longitudinal studies.
1.43 Citation Search and Literature Review
The first methodological step in this dissertation was to conduct three 
citation searches and literature reviews in three fields. The first citation 
search and review focuses on the seminal works in strategic management 
generally and in strategic learning more specifically. The seminal works were 
identified through an initial citation search using published histories of 
strategic management, including Whittington (2001), Mintzberg et al. (1998), 
Mintzberg (1994a) and McKlernan (1996a, 1996b). This citation search and 
review allows for a number of key insights to be extracted and gaps identified 
in the literature in relation to the role that hindsight plays in foresight.
The second citation search in this dissertation was to search for published 
research on counterfactual reasoning in credible (peer refereed) psychology 
journals between 1982 and 2000. To ensure the credibility of the data, the 
initial citation search and subsequent documentary analysis of the published 
research relies solely on studies published in refereed journals in psychology. 
The journals include:
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/  Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
/  Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
/  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
/  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
/  Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology
/  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition.
Moreover, the secondary data used from psychology, especially in book form, 
is from literature by well-cited, recognized academic researchers, published in 
the latter refereed journals. As the citation search and analysis and synthesis 
of documentary data is fairly thorough, and each study within the field builds 
on earlier studies, the problem of interpretation is not relevant to this study.
The third citation search consisted of searching published works in history 
and the social sciences for debates on the validity of using counterfactual 
history.
1.44 Documentary Analysis
The second methodological step was to conduct a documentary analysis of 
research and literature generated from the citation search. Documentary 
analysis as an exploratory research method has both disadvantages and 
advantages. The disadvantages, as highlighted by Denscombe (1998) 
include:
Credibility of the source. Researchers need to evaluate the authority of the source 
and the procedures used to produce the original data in order to gauge the credibility 
of the documents.
Secondary data. When researchers use documents as a source of data, they 
generally rely on something which has been produced for other purposes and not for 
the specific aims of the investigation.
Social constructions. Documents can owe more to the interpretations of those who 
produce them than to an objective picture of reality. (Denscombe, 1998, p. 170)
The advantages of documentary analysis, according to Denscombe (1998),
are the following:
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❖ Access to data. Vast amounts of information are held in documents. Depending on 
the nature of the documents, most researchers wilt find access to the sources 
relatively easy and inexpensive.
❖ Cost-effective. Documentary research provides a cost-effective method of getting 
data, particularly large-scale data such as those provided by official statistics.
❖ Permanence of data. Documents generally provide a source of data which is 
permanent and available in a form that can be checked by others. The data are open 
to public scrutiny (Denscombe, 1998, p. 169).
For the purpose of this doctoral research, the advantages of relying on a
documentary analysis outweigh the disadvantages. Vast amounts of relatively
untapped studies, held in psychology journals, are easily accessible and
inexpensive. It has thus been a cost-effective method of getting large-scale
data that has not filtered into the strategic management literature. Finally, this
data is permanent and can be scrutinized for anyone wishing to draw his or
her own conclusions or critique this work.
1.45 Grounded Theoretical “Hybrid’'Approach
The grounded theoretical approach is an approach where theory emerges 
from data that ‘has been systematically gathered and analysed through the 
research process’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 12). Researchers do not 
begin by projecting preconceived theories in their mind. The theory emerges 
from the data. As Strauss and Corbin argue:
“Grounded theories, because they are drawn from the data, are likely to offer 
Insight, enhance understanding, and provide a meaningful guide to action” 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
Of course, as research by Argyris (1982) suggests, people always bring 
concepts and theories to the table, which calls into question the premise 
proffered by Strauss and Corbin that theories can emerge from data 
unencumbered by preconceived conceptions. However, this criticism does
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not diminish the usefulness of grounding theory in data and letting theories 
emerge naturally, which is a primary feature of this method (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998).
Strauss and Corbin (1998), and Sandelowski (1995) argue that creativity of 
researchers is also an important ingredient in the grounded theory approach. 
While the grounded theoretic approach is normally used in empirical studies, it 
is adapted to be used in conjunction with the exploratory, documentary 
analysis approach already outlined for the purposes of this doctoral research. 
In other words, in addressing the research question: “What role does hindsight 
play in foresight,” the concepts have emerged from investigating and 
analysing three literatures in three disciplines and synthesising key insights.
1.46 Approaches to Understanding Reality
According to Allard-Poesi and Maréchal (1999), the construction of a 
research question or knowledge goal rests on certain epistemological 
assumptions. The research question will thus differ depending on whether the 
researcher takes a constructionist, interpretativist, or positivist view of reality.
Constructivist research approaches assume that the mind creates 
knowledge and reality (Allard-Poesi and Maréchal, 1999) and observation is 
dependent on the researcher and is thus subjective (Segal, 1986). 
Interpretativist research approaches adopt a phenomonological hypothesis 
(Hudson and Ozanne, 1988), where reality is ‘essentially mental and 
perceived.’ The research problem is not guided by a research goal, as it is 
with a positivist approach, but seeks to understand reality from the 
perspective of those being studied (Allard-Poesi and Maréchal, 1999, p. 38).
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A positivist research approach adopts an ontological hypothesis and assumes 
that reality is independent of individual perceptions and is governed by laws 
and rules (Allard-Poesi and Maréchal, 1999; Kerlinger, 1973). Researchers 
will base their research question on discontinuities between facts and theories 
(Landry, 1995) or on an identifiable inadequacy in an existing theory (Allard- 
Poesi and Maréchal, 1999).
Unlike the constructionist and interpretevist approaches and similar to the 
positivist approach, this doctoral research question did not emerge from the 
data, but was stated from the outset. While the doctoral researcher takes the 
perspective that reality is knowable, as positivist views of reality do, it also 
acknowledges that when dealing with human behaviour and understanding 
the ‘mind of the strategist,' one must also accept that people will interpret data 
based on intentions, motives, culturally shared meanings and the context in 
which reality is interpreted, to better understand, in this case, the role of 
hindsight in foresight. One must also acknowledge that reality, within the 
constructivist tradition, is moulded to fit deliberate acts by individuals and can 
be expressed through language and symbol systems (Schwandt, 1994).
In a sense, the on-going debate within strategic management concerning 
whether environments are perceptual (interpretivist) or objective (positivist) 
phenomena also reflects this view. Child (1972), who emphasises strategic 
choice within environments, and Aldrich (1979), who views the environment, 
in the Darwinian tradition, as ruthlessly efficient at naturally selecting those 
organizations that will survive and those that will become extinct, both 
approach the environment as an objective “external" entity.
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Scholars such as Simon (1957) argue that a strategist whose perceptions 
are bounded by imperfect information perceives the environment, but not 
always accurately. The distinction between the ‘objective,’ knowable 
environment and the ‘perceived’ environment thus rests with the strategist and 
whether they have the ability to receive and process all necessary information 
about the environment, as classical notions of perfect rationality suggest, or 
whether the strategist is constrained by imperfect information and bounded 
rationality.
A third view, drawing on interpretivist notions of understanding an 
environment through patterns and processes of activity, but in substance 
closely resembling constructionist approaches to understanding reality, is that 
of an environment that is enacted by the interaction of organized actors and 
processes of social construction. This perspective, heavily influenced by 
cognitive social psychology, interpretive sociology and the sociology of 
knowledge proffers that organization and environment are created, or 
‘enacted, together (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985). As Smircich and Stubbart 
state:
“From an interpretive worldview, separate objective ‘environments’ simply do 
not exist. Instead, organizations and environments are convenient labels for 
patterns of activity. What people refer to as their environment is generated 
by human actions and accompanying inteliectuai efforts to make sense out of 
these actions" (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985, p. 727).
Consequently, there is a continuous pattern of ‘interacts’ (Weick, 1979) -  
action and reaction -  which, as Gidden’s (1984) emphasises, creates both the 
organisation and environment reflexively. However, when the assumptions 
generated through these processes go untested, they can lead to ‘collective
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ignorance (Weick, 1979). As such, people must first change themselves if 
they wish to change their environment. As Weick argues:
“If people want to change their environment, they need to change themselves 
and their actions -  not someone eise ... Problems that never get solved, 
never get solved because managers keep tinkering with everything but what 
they do" (Weick, 1979, p. 152).
Immanent to cognitive approaches to strategy is a corresponding positivist 
view of reality. However, this dissertation leans more towards the 
constructionist view of reality and adopts an exploratory methodological 
approach to achieving the research objective. This dissertation also 
professes that to know reality in the constructionist tradition, one must also 
acknowledge that to a large extent the demarcations drawn between 
approaches to understanding reality (and environments) are often false 
dichotomies because the three approaches are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and approaches to understanding reality will often draw on all three 
perspectives.
The epistemological foundations of cognitive approaches to strategy are 
underpinned by a corresponding view of reality and idioms such as bias, 
correction and reality. Yet this raises the question of how such a paradigmatic 
stance can be juxtaposed with a more constructionist position on 
counterfactuals? Such a question drives at the heart of a debate around 
paradigm incommensurability that has its genesis in Burrell and Morgan 
(1979). Their work identified four paradigms, each hermetically coherent but 
containing different assumption about knowledge and concomitant research 
assumptions and methodologies. The corollary of their argument is that a 
state of incommensurability exists between different paradigms. Such an 
understanding would problematize notions of trying to fuse cognitivism with
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constructionism. That said, within the history of the paradigmatic debate 
some writers e.g. Hassard (1991) have argued that there are analytical 
opening between different paradigms. This was his major finding from his 
study of the British fire service where he conducted four research projects, 
each using a different paradigm. Hassard’s optimism regarding the capacity 
to work with different paradigms has been challenged by Tsoukis (1993), for 
whom research paradigms go to the core of what a researcher believes about 
the world and he expresses Hassard’s view of the world as akin to changing a 
shirt. So what conclusions can we draw from the paradigmatic disputes 
embodied in the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), Hassard (1991) and 
Tsoukis (1993)? While it is important to be wary of the links between different 
paradigms, it is nonetheless important when trying to make a contribution to 
knowledge to entertain the possibility that it is possible to draw selectively 
from different paradigms. This is the position adopted in this thesis where 
literatures from constructionist counterfactual history and reality cognitive 
approaches are combined and written into strategy.
1.47 Methodological Summary
A qualitative methodological approach can be used for exploring 
substantive areas, either unknown or known, to gain novel understandings 
(Stern, 1980). Qualitative methodologies can be used to extract and learn 
about intricate details about such phenomena as thought processes, emotions 
and feeling that conventional research methods would have more difficulty 
eliciting (Strauss, 1998, p. 12). Furthermore, as Neuman asserts, qualitative 
data can accommodate interactive research processes (Neuman, 1997) such
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as the grounded theory approach through documentary analysis. As Strauss 
and Corbin state: “Analysis is the interplay between researchers and data” 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 13). Qualitative data, unlike quantitative data, is 
intrinsically meaningful and more apt at developing social constructions and 
cultural meanings, especially when they involve explicit values (Neuman, 
1997) and implicit processes. However, it is incumbent on the researcher to 
articulate a clear analysis of the data for the purpose of making a credible 
argument (Eisenhardt, 1989). This requires the study to be structured in such 
a way that it is authentic, convincing and plausible to the reader (Golden- 
Biddle and Locke, 1993).
Given the nature of the thesis, its authenticity, conviction and plausibility 
necessitates that the citation searches and documentary analysis reflect 
mainstream debates in historiography and psychology. The thesis must 
convey that these are live debates.
Theoretical exploration consists of linking two or more theoretical fields that 
have not been previously connected in the literature before. The disciplines 
cannot be totally circumscribed by the researcher, but only a limited area of 
the field that is most relevant to the research question can be focussed on 
(Charreire, 1999). Citation analysis pointed the researcher towards these 
debates, which were reviewed, analysed, and written into strategic 
management discourse.
The research does not use an inductive (generating universal laws and 
theories from observable facts) or a deductive (offering explanations and 
predictions from universal laws and theories) approach in the traditional
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sense, but a hypthetico-deductive process, which begins with reviewing 
conceptualisations in psychology and history, and using these 
conceptualisations to proffer explanations, in this case, in strategic 
management (Chalmers, 1976).
1.5 Chapter Conclusion
At different points in this thesis views from positivistic psychology to 
constructionist history are marshalled to explore the phenomena of 
counterfactual reasoning. In psychology this phenomena has become a 
signature domain of inquiry, but in history it is treated with suspicion. Indeed, 
mainstream historians have traditionally rejected counterfactual reasoning as 
an analytical technique for understanding hindsight (Thompson, 1978; Croce, 
1966; Carr, 1961/1990).
The illegitimacy of counterfactual reasoning within historiography, however, 
is now being challenged (Lebow, 2000b; Cowley, 1999; Ferguson, 1997; 
Breslauer, 1996; Hawthorn, 1991). Developments in psychology research 
(Roese and Olson, 1995b; Miller et al., 1990; Gleicher, 1990; Wells, 1987; 
Kahneman, 1982), when combined with debates in history, help to illuminate 
the role of hindsight in foresight, and how reasoning into the past influences 
reasoning into the future. Thus, current thinking in psychology demonstrates 
that hindsight is not 20/20, and as such, has to be rigorously tested to improve 
strategic thinking and decision-making.
This thesis will successfully achieve its objectives if it brings concepts and 
sensibilities in history and psychology in particular, as well as in
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neurophysiology and political theory to bear on strategic management thinking 
and literature.
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?W/ Si>tctte^
“He uses statistics as a drunken man uses lamp-posts -  for support rather than
Illumination.”
~ Andrew Lang, 1844-1912
“For every complex problem there Is a simple solution that Is wrong.”
~ George Bernard Shaw, 1856-1959
“One has to be prepared for every eventuality.”
~  Einstein, 1918
“While Napoleon thought he was In control of events, the Russian general Kutuzov 
knew that neither of them were, and so made fewer mistakes.”
~ Tolstoy, 1828 -  1910
2.0 Chapter Introduction
Strategy is a ‘youthful discipline’ (McKlernan, 1997). As such, there is little
consensus about strategy within the field (Whittington, 2001, p.2). As the
Economist argues:
“The consultants and theorists jostling to advise businesses cannot even 
agree on the most basic of all questions: What precisely Is a corporate 
strategy” (Economist, 1993, p. 106).
Despite the lack of consensus about what strategy is, there has been a great
deal of literature dedicated to it, much of it generated from research studies
over the past 40 years (McKiernan, 1997). Several strategy thinkers have
made attempts to partition this research into schools of thought (Whittington,
2001; Mintzberg et al. 1998; McKiernan, 1997; McKiernan, 1996; van der
Heijden, 1996, Mintzberg, 1994). The reason for distilling strategy thinking
down into schools of thought is that to comprehend strategy as a whole, its
parts must first be understood (Mintzberg et al., 1998). Breaking strategy
down into its parts also helps one to understand its roots, and its choice of
future directions (McKiernan, 1997).
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2.1 Chapter Purpose and Contribution
The purpose of this chapter is to map out the historical evolution of 
contemporary strategic thought and to critique the various schools on the 
basis of their treatment of foresight in the context of environmental 
uncertainty. Writing in 1916, Fayol recognized that:
“The Maxim, ‘Managing means looking ahead,’ gives some Idea of the 
Importance attached to planning In the business world, and It Is true that If 
foresight Is not the whole of management at least It Is an essential part of It"
(Fayol, 1916/1949, p. 43).
And Loasby argues that:
"The first reason for looking at the future In a systematic way Is to understand 
the future implications of present decisions [and also] the present 
Implications of future events" (Loasby, 1967, p. 301).
Indeed, there is a prevailing assumption that strategic thinking and planning 
“denotes thinking about the future" (Bolan, 1974, p. 15). As Mintzberg et al. 
(1998) conclude: "Almost everyone would agree that strategic thinking means 
seeing ahead,” but they also acknowledge that:
“You cannot see ahead unless you can see behind, because any good vision 
of the future has to be rooted In an understanding of the past" (Mintzberg et 
al., 1998, p. 126).
This chapter sets the larger context for the rest of this dissertation (exhibit 
2 .0).
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By analyzing the historical evolution of strategic management, assessing how 
the assorted ‘schools’ of strategy approach the future, and identifying a future 
direction for strategic management, the following chapters then have a 
foundation to add its own contribution to, paraphrasing McKiernan’s (1997) 
metaphor, helping this ‘youthful discipline’ to ‘mature from adolescence to 
adulthood.’
2.2 Chapter Structure
This chapter begins by reviewing the historical evolution of strategy
thought, beginning over 2000 years ago with Caesar (1996), Thucydides
(1972), and Sun Tzu (2002), and continuing through to 20^ century
conceptions of strategic thinking in a commercial context. It focuses on
strategy perspectives that have emerged since 1957, beginning with Selznick
(1957), Chandler (1962), and Ansoff (1965) through to the present, and
emphasizes the differences between these perspectives.
Chapter Two: A Brief History of Strategy Thought
Counterfactual Reasoning in Strategy Context 28
Strategic planning has had its successes and its failures (Whittington, 
2001; Mintzberg, 1994a; Mintzberg, 1994b). The subsequent section looks at 
the reasons for the rise and fall and rise again of strategic planning within 
organizations. The ensuing section critiques the usefulness of classifying 
streams of strategy thought into schools/perspectives and offers two areas of 
future research. The chapter concludes by arguing that, in a highly dynamic 
environment where the future is uncertain, value will be added to strategic 
formulation and implementation by developing better learning heuristics for 
improving foresight.
2.3 In the beginning ...
Strategy is a field of human inquiry that finds its scholastic genesis in such 
early literary classics as Julius Caesar's Gallic Wars, Thucydides' 
Pelopponesian War and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. Tzu, writing 2,400 years 
ago, even makes a reference, loosely translated, to a ‘Director of Strategic 
Planning’. In his strategy manual, he outlines a strategic vision of conflict as 
being interwoven with human life, and as such, he proffers, we must learn to 
work with this conflict by using knowledge, self-knowledge in particular, and 
by bringing conflicting views around to a larger perspective. He defines 
strategy as “the means by which all actions are coordinated and all resources 
allocated” (Tzu, 2002, p. 104) and he goes on to teach that strategy is as 
much about the mind as the physical conditions of warfare: “This is as much a 
matter of mind as it is of the physical conditions of warfare” (Tzu, 2002, p. 
104). Even in these ancient times, complexity and uncertainty were 
characteristics of operating environments, and specifically, of battle fields. 
Tzu recognizes this when he says: “In this complex and essentially
Chapter Two: A Brief History of Strategy Thought ^
Counterfactual Reasoning in Strategy Context 29
uncontrollable world, the ultimate outcome of present actions is not 
predictable” (Tzu, 2002, p. 104).
Like so many classics, the teachings of Tzu still find resonance today.
Perhaps this is because, as another master strategist, general and chronicler
of ancient wars, Thucydides, writing 400 years before the Common Era
states: “My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an
immediate public, but was done to last for ever” (p. I, 22). Thucydides, an
Athenian, had first come to the office of strategos, or general, before taking up
the pen to chronicle the civil war between Sparta and Athens. He did so for
the expressed, and somewhat cynical purpose of dispelling myth and romantic
notions about the war and, as humans are prone to repeating their mistakes to
clearly understand the events of the past:
“And it may well be that my history will seem less easy to read because of 
the absence in it of a romantic element (to mythodes). It will be enough for 
me, however, If these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to 
understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human 
nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same 
ways, be repeated in the future" (Thucydides, 1972, p I, 22).
Caesar, too, in his record of the Gallic War, published in the twilight of the 
Roman Republic and on the eve of civil war, 50 years before the birth of 
Christ, has left a lasting legacy in terms of leadership (both Frederick the 
Great of Prussia and Napoleon compared themselves to Caesar), 
organization (the ruthless efficiency and execution of the Roman Legions), the 
pursuit of power and wealth (Caesar, 1996). As the French essayist, 
Montaigne writes:
“Caesar, in my opinion, deserves particular study, not only for the knowledge 
of history, but for himself too ... I read him with rather more reverence and 
respect than one feels in reading other human works" (Montaigne, 1936,
2 .10).
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Tolstoy, writing in the 19^ century, in his chronicling of Russia and the 
Napoleonic Wars refers to the ‘new science of strategy' (Tolstoy, 1978), not so 
much ‘new’ as a field of human inquiry, as we've seen with such strategy 
classics as Tzu, Thucydides and Caesar, but perhaps new as a defined 
discipline of study. Von Clausewitz, the 19^ century Prussian soldier and 
writer, also turned his attention to the importance of strategy for the military 
when he writes:
“Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war” (von 
Clauswitz, 1997, p. 142). Like Sun Tzu, von Clauswitz argues that strategy 
must be concerned with the ‘whole’ of military action, “which must be in 
accordance with the object of the war” (von Clauswitz, 1997, p. 142). To von 
Clauswitz, plans are formed from strategy, and strategy is not something that 
can be generated in an ivory tower, or in this case, with cabinets, removed 
from the battlefields, but in the tents of the army who are near the front lines.
In the 20^ century, the concept of strategy proliferated into commercial life 
with the publishing of such contemporary strategy literary classics by writers 
such as Selznick who introduced the notion of “distinctive competence” and 
reconciling a firm’s “external expectations” and “internal state” (Selznick, 
1957, p. 42-74), Chandler who wrote on the relationship between an 
organization’s structure and business strategy (Chandler, 1962), and Ansoff 
(1965) who links his concept of strategy directly with academic economics and 
military practice (Whittington, 2001, P. 13). Selznick, Chandler and Ansoff 
were not, however, the first to apply the concept of strategy to business. 
Bracker traces the link between business practice and the military to classical 
times, when Socrates consoled the Greek soldier Nichomachides, who had
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been defeated by a ‘mere businessman’ in an election to the position of 
general (Bracker, 1980, p.219). As Whittington says:
“Scocrates explained to Nichoomachides that the duties of a general and 
businessman were equivalent: both Involve planning the use of one’s 
resources in order to meet objectives” (Whittington, 2001).
The roots of the actual word strategy can be found in the ancient Athenian 
position of strategos. After leading a popular revolution against an oligarchy 
supported by the Spartans (508-7 BC), the Kleisthenes established a new 
sociopolitical structure in Athens, comprising of 10 tribal divisions, which acted 
as both a political and military subunit of Athens. Each tribe elected a leader 
known as a strategos, and the 10 strategio collectively formed the Athenian 
war council. Strategos is thus a compound of stratos, meaning an ‘encamped 
army spread out over the ground’ and agein, which means ‘to lead’ (Bracker, 
1980), (Cummings, 1993). The concept of strategy for the ancient Greeks can 
best be summarized by the oft-quoted maxims of the great strategoi Pericles, 
“Opportunity waits for no man” and “to limit risk while holding fast to essential 
points and principles” (Cummings, 1993).
Throughout the latter half of the 20^ century, scholarly activity in the field of 
strategy, as a concept for business, has evolved and diversified as the 
complexity of the strategic process and the various elements that that process 
consists of have increased. For the purposes of analysis and synthesis, 
strategic thought has been broken down into taxonomies, which have evolved 
into “schools of strategy.”
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2.31 The Design and Planning Schools
The “design” and “planning” schools of strategy were both established as 
parallel developments in the 1960s (Mintzberg, 1998; McKiernan, 1997). 
These schools represent the beginnings of a coherent discipline in strategy 
(Whittington, 2001). As Spender argues:
“Prior to the 1930s, there seemed to be little difference between theories of
organizations, their management and their strategies" (Spender, 1993).
Both schools take a classical approach to strategy formulation and 
implementation, which emphasizes rational analysis, specialization, control 
planning and commitment to profit maximization (Whittington, 2001), and both 
schools prescribe the ‘proper’ ways of going about strategy formulation 
(Mintzberg, 1994). The original conceptions of Selznick (1957), Chandler 
(1962), and Ansoff (1965) are classical in that they resonate with expectations 
of implementation through a hierarchical command, which are rooted in a 
militaristic tradition that, some argue, can be traced back to the ideals of 
ancient Greece, and economistic ideas about rational expectations in strategy 
formulation, which is informed by 18^ century Scotland. The idea of a ‘heroic 
yet slightly isolated figure of a general, from Alexander to Rommel, presiding 
at the top of a rigid hierarchy and using their individual genius to achieve 
victory’ features prominently in classical thinking (Whittington, 2001, p. 13), 
Contemporary classical thinking also builds on the contributions of such 18 '^ 
century writers as Arkwright, Owen, Stuart and Smith that included the 
integration of specialized occupations within the organization and mechanized 
approaches, which in classical times, has also been known to the Sumerians, 
Egyptians, Hebrews and Chinese (McKiernan, 1996; McKiernan, 1997).
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The design school attempts to achieve a fit between internal capabilities 
and external opportunities (Mintzberg etal., 1998, p. 24). Selznick (1957) and 
Chandler (1962) are credited with being instrumental in inspiring this stream of 
strategy thought (Whittington, 2001; Mintzberg etal., 1998; McKiernan, 1996). 
Selznick in particular advanced the notion of “distinctive competence” which 
Andrews would further cultivate in the Harvard casebook authored by 
Andrews, with minor contributions by Learned, Christensen, and Guth (1965) 
(McKiernan, 1996, p. xvi). Barnard (1938), the original pioneer of the idea that 
there must be an organizational “fit” between the firm and the operating 
environment, influenced Andrews, who viewed each organization as unique 
with its own capabilities, set of current policies, personality and history (Porter, 
1991, p. 199), and who was one of the principle writers of the text material.
The design school has had a lasting influence on the evolution of strategy 
as a discipline and it has provided the foundation for other strategic “schools” 
that have emerged since the 1960s. Indeed, the design school, which views 
the formation of strategy as an informal conception or design, and provides a 
loose conceptual framework for analyzing the political, economic, social and 
technological factors (PEST) that form the underlying structure of an industry, 
and linking the analysis of the external environment with the internal state of 
the organization, featured prominently in textbooks in the 1960s and 1970s 
(McKiernan, 1997; Argenti, 1974; Ackoff, 1970; Steiner, 1969). Many of the 
tools that were generated at this time, such as SWOT analysis, which 
identifies the Strengths and Weaknesses of an organization in the context of 
the Opportunities and Threats present in the organization’s operating
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environment, are still widely taught in classrooms around the globe 
(Whittington, 2001). Thus, corporate strategy, according to this school, is:
"The pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals Its 
objectives, purposes, or goals, produces the principal policies and plans for 
achieving those goals, and defines the range of business the company is to 
pursue, the kind of economic and human organization it is or intends to be, 
and the nature of the economic and non-economic contribution it intends to 
make to its shareholders, employees, customers, and communities”
(Andrews, 1971, p. 18).
In 1965, Ansoff published Corporate Strategy. The book was paramount in 
the establishment of the planning school, which relied, and still relies heavily 
on formalized, virtually mechanized processes. The planning school still very 
much fits into the 'classical' approach to strategy formulation, sharing a 
common model with the design school, however, as Learned and Sproat 
emphasize, there are distinct demarcations between the two literatures:
“A distinctive difference between Ansoff and the Harvard group may be found 
in the former’s attempt to routinize -  so far as possible -  the process of 
strategic decision making. This he does by providing rather detailed 
checklists of factors that the strategy maker must consider, plus pointers on 
weighting these factors and on establishing priorities among them, plus 
numerous decision-flow diagrams and choice rules” (Learned and Sproat,
1966, pp. 95-96).
The planning process, epitomized by Ansoffs model of strategic planning, is 
distilled down into precise, formal steps. The process begins by setting 
objectives, analyzing the internal and external environments of the 
organization using formal analysis and empirical research, thus resulting in 
forecasts of the future. It is then cross-referenced and verified using 
checklists and other techniques. From this process a strategy is derived and 
then implemented in the firm (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 49-79). Unlike the 
informality and simplicity of the design school, the planning school developed 
elaborate planning models that could be applied generically to firms. After
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studying ‘scores of planning systems,' for example, Steiner, one of the most 
prolific of the planning school scholars, constructed his own conceptual 
model. He argues:
"I have found the model to be flexible and adaptable to almost any size or 
type of business, style of management, or stage in the development of 
organized formal planning” (Steiner, 1969, p. 31).
Despite the literatures of the design and planning schools sharing the
same basic model, one significant difference is that the planning school
effectively side steps the CEO, the ‘heroic leader’, as the chief architect of
strategy and moves the planner front and center in the process (Mintzberg,
1994, pp. 40). The differences between the two schools are not so much in
the basic premises that underpin the classical approach to strategy
formulation then, but in the approach to formulation and implementation. As
Christensen et ai. emphasizes:
“[My text is not] a how-to-do-it checklist for corporate planners. In fact, it 
virtually ignores the mechanisms of planning on the grounds that, detached 
from strategy, they miss their mark" (Christensen etal., 1982, p. 10).
2.32 The Positioning School
The third “school” of strategy, which, along with the design and planning 
schools also shares classical attributes (Whittington, 2001) and is prescriptive 
in its approach to strategy formulation (Mintzberg, 1994), is the positioning 
school.
The positioning school, which finds its genesis in the econometric brewing 
studies into strategy at Purdue (e.g. Hatten et al., 1978), deductive research 
at the Harvard Business School into diversification patterns e.g. (Wrigley,
1970), and work in the economics department at Harvard, which questioned
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over-simplified neoclassical assumptions about firms and industries 
(McKiernan, 1996b), extrapolates many of the same messages of the 
planning school, but applies it to strategy content rather than the processes 
used to formulate strategy (Mintzberg, 1994). The failure of forecasts and 
other formal techniques and tools used by the planning school during the 
1970s and 1980s, and the over-simplification of the strategic process in the 
design school, led to a great deal of disenchantment with traditional strategic 
frameworks. The watershed year came in 1980 (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 82) 
with the publication of Porter’s book Competitive Strategy (1980).
Porter identifies a firm’s environment as the principal determinant for 
developing competitive strategy. Porter’s notion of strategy is an “outside-in” 
view. First, a firm must assess the five forces in any given industry 
environment (the threat of new entrants, the threat of substitute products, the 
intensity of rivalry among competing firms, the bargaining power of buyers and 
the bargaining power of a firm’s suppliers) (see exhibit 2.1).
Exhibit 2.1 Porter’s Five Forces
Entry B arriers
• Economies of Scale
■ Proprietary product differences
■ Brand identity
• Switching costs
• Capital requirements
• Access to distribution
• Absolute cost advantages
Proprietary learning curve 
Access to necessary inputs 
Proprietary low^wst product design
■ Expected retaliation
R ivalry D eterm inants
• industry growth
• Fixed (or storage) costs/value added
• intermittent overcapacity
• Product differences
• Brand identity
• Switching costs
> Concentration and balance
• Informational complexity
• Diversity of competitors
• Corporate stakes
• Exit barriers
Threat of 
New Entrants
Competitiv 
Rivalry
Bargaining 
Power of 
Suppliers
Bargaining 
Power of 
Buyers
Threat of New 
Substitutes
D eterm inan ts  o f S u p p ly  P ow er
■ Differentiation of inputs
• Switching costs of suppliers and firms 
in the Industry
• Presence of substitute inputs
• Supplier concentration
• Importance of volum e to supplier
•  Cost relative to total purchases in the 
Industry
■ impact o f inputs on cost or differentiation
• Threat of fonvard integration relative to 
threat of backwaid integration by firms in 
the industry
Source: Porter 1985
D eterm inan ts  o f B u ye r P o w e r  
Baiya/ning Leverage Price Sensitivity
• Buyer concentration ■ Price/total purchases
versus firm concentration • Product differences
Buyer volume 
Buyer switching costs 
relative to firm 
switching costs 
Buyer information 
Ability to backward 
integrate 
Substitute products 
Pull-through
• Brand identity
• Impact on quality/
performance
■ Buyer profits
■ Decision makers’
incentives
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Secondly, using generic strategies (cost leadership, cost focus, 
differentiation, differentiation focus), the firm must identify a position in the 
marketplace, which enables the firm to establish a competitive advantage. 
Effectively, rather than having to accept the firm's environment. Porter’s 
positioning framework gives a firm’s management choice within the 
marketplace, rather than having to acquiesce to the whims of the competitive 
environment (McKiernan, 1996b, pp. xii-xv).
As with the other two schools that adopt a classical approach to strategy 
formulation, the positioning school predisposes many of the same principals 
as the design school and the planning school. All three schools approach 
strategy making deliberately. They consciously develop full-blown strategies 
before implementing them (Mintzberg ef a/., 1998). The positioning school is 
particularly influenced by classical economic theories of competitive and 
monopolistic competition. Mason’s paper on the objectives of anti-trust 
policies in the context of how competitive and monopolistic theories impact on 
industry structure and the competitiveness of the firm (Mason, 1949), and 
Bain’s papers on working competition in oligopolies, which advanced notions 
of relationships between buyer concentration, seller concentration, condition 
of entry, and relationships concerning the degree of product differentiation to 
selling costs, profits, and relative efficiency of scale and capacity (Bain, 1950; 
Bain 1951), laid the classical foundations for the positioning school. Caves 
and Porter built on these developments in industrial organization with their 
paper on entry and mobility barriers that deter new competition (Caves, 1977). 
Indeed, Porter is quite open with his allegiance to the classical approach to 
formulation, when, in his introduction to Competitive Strategy, he states:
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"This section draws heavily on work by Andrews, Christensen, and others in
the Policy group at the Harvard Business School (Porter, 1980, p. xvi).
Consequently, it is subject to many of the same criticisms. One can view the 
positioning school’s deliberate, top-down, excessively formal strategy- 
formulation processes as stifling institutional learning (Mintzberg et ai., 1998, 
p. 112) and, as Ghemawat highlights, ignoring the assets and distinctive 
capabilities that can ensure a sustainable competitive advantage (Ghemawat, 
1986). As McKiernan (1996) says: “The roots, trunk and branches are 
absent” (McKiernan, 1996b).
2.33 The Resource-Based View
Where the “design,” “planning,” and “positioning” schools of strategy 
formulation can be broadly described as classical (Whittington, 2001) and 
prescriptive (Mintzberg et al., 1998; Mintzberg, 1994) in their approach to 
strategy formulation, the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, which is an 
‘inside-out’ approach to the marketplace (McKiernan, 1996), is described as 
having a processual (Whittington, 2001) and descriptive (Mintzberg, 1998), 
(Mintzberg, 1994) approach to strategy formulation. The RBV is considered 
processual in the sense that they see long-term planning as being futile due to 
the unpredictability and implacability of the environment, but they also believe 
that firms can survive without optimizing a “fit” with the environment 
(Whittington, 2001). The Resource-Based View (RBV) of strategy formulation 
has been the dominant strategy paradigm in the 1990s. The resource-based 
view emphasizes the mix and development of capabilities and heterogeneous 
resources as the firm’s fundamental source of competitive advantage.
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The fundamentals underlying the RBV framework can be traced back to 
Coase (1937). In his essay, Coase presents the seemingly simple, yet 
profound task of finding out why a firm exists at all in a specialized exchange 
economy. He says: “Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at 
all In a specialized exchange economy” (Coase, 1937). He concludes that 
there are costs (i.e. transaction costs) associated with the functioning of the 
price mechanism. By forming an organization and allowing the entrepreneur
to coordinate economic activities and direct the firm’s resources, varying
marketing costs can be saved (Coase, 1937).
While the notion of creating and exploiting distinctive competencies can be 
originally attributed to Selznick (1957) (Porter, 1991, p. 199), the influential 
works by Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Grant (Grant, 1991) and Nelson (1991) 
were fundamental in establishing the contemporary RBV as the dominant 
strategy framework in the 1990s.
Prahalad and Hamel’s paper argues that to survive in the 1990s,
corporations will have to be adept at recognizing, developing and taking
advantage of their core competencies. Core competencies, according to this
view, consist of “the collective learning in the organization, especially how to
coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of
technologies” (p. 82). One might look at the diversified corporation, according
to Prahalad and Hamel, as a large tree:
"The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are 
business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root
system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core
competence” (p. 82).
Competitive advantage is thus derived from management’s ability to 
consolidate corporate wide production skills and technologies into core
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competencies that “empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to 
changing opportunities" (p. 81) and to manage the companies strategic 
business units as bundles of resources, thus challenging the view that the 
strategic business unit’s autonomy is sacrosanct. Resources should be 
transparently allocated within an overarching strategic architecture that acts 
as logic for market and product diversification (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).
Exhibit 2.2 Resource-Based View
Strategic Business Unit Core Competence
Basis for competition Competitiveness of today’s 
products.
Interfirm competition to build 
competencies.
Corporate structure Portfolio of businesses related 
in product-market terms.
Portfolio of competencies, 
core products, and 
businesses.
Status of the business unit Autonomy is sacrosanct; the 
SBU ‘owns’ all resources other 
than cash.
SBU is a potential reservoir of 
core competencies.
Resource allocation Discrete businesses are the 
unit of analysis; capital is 
allocated business by 
business.
Business and competencies 
are the unit of analysis: top 
management allocates capital 
and talent.
Value added of top 
management
Optimizing corporate returns 
through capital allocation 
trade-offs among businesses.
Enunciating strategic 
architecture and building 
competencies to secure the 
future.
Source: Prahalad and Hamel, 1990
Grant’s paper (1991), in a similar vein, emphasizes the capabilities and 
resources of the firm as the primary source of profitability and the principle 
constant that a firm can identify and construct a strategy framework around 
(Grant, 1991). Finally, Nelson (Nelson, 1991) points out that economic 
analysis tends to repress the differences between firms in the same 
industries, while management and business students view these differences 
as being ‘at the heart of their inquiry.’ He argues that economic analysis 
comes from the theoretical perspective of neoclassical views, but should take 
an evolutionary view of economic activity which emphasis differences
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between firms. The ‘dynamic capabilities’ view of firms, Nelson contends, is 
an important contribution to the field of strategy, guide for management, and 
foundation for the economic analysis of the firm (Nelson, 1991).
Porter (1991) is adamant that the RBV is not an alternative to the 
positioning school. As McKiernan says:
“He is cynical of claims that the resource view is the alternative to strategy, 
but wise enough to recognize that ‘stress on resources must complement, 
not substitute for stress on market positions’" (McKiernan, 1996b, p. xv).
He argues that the environment determines how activities are conducted:
“The environment shapes how activities are configured, which resources can 
be assembled uniquely, and what commitments can be made successfully”
(Porter. 1991, p. 212)
Porter argues that strategy is a matter of choice; firms cannot influence the 
industry structure, but they can position themselves in it. He argues that 
some routines and skills emerge over time through a process of institutional 
learning, which is a reflection of past strategy choices (p. 211). The RBV, 
according to Porter, will have its greatest significance in environments “where 
change is incremental, the number of strategic variables and combinations is 
limited" (p. 109).
2.34 The Learning School
Like the resource-based view of the firm, the “learning school” has been 
another significant processual (Whittington, 2001) perspective throughout the 
1990s. The learning school regards the field of strategy as inherently 
cognitive and complex and “[gives] considerable discretion to managerial 
choice in complex strategic decisions” (McKiernan, 1996b, p. xiv). One can 
imagine a proponent of the learning school describing organizational
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environments in the same manner as Luis Alvarez, 1964 Nobel Laureate in 
physics once described advanced physics:
“This is the course In advanced physics. That means the Instructor finds the 
subject confusing. If he didn’t, the course would be called elementary 
physics” (Mintzberg etal., 1998, p. 176).
The learning school views strategy formulation as being ‘cloaked’ in rituals, 
myths and symbols (Johnson, 1988), organizational routines and routinized 
behavior (Johnson, 1988; Cyert and March, 1963), and organizational politics 
(Pettigrew, 1992; Simon, 1979; Pettigrew, 1977; Child, 1972; Hickson et ai.,
1971). Recipes and paradigms become embedded in an organization’s 
culture (Whittington, 2001; Sheldon, 1980; Grinyer and Spender, 1979a) and 
must therefore be unlearnt for change to take place (Nystrom and Starbuck, 
1984). For firms to make effective strategies, they must learn and adapt 
(Mintzberg etal., 1998, p. 176).
The school’s origins can be traced back to Lindblom (1959). His article 
describes public policy decision making as a fragmented, complex process 
that attempts to reconcile a multitude of values, alternative interests and 
objectives (Lindblom, 1959). As Mintzberg et al. (1998) state, Lindblom’s 
notions of 'muddling through’ may have violated virtually every premise of 
“rational” management (Mintzberg et ai., 1998, p. 176), which dominates 
classical thinking. Indeed, the learning perspective on strategy formulation 
and implementation emerged at a time when the design school was just 
reaching its hiatus. Strategy was perceived to be a highly deliberate, overly 
formalized practice and Lindblom’s emergent theory, which suggests that 
strategy formulation (in government) is a chaotic affair in a complicated world, 
flew in the face of the dominant notions of the day.
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Quinn (1978) also did much to catalyze the school. To Quinn, however, 
effective strategy formulation is not a matter of “muddling through”. To the 
contrary, it is a process of keeping objectives nebulous and allowing the firm’s 
strategy to emerge based on the endeavors of those at the sub-unit level. A 
successful executive will be effective at identifying new directions and creating 
cohesion within the organization (Quinn, 1980). Existing recipes and cognitive 
structures within organizations are inherently self-reinforcing and must 
therefore be constantly challenged (Whittington, 2001). This has led Senge 
(1990) to argue that, unlike the classical notion of the CEO as the heroic 
general, particularly in the design school, the ‘leader’s new work’ is for 
ensuring that the conditions in an organization are such that unlearning, 
learning and adaptation can take place. He argues that learning needs to be 
built in or institutionalized in the organization. “Human beings are designed 
for learning”, and the leader’s role in a learning organization is that of teacher, 
steward and coach. He suggests that the quality movement in Japan 
highlights the evolution from adaptive learning, which is about coping, to 
generative learning, which is about creating, expanding capabilities and 
coping (Senge, 1990). The solution to bounded rationality, and the cognitive 
biases that exist within ‘cognitive communities’ is, thus, both learning (Jones 
and Hendry, 1992) and unlearning (Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984) processes.
De Geus (1997), who has been accredited by Senge (De Geus, 1997) as 
conceiving of the metaphor of the “learning organization”, conjectures the firm 
as a living, learning entity. He presents the future company as one that is a 
living being whose decisions for action are made through a learning process. 
De Geus, formerly the coordinator of planning worldwide for Royal
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Dutch/Shell, bases his inquiry into the longevity of firms on a Royal/Dutch 
Shell Group Planning study done in 1983, entitled, Corporate Change: A Look 
at How Long-Established Companies Change. Shell's history had been 
replete with changes from self-preservation to growth and back again to self- 
preservation. When Rockefeller's Standard Oil cut oil prices at the beginning 
of the 20^ century, for example. Shell, who dominated the Far East markets 
for “All the lamps of China” and kerosene in tins, lost market share, which led 
to the merger of Royal Dutch Petroleum and the Shell Transport and Trading 
Company (which, until this period, had been competitors) in 1907, and 
eventually to entering the United States market in 1911. Outcomes such as 
this. De Geus maintains, does not happen automatically, but through a 
process of institutional learning.
Institutional learning is often the lowest common denominator. 
Consequently, many institutions are slow to learn. The study concludes that 
the mortality rate for a multinational company that is equivalent to a Fortune 
500, is 40 to 50 years. For example, by 1983, one-third of the companies 
listed in the Fortune 500 during the 1970s had merged, been purchased, or 
had been dissolved (PL/I, 1983). Howe (1986) has highlighted that for every 
successful corporate turnaround, there are two troubled firms that do not 
recover (Howe, 1986). The criteria for the study, as conveyed by Lo van 
Wachem, the then chairman of the most senior board at Royal Dutch/Shell, 
the Committee of Managing Directors, was that the companies that were 
looked at must be as old (Shell dates back to the 1890s) and of comparable
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size. The planners eventually narrowed their study down to 27 companies.^ 
The study concluded that there were four characteristics that contributes to 
firm life-longevity. They are: a sensitivity to the firm’s environment 
represented by a company’s ability to learn and adapt; cohesion and identity, 
which consists of a company’s innate ability to build a community and a 
persona for itself; tolerance and its corollary, decentralization, which are both 
symptoms of a company’s innate ability to build constructive relationships with 
other entities, within and outside itself; and conservative financing, which is an 
element in the corporate attribute of being able to govern its own growth and 
evolution effectively (see exhibit 2.3).
Exhibit 2.3 Characteristics that Contribulte to a Companies’ Life-Longevity
Characteristic Explanation
1. Sensitivity to the firm’s environment: Represents a company’s ability to learn and 
adapt.
2. Cohesion and identity: Aspects of a company’s innate ability to build a 
community and a persona for itself.
3. Tolerance and its corollary, 
decentralization:
Are both symptoms of a company’s awareness 
of ecology: its ability to build constructive 
relationships with other entities, within and 
outside itself.
4. Conservative Financing: One element in the corporate attribute of being 
able to govern its own growth and evolution 
effectively.
Source: Adapted from De Geus, Arle. (1997). The Living Company. London: Nicholas 
Brealey Publishing.
The learning school is not without its criticisms. Change can be slow and 
constrained by executives, for instance, whose status and power is personally 
threatened, despite recognizing a need for change. It can also lead to 
underestimating competitors and missing opportunities (Whittington, 2001). 
Innovating piecemeal, or ‘irrational incrementalism’ as Hayes and Jaikumar
‘ The companies included were Anglo American Corporation, Booker McConnell, British 
American Tobacco, Daimaru, DuPont, East India Companies, Anthony Gibbs, W. R. Grace, 
Hudson’s Bay Company, IBM, Kennecott, Kodak, Kounike, 3M, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Pilkington, 
Rolls-Royce, Rubber Culture, SKF, Siemens, Société Generate, Suez Canal Company, 
Sumitomo, Suzuki, Unilever and Vestey.
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term it, can lead to piecemeal strategies, and the disintegration of a coherent 
strategy (Mintzberg etal., 1998).
Andrews (1980) criticizes Lindblom’s (1959) ideas about organization's 
“muddling through” as “purposeless,” and in a similar vein, Johnson highlights 
the dangers of “strategic drift” (Johnson, 1987, pp. 244 - 247). The 
consequences, as Gaddis suggests, can be the failure of a strategy to 
‘emerge’ and this situation can ultimately result in disaster. As an example, 
he emphasizes the defeat of the strategy-less Roman general Varro, “an early 
incrementalist”, at the hands of Hannibal, who had a strategy of a weak 
center, stating that: “Apparently a suitable strategy for the superior Roman 
army failed to ‘emerge’ as the battle wore on” (Gaddis, 1997, pp. 38 - 45).
Finally, Mintzberg, an adherent of the learning school, summarizes these 
criticisms using the story of a boiled frog. If a frog is placed in hot water, it will 
jump out. However, if a frog is placed in cool water, and the water slowly 
heats up until it is boiling, the frog will adapt to the new temperatures until it is 
too late, and it boils to death (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 226).
2.4 The Rise and Fall and Rise Again of Strategic Planning
Mintzberg argues that the history of strategic planning since 1965 has
been one of rise and fall, fall and rise (Mintzberg, 1994; Mintzberg, 1994b).
He proposes that the fall of strategic planning in the 1980s was due to
“planning pitfalls.” The “predict and prepare” (Achoff, 1983) processes of
strategy formation, particularly with the classical school of thought, can breed
an atmosphere of politics, constrict an organization’s vision, destroy
commitment and discourage change (Mintzberg, 1994a). Hamel and
Prahalad concur:
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"In many ways, strategy has been discredited over the past several years. 
Consulting companies that once focused on strategy are now turning to 
operational issues. Strategic planning departments are being disbanded ... 
Most strategic planning is strategic In name only, ritualistic and formulaic, 
seldom deeply creative” (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994, p. xii).
True to the scientific management pioneered by Frederick Taylor, the 
argument follows, strategic thinking was separated from doing, and strategic 
planners were expected to produce ‘the one best way’, and planning systems 
were expected to produce step by step instructions on implementing the ‘one 
best strategy’ (Mintzberg, 1994b). Indeed, General Electric is a case in point.
General Electric, Pascal (1991) writes, pioneered corporate planning under 
the stewardship of CEO Fred Borsch in the 1960s and 1970s. Eventually 
large central corporate planning departments (General Electric’s grew to be 
over 200 people) spread throughout Western businesses. However, despite 
their planning efforts, poor financial performance forced companies like IBM 
[McMaster, 1996 #539] and General Electric (Pascale, 1991) to reconsider 
strategic planning. Large planning departments had failed to cope with slow 
growth (Whittington, 2001). In General Electric, ‘Neutron Jack’ Welch 
‘rationalized’ the corporate planning system. Welch, quoted in Pascale, 
justifies his actions by arguing that:
"We had constructed over the years a management apparatus that was right 
for the time, the toast of the business schools. Divisions, strategic business 
units, groups, sectors, all were designed to make meticulous, calculated 
decisions and move them smoothly forward and upward. This system 
produced highly polished work. It was right for the seventies ... a growing 
handicap in the early eighties ... and it will be a ticket to the boneyard in the 
nineties” (Pascale, 1991, p. 213).
As Whittington (Whittington, 2001), Moran and Ghoshal (1999) and Sampler 
(1998) all propound, traditional boundaries no longer exist (e.g. Amazon.com 
competes with traditional book retailers and Ryan Air bypasses travel agents).
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So where Porter writes in the Economist: “I favour a set of analytical 
techniques for developing strategy” (Porter, 1987), formal planning techniques 
for analyzing traditional industry structure no longer serve as a sustainable 
source of competitive advantage because, as Mintzberg says: “Formal 
procedures will never be able to forecast discontinuities, inform detached 
managers, or create novel strategies” (Mintzberg, 1994b, p. 111). In a thesis 
written by Gomer (Gomer, 1976), concerning the role of planning systems in 
response to the 1973 OPEC oil crisis, three companies who had planning 
systems reflecting the classical model were studied. Gomer found that, in 
each case (e.g. one company manufactured mining equipment, the second 
company was in insurance and the third company was in primary products) 
the planning systems failed to generate “early warning”, and that conventional 
planning systems “seems to have rather little or use as a method for problem 
solving, being more related to the implementation measures” (p. 16). He 
concludes that:
“Formai planning lent some evaluative support to problem-solving activities 
related to the crisis, but did not provide ‘early warning’ or otherwise make the 
organization more sensitive to change” (Gomer, 1976, p. 1).
Many of the tools for analyzing environmental uncertainties such as the ‘five
force' analysis of industry structure, really require a world that is sufficiently
stable to predict the future (Whittington, 2001). Consequently, one might
argue, as Mintzberg does, that:
"While certainly not dead, strategic planning has long since fallen from its 
pedestal. But even now, few people fully understand the reason: strategic 
planning is not strategic thinking" (Mintzberg, 1994b, p. 107).
In fact, “strategic planning often spoils strategic thinking'’ (Mintzberg, 1994b, p. 
107). The Boston Box is one example.
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The Boston Box, or growth-share matrix, developed in the 1970s by the 
Boston Consulting Group, provides a simplified framework for managing a 
portfolio of strategic business units (SUBs) (See Exhibit 2.4).
Exhibit 2.4: Growth-Share Matrix: “The Boston Box"
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The Boston Box quickly gained prominence in both academic and business 
worlds (McKiernan, 1992), and is still taught in business schools today. 
However, it has been criticized for being too simplistic (Mintzberg et al. 1998) 
and prescriptive in its strategies, thus crowding out more “creative” solutions 
for SUBs that are not performing well, such as recovery or internationalization, 
rather than simply “divestment” (McKiernan, 1992).
This is not to say that strategic planning in the classical sense is dead, but 
it is to say that strategic planning can no longer embrace the ‘one best way'. 
As many strategy scholars admit, it must integrate and draw on the assorted 
strategy disciplines, perspectives and tools (Mintzberg et al., 1998; 
McKiernan, 1997) for more robust outputs from strategy formulation and 
implementation processes.
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2.5 Critique and Two Areas of Future Research in Strategy
Mintzberg emphasizes that strategy making is a complex process that 
“involves the most sophisticated, subtle, and, at times, subconscious elements 
of human thinking” (Mintzberg, 1994b). For strategy to remain effective in a 
world where discontinuities are commonplace, conventional tools must be 
reinforced by flexible and creative strategic thinking and learning (McKiernan, 
1997 #504).
This chapter has discussed five approaches, or “schools" of strategy 
formulation -  design, planning, positioning, resource-based and learning. 
However, there is much taxonomy for classifying strategic approaches. 
Schools of strategy vary depending on the taxonomist (i.e. McKiernan, 
Mintzberg, van der Heijden, Whittington).
McKiernan (1996), for instance, divides strategic management Into four 
broad categories or “schools”, with one school divided into six sub-categories. 
They include:
1. The Planning and Practice School,
2. The Learning School
a. The Natural Selection View
b. The Incremental View
c. The Cultural View
d. The Political View
e. The Visionary View
f. Patterns of Strategy Development
3. The Positioning School, and
4. The Resource Based School.
The planning and practice school (e.g. Selznick, Chandler, Andrews and 
Ansoff) stress market positioning, resource capability and environmental 
appraisal. They are about corporate, rather than strategic planning and are 
prescriptive and mechanical in nature.
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The learning school (e.g. Lindblom, Wildavasky, Johnson, Quinn, 
Mintzberg, Pettigrew), according to this classification, borrows from the natural 
selection model and views the environment as unpredictable and complex. 
Strategy is a pattern that sometimes emerges incrementally, and at other 
times is deliberate. It is a process that can be ‘cloaked’ in rituals, symbols, 
belief and it is influenced by organizational politics, problems of legitimacy and 
conflicting demands.
The positioning school (e.g. Caves, Hunt, Porter) approaches strategy 
formulation from the ‘outside-in.’ It links the firm with its environment. Firms 
will position themselves within an industry where it could best defend itself 
from its competitors.
The Resource Based View of the firm (e.g. Nelson, Prahalad, Hamel), or 
the ‘inside-out’ view, regards competitive advantage as being derived from the 
accumulation of scarce resources and core competencies, which are difficult 
for competitors to replicate, through learning and skill acquisition (McKiernan, 
1997; McKiernan, 1996; McKiernan, 1996b #163).
Van der Heijden (1996) puts a slightly different spin on classifying strategy 
literature into schools. He divides the differing approaches to strategy 
formulation and implementation into three broad schools. They include the 
rationalist, evolutionist and processualist schools.
The process of strategy formulation for the rationalist school is one of 
finding the “optimal strategy (e.g. Porter), where as the evolutionsts (e.g. 
Mintzberg) view strategy formulation as an emergent process and can only be 
understood in retrospect. The processualists, on the other hand, take a 
middle position (e.g. van der Heijden). As a general rule managers dislike the
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evolutionist school because.it disenfranchises their ability to determine the 
destiny of their organization. For the opposite reason, they love the rationalist 
school because it empowers managers to determine their organization’s fate. 
The problem with the rationalist school is that the future is unpredictable and 
often times it unfolds differently than was anticipated. As van der Heijden 
(1996) says: “If things change rapidly and are unpredictable, today’s strategy 
may be tomorrow’s disaster.” There is thus a need for a strategic framework 
between the two extremes. Again, to quote van der Heijden:
“You have to stay with the consequences. The less things are predicatable 
the more attention you have to pay to the strategy process. Uncertainty has 
the effect of moving the key to success from “optimal strategy” to the “most 
skillful strategy” (Van der Heijden, 1996, p. vii-viii).
A middle ground between the two extremes is the processual school. The 
emergence of the processual school results from strategic conversations 
within organizations (van der Heijden, 1996).
Mintzberg et ai. (1998) elevate the six sub-categories of the learning 
school identified by McKiernan (1996) to schools in their own right, thus 
coming up with ten schools of strategy. In the design school strategy 
formation is a process of conception. In the planning school strategy 
formulation is a formal process. The positioning school views strategy as an 
analytical process. The entrepreneurial school approaches strategy 
formulation using visioning processes. The cognitive school of strategy 
formulation uses mental processes. The learning school views strategy 
formulation as an emergent process. The power school takes the perspective 
of strategy formulation as a process of negotiation. The cultural school 
approaches strategy formulation as a collective process. The environmental 
school takes the perspective as strategy formulation as a reactive process.
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And finally, the configuration school views strategy formulation as a process of 
transformation (Mintzberg etal., 1998; Mintzberg, 1994a).
Like McKiernan, Mintzberg et al distill their ten schools of strategic 
formation down into three broad categories. The first three schools, they 
contend, are prescriptive in nature. The following six schools, on the other 
hand, are descriptive in nature. Finally, the configuration school, they argue, 
integrates many aspects of the other nine schools, and is thus collective in 
nature (Mintzberg etal., 1998, p. 4-7).
Whittington has developed taxonomy of four for classifying approaches to 
strategy. They are the classical perspective (e.g Selznick, Ansoff, Chandler, 
Ackoff, Porter), the evolutionary perspective (Alchian, Henderson, 
Williamson), the processual perspective (Cyert, March, Simon, Lindblom, 
Quinn, Mintzberg, Pettigrew, Hamel, Prahalad) and the systemic perspective 
(Granovetter, Whitley, Pascale, Boyacigiller, Atler, Meyer, Shrivastava).
The classical approach to strategy is formal, profit maximizing, focused on 
internal plans that are analytically arrived at, influenced by economic and 
military thinking, and emerged in the 1960s. The processual approach to 
strategy is crafted, vaguely rationalized, focused on internal politics and 
cognitions and on processes of bargaining and learning, influenced by 
psychology and emerged in the 1970s. The evolutionist approach to strategy 
is efficient, finds its rational in survival, focuses on external markets and on 
Darwinian processes, is influenced by economics and biology and emerged in 
the 1980s. Finally, the systemic approach is embedded, rationalized by local 
environments, focused on external societies, arrived at through social
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processes, influenced by sociology and emerged in the 1990s (Whittington, 
2001).
One criticism of the strategy literature generally, is that despite variations 
between the differing classifications of strategy approaches, there has not 
been a sufficient debate within the literature about what a ‘school’ of strategy 
is, or what principles should underpin the classification of strategy thought into 
schools of strategy. Three of the four scholars that have been reviewed here 
(Mintzberg, van der Heijden, and Whittington) are opaque about the 
methodology that they use for identifying patterns within the strategy literature 
or the principles that are used for conceptualizing schools (McKiernan, (1997) 
uses a survey of strategy scholars to construct his taxonomy). Many strategy 
scholars admit that schools of strategy are not mutually exclusive (Mintzberg 
etal., 1998; McKiernan, 1997; Porter, 1991). To quote McKiernan:
“The history of the development of strategic management must therefore 
reflect the 'relatedness of collective learning’ that grows through time. The 
rope’s strength depends on the integrity of individual strands working in 
harmony. Our development as academics should not be restricted by 
artificial barriers” (McKiernan, 1996b, p. xviii).
Mintzberg et al. concur. They argue that:
“There are categories out there, but they should be used as building blocks, 
or, better still, as ingredients of a stew” (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 368).
While there may be overlap between the schools and the various 
taxonomies that exist, there are still some significant differences of opinion in 
what actually constitutes a ‘school.’ .Mintzberg, for instance, places the 
Resource Based View of strategy in the ‘learning’ school’, while McKiernan, 
recognizing both the influence of the RBV throughout the 90s, and differences 
in the way RBV literature and learning literature conceptualize strategy
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formulation and implementation, elevate both approaches to schools in their 
own right. More specifically, what differentiate these two streams of thought 
are both their views of what constitutes a source of competitive advantage 
and how they approach the future. The RBV, for instance, looks for ways to 
‘create the future’ (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994), while viewing the primary 
source for competitive advantage as the distinctive competencies and unique 
capabilities of a firm, and treats learning as a modus operand. Competitive 
advantage thus comes from:
"Management’s ability to consolidate corporate-wide technologies and 
production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to 
adapt quickly to changing opportunities” (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, p. 79).
Proponents of a learning perspective view learning as a primary source of 
competitive advantage in a quickly changing and complex environment. To 
quote de Geus:
“The ability to learn faster than your competitors may be the only sustainable 
source of competitive advantage” (De Geus, 1988, p. 71).
Until there is a debate in the field as to what constitutes a school, what 
principles should be used for distinguishing points of view, patterns, or 
streams of thought, it is difficult to see where value can be added to the 
strategy field by creating new taxonomies. There seems to also be some 
confusion about what constitutes the content of a ‘school,’ or a strategy 
‘perspective’ and what constitutes process, or modus operand. For example, 
Whittington’s approach conceptualizes strategy as four ‘perspectives’ 
(classical, evolutionary, processual and systemic). Van der Heijden’s 
approach conceptualizes strategy as three ‘paradigms’. What defines a 
‘school,’ or a ‘perspective,’ or a ‘paradigm’? Are they talking about the same
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thing, approaches to strategy formulation and implementation (i.e. content), or 
are they talking about different things such as modus operand (i.e. process)? 
Can you have a school, such as the planning school, which represents 
strategy content, but which is also classical in context and prescriptive of 
process? It seems unlikely that these various scholars are unaware of each 
others work, which leads one to the conclusion that they’ve chosen to side­
step the issue of definition and the rationale for their approaches to analyzing 
the strategy literature.
Besides a debate about the optimal ways of classifying the various streams 
of thought in the strategy literature, a second area where real value can be 
added to the strategy field is in the way in which strategy school, perspective, 
paradigms, treat both the environment and the future. Ansoff attributes the 
rise of strategic corporate planning between 1945 and 1965 as being 
catalyzed by:
"Growing realization that the firm’s environment has become progressively 
changeable and discontinuous from the past and that, as a result, objectives 
alone are insufficient as decision rules for guiding the firm’s strategic 
reorientation as it adapts to changing challenges, threats and opportunities"
(Ansoff, 1965, p. 46).
Yet, the history of strategic planning tells us that some approaches to strategic 
planning have been more effective in turbulent environments with uncertain 
futures than others (Whittington, 2001; Mintzberg et a!., 1998; McKiernan, 
1997; Mintzberg, 1994a; Porter, 1991). For instance, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various strategy schools/perspectives/paradigms in 
various environmental states can be discerned from debates between 
scholars in the literature (See Exhibit 2.5).
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Exhibit 2.5: The Environmental State & Future Uncertainty Matrix
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Source: McKiernan, P. and MacKay, B. 2001, University of St Andrews.
if we take McKiernan’s classification of four schools (e.g. Planning and 
Practice, Positioning, Resource Based View, Learning) for example, the 
literature suggests that the planning and practice school, with its focus on 
fitting internal capabilities with external opportunities, will be optimal in an 
environment that is static with a future that is certain
Yet, ironically, as Mintzberg argues, for planning to be effective the 
strategy requires an environment that is acquiescent and predictable 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). To quote Mintzberg and Waters;
“Since strategy has almost inevitably been conceived in terms of what the 
leaders of an organization 'plan' to do in the future, strategy formation has, 
not surprisingly, tended to be treated as an analytic process for establishing 
long-range goals and action plans for an organization; that is, as one of 
formulation followed by implementation” (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985, p.
257).
The resource-based view, with its inside-out focus on scare resources, 
internal capabilities and competencies, will be an optimal approach to strategy 
formulation and implementation in an environment that is fairly static, with an 
uncertain future. To quote Porter;
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“The resource-based view will have the greatest significance in environments 
where change is incremental, the number of strategic variables and 
combinations is limited, so that a few scarce resources can govern 
outcomes, and the time period is short to intermediate term so that 
managerial choices can replicate or offset resource stocks” (Porter, 1991, 
p. 109).
The positioning school, with its outside-in focus on positioning a firm within a 
market where it is easiest to either influence or defend against the ‘five 
forces,' on the other hand, will operate optimally in dynamic environments with 
relatively predictable futures. But in dynamic environments with uncertain 
futures (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994), it is no longer enough for "the diversified 
corporation [to] point its business units at particular end product markets and 
admonish them to become world leaders” (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, p. 80). 
Prahalad and Hamel underscore their point using the metaphor of a tree:
“The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are 
core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, 
and fruit are end products. The root system that provides nourishment, 
sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength 
of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you 
miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its leaves" (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990, p. 82).
It is for these reasons that De Geus (1997; 1988), Senge (1990), Mintzberg et 
al. (1998), Mintzberg, (1994b; 1994a; 1991) and others have turned to the 
learning school in environments that are dynamic with unpredictable and 
uncertain futures. As Mintzberg et al. propound:
“Some organizations face perpetual novelty. In other words, their 
environments are dynamic and unpredictable, which makes it difficult to 
converge on a clear strategy at all. in this case, the structure tends to take 
the form of adhocracy, or project organization, and the learning approach 
becomes almost mandatory -  the means to work things out in a flexible 
manner” (Mintzberg etal., 1998, p. 229).
So one may conclude, as De Geus does, that: “The ability to learn faster than 
your competitors may be the only sustainable competitive advantage” (De 
Geus, 1988).
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2.6 Chapter Conclusion
In recent decades various planning perspectives have, like the biological
metaphor of product life cycles, emerged, grown to maturity and then 
declined, but are never completely vanquished. Deliberate planning 
perspectives that rely on classical notions of rational thinking processes, 
prescriptive strategies and top-down decision-making, were prevalent in the 
relatively stable 1960s. The learning perspective found its genesis in the 70s, 
acknowledges complexity, adaptive behavior, incrementalism and recognizes 
that strategy formulation and implementation is not just deliberate, but also 
emergent, and has grown into maturity in the 90s. The positioning 
perspective, which, in many respects is a surrogate of the classical 
perspectives that were prominent in the 60s, emphasizes the important of 
positioning in turbulent markets, and came to dominate strategic thinking in 
the 80s. The resource-based view also has a pedigree that can be traced 
back to the late 60s, shares many of the premises of the learning perspective, 
and relies on acquiring scarce resources that are hard to replicate, such as 
capabilities, competencies and skills, also passed from adolescence into 
adulthood in the 90s.
Each school has made significant contributions to the evolution of strategic 
thought. However, many strategy scholars believe that for strategic planning 
to be successful in dynamic and uncertain environments, then it is the informal 
thinking, learning and adaptive processes that will add value to strategy 
formulation and implementation, rather than formal procedures that attempt to 
forecast discontinuities (Mintzberg, 1994b; Senge, 1990; De Geus, 1997; De 
Geus, 1988).
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The contribution of this brief history of strategy thought, and concomitant 
review of strategic literature is that it sets the context for this thesis by 
showing that the theoretical development of strategic thought has 
incrementally evolved into differing perspectives, represented by distinct 
taxonomies. However, this account of the development of strategic thought 
subscribes to one general perception of its evolutionary history. Indeed, one 
might argue that what has been presented in this chapter is a construction of 
a taleology of strategic thought. Researchers who have looked at it through 
their own lenses and biases have driven this evolution. In this sense, the 
evolution of strategic management has been retrospective and historicist in 
nature, as has, one might argue, the strategy canon presented here. What is 
needed is more integrative and prospective thinking on the subject. 
Furthermore, as the environmental context has become more uncertain and 
complex, managers need more effective frameworks and heuristics for 
challenging assumptions, improving learning, and ultimately foresight into the 
future.
In the following chapter, the context of this thesis is refined further by 
focusing in on learning within strategic management.
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“The question of what exactly Is Involved In the cognitive experience and how It arises 
must be addressed If we are to arrive at a better understanding of the workings of the 
strategic mind and the level of foresight associated with lt.“
-  Chia, 2002
“Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.”
~ Wells, 1920
“It Is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most Intelligent, but the
ones most responsive to change.”
-  Darwin, 1860
3.0 Chapter Introduction
The only sustainable source of competitive advantage, De Geus argues
(1988), is learning. Senge concurs. He argues that in the long run, superior 
performance depends on superior learning (Senge, 1990).
Learning, at the individual level, occurs when one can perform a new skill 
that could not be performed before, when one has a new realization or insight 
into a problem, or when a new fact is acquired. Learning can occur formally 
through reading, lectures and teaching, or it can transpire, often times 
unconsciously, through experiencing daily events. Researchers of individual 
learning (Honey and Mumford, 1992; Kolb, 1991), generally agree that 
learning is a continuous process that, loosely, involves four stages. The four 
stages include a) experiencing, b) concluding, c) reviewing, d) planning. 
There is thus a past element (having had an experience), a present element 
(reviewing and concluding from that experience), and a future element 
(planning for the future).
Some individuals, as Honey and Mumford (1992) suggest, place more 
emphasis on one stage than another. This relates to people’s learning styles.
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There are pitfalls, however. Bi-passing stages in the learning process, or 
over-emphasizing one stage over another can impair the learning process. 
Rushing around having experiences is sometimes assumed to be 
synonymous with learning from them. The postponement of reaching 
conclusions from the reviewing of experiences for as long as possible while 
more data is collected can result in “analysis to paralysis.” Experiencing and 
planning to the detriment of reviewing and concluding can lead to inadequate 
analysis and the implementation of “quick fixes”. Even within each one of the 
stages there are various biases that can Influence the learning process. 
Finally, in times of ambiguity and uncertainty there is frequently a compulsion 
to reach a conclusion quickly, which can lead to circumventing the review 
stage (Honey and Mumford, 1992). As Honey and Mumford (1992) point out: 
“Conclusions, even if they are the wrong ones, are comforting to have” (1992, 
p. 5).
Organizational learning is considered by many researchers to be the sum 
of individual learning. Starkey defines it as:
“The integration of the sum of individuals’ learning, to create a whole that is 
greater than the sum of its parts" (Starkey, 1996, p. 2).
Eden and Ackerman (Eden, 1998a) echo this sentiment. They concede that
cognition, which is closely linked to learning, is the domain of the individual,
not the organisation:
“The attribution of cognition to an organisation is problematic and depends 
completely upon the legitimacy of reification" (Eden and Ackerman, 1998a, p.
193).
Grinyer (2000) also agrees. He argues that it is not the group that thinks, but 
the individual. Moreover, he suggests that the cognitive map of the 
organization only has meaning in so much as some of the individual cognitive
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maps may result in shared, and possibly negotiated values, beliefs and 
cognitions. However, controlling for perceptions at the individual level can 
reduce processes that lead to such psychological phenomena as “group think” 
(Janis, 1971) and various disruptive biases (Grinyer, 2000; Eden, 1992b), in 
particular at the ‘review’ stage of learning (Honey and Mumford, 1992; Kolb, 
1991). This is not to suggest that individual learning and organisational 
learning are not intricately interwoven. Indeed, Giddens (1979) and Clegg
(1989) have both demonstrated that in turbulent periods, individuals and 
groups will try to persuade others of their ideology, beliefs and values as an 
interpretation of the collective experience of the organisation. Consequently, 
power, politics, and ideology at both the orgnanisational and individual levels 
influence both organisational and individual learning through a socialization 
process. However, as Starkey points out, organisational learning is not well 
understood and, for this reason, the argument presented by Grinyer (2000), 
Starkey (1996), and Eden (1992), that organisational learning is the sum of 
individual cognitions, is a central assumption of this chapter.
To improve organisational learning, a better understanding of the workings 
of the strategic mind and levels of foresight associated with it (Chia, 2002, 
May) is needed, particularly because “strategy formulation is quintessentially a 
learning process” (Starkey, 1996). To achieve this end, however, the question 
of what influences the cognitive and learning experience, and the biases and 
heuristics that constrain and enable learning, must also be investigated.
3.1 Chapter Purpose and Contribution
Strategy is both an individual and a collective learning process. As
circumstances change, individuals learn about the changes, assess the
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capability of their organisation to adapt to the changes, and then converge on 
patterns of behavior to address them (Mintzberg, 1998). As such, 
management becomes "no longer just the management of change but 
management by change” (Lapierre, 1980). Paraphrasing Wells (Wells, 1920), 
organisational survival thus becomes more and more a race between 
education, change and catastrophe. The sort of learning that is needed to 
avoid catastrophe requires that the company is able to “see clearly what is 
happening in its environment” and to “see early and manage change by 
foresight” (De Geus, 1997, p. 37).
Foresight, Whitehead (1931) argues, is rooted in deep understanding. The 
purpose and contribution of this chapter is to understand influences, such as 
ideology, myth, routines, bias, which are the stuff of hindsight, on strategic 
learning, and to build a framework that illustrates how these vestiges of 
hindsight influence foresight.
When it comes to strategic planning, we tend to believe that it should be 
future oriented (Sanders, 1998). The contribution (see exhibit 3.0) that this 
chapter adds to the research question. What role does hindsight play in 
foresight?, is in understanding the critical linkage, often underdeveloped in the 
strategy literature, between the past and the future -  hindsight and foresight 
(Weick, 1995; Theus, 1995; Thomas and McDaniel, 1990; Frederickson, 
1986; Weick, 1979).
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It should be noted that this dissertation does not draw the distinction 
between cognition and learning that Mintzberg et a i (1998) do. The reason is 
simple: Where cognition is primarily concerned with the totality of thinking 
processes and information processing, learning is both a prerequisite and a 
consequence of these thinking processes, and as such, the demarcation that 
is made in the strategy literature, in particular by Mintzberg et al. (1998), is a 
false one. You cannot have learning without cognition.
3.2 Chapter Structure
This chapter begins by reviewing the literature on strategic learning. It
commences by looking at the natural selection perspective (McKelvey, 1983),
which follows in the Darwinian tradition (Darwin, 1860), but also points out the
importance of co-operation in biological systems (Sahtouris, 1996). It then
looks at the complexity of planning and the debate over the extent of
rationality inherent in incremental learning (Lindblom, 1959; Quinn, 1978;
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Johnson, 1988), while keeping in mind Wildavsky’s (1973) question of 
whether strategic planning has, by trying to be everything, dissipated into 
nothing.
Organisational learning, as Sheldon (1980) and Grinyer and Spender 
(1979b) argue, is affected by, to use Johnson’s (1988) metaphor, a web of 
assumptions, beliefs and past experiences, influenced by the organisational 
culture, which results in addressing uncertainty through shared paradigms 
(Sheldon, 1980) and ‘managerial recipes’, which can, they argue, constrain 
thinking in certain circumstances (Grinyer and Spender, 1979b). In his 
research, Pettigrew (1992; 1977) does not dispute these premises, but 
approaches strategic learning and decision-making from a political 
perspective. He tacitly agrees with much of the work by Johnson (1988), 
Sheldon (1980), Grinyer and Spender (1979b) and even aspects of McKelvey 
and Aldrich (1983), who all, to lesser and greater degrees, point to cultural 
factors such as the role that assumptions, beliefs, experiences, understanding 
of history, ideology, myths, politics, routines, and symbols play in strategy 
formulation, and strategic learning. In a contrasting approach, Pettigrew 
emphasises of politics and conflict in the strategy formulating process. The 
section concludes by eliciting areas of consensus within the literature.
Following on from a review of the strategy learning literature, the following 
section examines the work on bounded rationality pioneered by Simon (1986; 
1979; 1957; 1956; Simon, 1955). It also examines arguments disparaging 
classical assumptions of instrumental rationality, the rigidity of quantitative 
models, and the influence of centers of power and dominant coalitions on 
strategy formulation and decision-making proposed by Child (1972) as well as
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the “softer” more intuitive influences on strategic learning and decision-making 
emphasized by Hurst et al. (1989).
The Chapter concludes with the argument that there are sufficient areas of 
commonality within the literature to build a conceptual framework for the 
purpose of illustrating how these various ‘forces’ coalesce to influence 
strategy learning, formulation and decision-making, but what is lacking in the 
literature is an in-depth analysis of the various heuristics and biases used to 
analyse the past in hindsight. Researchers, such as Pettigrew (1977), for 
instance, acknowledge that an understanding of history is important in 
strategy formulation, learning and decision-making, and other researchers 
(Starkey and McKinlay, 1996; Hurst, 1989) emphasise the importance of 
undoing the past to learn for the future. However, there is little analytical 
depth to how history is used, and what role hindsight plays in strategy 
formulating, learning and decision-making processes.
3.3 Strategic Learning Literature Review
Shell’s study of company longevity found that the companies comprising
their study were able “to recognize and react to environmental change before 
the pain of a crisis” (De Geus, 1988, p. 71). Adapting to environmental 
changes requires that companies have knowledge of both their environment 
and themselves. The decision making process within organizations, 
according to De Geus (1988), is a learning process. As people engage in 
organizational dialogue they may change their own mental models 
(sometimes referred to as microcosms (Wack, 1985a; 1985b)) and build up a 
group model. However, the process is slow, and “the ability to learn faster 
than your competitors may be the only sustainable competitive advantage”
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(De Geus, 1988, p. 71). Finding mechanisms to speed up the velocity and 
improve the accuracy of institutional learning is an important element in 
developing sustained competitive advantage. Shell has found that scenarios 
have been effective tools for triggering institutional learning. As Schoemaker 
says:
"[scenario planning] is essentially a study of our collective ignorance. It 
institutionalizes the hunt for weak signals, such as OPEC’s price hikes in 
1973 or Gorbachev’s political ascent In the early 1980s. The scenario 
method continually pushes the envelope of possibilities since It views 
strategic planning as learning’’ (Schoemaker, 1997, p. 51).
3.31 Individual Learning
Holt’s (1982, 1983) research has shown that, in most circumstances, only 
about 25 per cent of what is taught is learned. At most, only 40 per cent is 
learned. These statistics illustrate the limitations of learning through the 
traditional learner-teacher framework. When you change the structure of the 
class from one where the teachers are authority figures that are deemed to be 
more knowledgeable in their genre to one where the learners are senior 
managers in a firm, this statistic is compounded. However, by suspending or 
changing the rules that management lives by e.g. the time of year for strategic 
planning, the Shell planners found that they could accelerate learning. 
Furthermore, they also found that games are an effective tool for increasing 
the velocity of institutional learning.
Microworlds, otherwise known as individual models of reality, rarely fully 
corresponds to reality because “no complex reality can be represented 
analytically and a model is an analytical way of representing reality” (De Geus, 
1988, p. 73). Thus, whether achieved through teaching or games, an 
important aspect of the institutional learning process is developing an
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organizational language for making explicit the implicit knowledge of 
individuals, which becomes a building bloc in the institutional model (van der 
Heijden, 1996; De Geus, 1988). The speed and degree to which this model 
changes will depend on the structures and culture of the organization. 
However, “institutional learning begins with the calibration of existing mental 
models” (De Geus, 1988, pp. 74-75). To learn faster than competitors and 
create sustainable competitive advantage through learning, organizational 
leaders must continually be revising their models of the world: “Learning is not 
a luxury. It’s how companies discover their future” (De Geus, 1988, pp. 74- 
75).
3.32 Strategic Learning Perspectives
Planning as learning is a concept that has evolved into several different 
strands. The rational-analytic view of the planning school became challenged 
due to the recognition that some strategies emerge informally while others are 
not realized at all. As McKiernan says:
“It was clear that the Planning school was only one of many approaches to 
strategy development. For instance, organizational studies scholars 
challenged intentional choice and outcome, embraced notions of bounded 
rationality, context, politics, power and chance in choice processes and went 
on to study strategic change in implementation. There was an emphasis on 
organizational adaptability since the rational process was inherently 
constrained by both external and internal variable whose behavior was 
unpredictable or simply unknown” (McKiernan, 1996b, p. xlx).
The natural selection view of learning, for instance, has a history that finds 
its genesis in the theories of Darwin (1860). According to this view, unlike the 
neoclassical homogeneous concept of the firm, firms can be differentiated in 
terms of their systems, culture, resources, power centers and processes. An 
organization’s environment is too powerful for a synoptic strategy to be 
effective in light of environmental uncertainties and an organization’s survival
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or extinction will be dependent on the extent of the “fit” or “harmony" between 
the environment and the organization (McKiernan, 1996b, p. xix).
In a paper by McKelvey and Aldrich (1983), the authors propose that the 
findings in organizational science would achieve a greater validity and could 
be applied more widely if their was a greater focus on the conditions under 
which research findings are elicited. Borrowing from biology, the authors use 
population ecology to illustrate that organisations and industries may behave 
differently in different environments, thus limiting the ability of single industry 
or single organizational studies to make theoretical assumptions, 
generalizations and predictions in business. In essence, they propose that 
there has to be a “fit” between the systems, cultural resources, power centers 
and processes of the organisation, the environment and the context (see 
exhibit 3.1).
Exhibit 3.1 Organisational Research
Context
Source: Based on McKelvey and Aldrich (1983)
Thus, homogeneous organizational populations must be identified and 
classified for generalisations to be made based on research findings. The 
characteristics of a population and how those organisations might have
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formed are important factors in identifying organisational clusters. Population 
thinking limits cross-species generalisations, which, it is asserted, cautions 
managers against heeding the advice of consultants, for instance, who often 
apply generic solutions to organisations regardless of their structure, culture 
and so on.
There is, however, a caveat to generating sustainable competitive
advantage through organisational learning and adaptation, proposed by De
Geus (1997). Organisations that adapt too quickly to their environment are
more vulnerable to environmental uncertainty because they have not
maintained the “requisite variety” within the organization to adapt to changing
circumstances (McKelvey, 1983). To maintain requisite variety, McKelvey and
Aldrich adopt Weick’s (1977) plan that some cumbersomeness be built into
the organisation:
"The essence of his plan is his call for effective organisations to be garrulous, 
clumsy, superstitions, hypocritical, monstrous, octopoid, wandering, and 
grouchy, it Is well to build in some clumsiness or “galumphing,” defined as 
‘patterned voluntary elaboration or complication of process’ (Miller, 1973) 
instead of designing organizational means that are streamlined, finely tuned, 
efficient, and inflexibly focused on a specified goal” (McKelvey and Aldrich,
1983, p. 122).
The concept of natural selection, according to this view, helps to illuminate 
how the requisite varieties (including processes and people) within 
organisations are selected or “weeded out”. For the organization to survive, it 
is thus argued, it is important to be aware of the selection processes within the 
organization. Putting units in competition with each other, thus causing an 
internal “struggle” is advised for “shaking out" units that are not competitive 
and keeping the organization prepared for industry shake-outs where 
organisational mortality rates jump.
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While natural selection and population ecology are still useful metaphors 
for continuous learning, it is important to note that advances in evolutionary 
biology have shown that the theories of natural selection have been blind to 
natural co-operation. Competition and competitive behaviour, according to 
evolutionary biologist Sahtouris (1996), is more a characteristic of young 
species as opposed to mature systems such as old growth forests. As 
Sahtouris points out, in many ecosystems competition e.g. for light amongst 
species in old growth forests, is balanced by co-dependence and co-operation 
amongst species. Those species that do not learn to co-operate perish 
(Sahtouris, 1996). Furthermore, cases of co-evolution, according to Imanishi, 
are an inherent characteristic throughout evolution (Thuillier, 1986). As 
Lietaer (2001) says:
“Even our own bodies would not be able to survive iong without the symbiotic 
collaboration of billions of micro-organisms in our digestive tract" (Lietaer,
2001, p. 52).
One can also criticize this strategic perspective e.g. (Aldrich, 1979) for being 
over-determined, and as such, reducing strategic management to a purely 
reactive proposition. In other words, the environmental determinists take 
away the possibility of choice (e.g. Child, 1972) in the strategic equation.
At the environmental level, strategy formulation, from a planning 
perspective, frequently places managers in the central role of steering 
organisations towards effective strategies for adapting to and manipulating 
their environments (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983, p. 121). As Chamberlain 
(1968) states:
“Strategic decisions ... express a firm’s purpose, a future state of affairs 
which it expects to bring into being ... Strategic decisions imply a belief in 
power to control the future, to make it something other than predictable. A 
choice of objective is involved, and then a contrivance of means, and both of 
these involve an assertion of will rather than responses deterministically 
derived from what has gone on before, they are purposive thrusts into the
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future rather than decisions directed by testable logic or continuity of 
circumstance” (Chamberlain, 1968, p. 33-34).
However, as McKelvey and Aldrich counter:
“Thinking that one can control the future is heady stuff. Our view is that 
some conditions or effects, those that comprise the niche, are subject to 
manipulation by the organization, but that the broader environment is not 
open to influence” (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983, p. 121).
While this debate may be ultimately irresolvable, it does nothing to diminish 
an important contribution to strategic management thinking. In sum, this 
‘environmental’ perspective calls attention to organizational environments and 
to the possibility that in certain circumstances organizations may be 
constrained by their environments, and consequently forced to react and 
adapt, and at other times organizations may have choice and the ability to 
either position or to influence their environments. In both cases, this 
perspective agrees that the “environment” is external and knowable, and as 
such, the two approaches to strategic management are not mutually 
exclusive.
The ability of a firm to influence its environment is a debate that has been a 
characteristic of strategic thought in the literature since the late 1960s, and 
quite likely dates farther back in time. In recent years it has manifested itself 
in the creative tension that exists between the resource-based view of the firm 
and the positioning school. In a sense, McKelvey and Aldrich (1983) have 
elements of both positions. They highlight the “requisite varieties” within the 
organization as being paramount for the survival and adaptability of the 
organization and they also recognize that the firm’s ability to influence the 
environment is restricted. Learning is thus seen as an important approach for 
developing the necessary “requisite varieties”. Quoting an (anonymous) top-
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level corporate strategy expert from an internationally renowned consulting 
firm, McKelvey and Aldrich state:
"So what do the great military strategists, like Patton or MacArthur, or the 
great business strategists, like Walter Wriston or Patrick Haggerty, really do?
What are the excellent companies -  who talk less, but do more about 
strategy -  really up to? I think the answer is this: first they are experimenting 
far more than the rest -  they are not more prescient than any others; they 
simply have lots and lots of experiments, trials, and miniature ventures going 
on at any one time. Second, they are better learners. Because their top 
managers have first-hand knowledge of all the trials going on in their 
companies (and perhaps those of competitors) they have first-hand 
knowledge of what works and what does not work. Third, they do not 
experiment expensively; they seem to have systems for quickly cutting off the 
failures and stepping up resources to the apparent successes. That’s it. I 
submit that the real strategists are simply better learners who are 
experimenting more’’ (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983, p. 123).
Planning as learning, to many strategic scholars, has been viewed as an 
incremental process. Lindblom (1959), whose concept of planning in public 
entities as a ‘science of muddling through’, germinated the idea of planning as 
complex and fragmented process consisting of balancing a myriad of 
alternatives, interests, values and objectives. Planning has accordingly 
become so much that some scholars have asked the question of whether it 
has dissipated into nothing.
Wlldavsky (1973) suggests that ‘if planning is everything, maybe its 
nothing.’ Writing in the context of the early, turbulent years of the 1970s, 
when planning and planners were under siege from a general disenchantment 
with planning, Wildavsky argues that:
“The planner has become the victim of planning; his own creation has 
overwhelmed him. Planning has become so complex planners cannot keep 
up with it. Planning protrudes in so many directions, the planner can no 
longer discern its shape. He may be economist, political scientist, 
sociologist, architect or scientist. Yet the essence of his calling -  planning -  
escapes him. He finds it everywhere in general and nowhere in particular.
Why is planning so elusive?" (Wildavsky, 1973, p. 185)
Wildavsky (1973) goes on to suggest that planning, as it was, and still is 
constituted, cannot work in the environment that it is meant to function.
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Wildavsky explores several themes such as planning as the ability to control 
the future. Success in planning, he contends, is thus measured by the ability 
of current acts to control the future. Failures to control the future are therefore 
equated with planning failures. Thus, in terms of national planning, causal 
knowledge is the first requisite:
"If the consequences of contemplated actions cannot accurately be 
appraised, specified objectives will be achieved only by accident” (Wildavsky,
1973, p. 187).
Causal knowledge is even more important in long-range planning because 
every error in prediction will be magnified further up the causal chain "because 
of its impact on future decisions” (p. 187). Of course, there are inter­
relationships between causal chains so planners must have a broad 
knowledge of causality. Planning is also inherently political. Planning 
assumes power, defined as the ability to get people to act in ways that they 
otherwise would not. Planning is adaptive. It assumes future objectives, often 
extrapolated from present trends and projected into the future, and intervenes 
to ensure that those objectives are achieved. Evaluation of formal planning 
depends on the link forged between the future performance of the 
organization and the intentions expressed in the plan. Planning is, therefore, 
also Intention. However: “The virtue of planning is that it embodies universal 
norms of rational choice.” (P. 197). Planning is thus preferred because:
"It is systematic rather than random, efficient rather than wasteful, co­
ordinated rather than helter-skelter, consistent rather than contradictory, and 
above all, rational rather than unreasonable” (Wildavsky, 1973, p. 197).
The sanctity of formal planning results in the impairment of learning because, 
despite its numerous failures, planning is not supposed to make mistakes, and 
to learn, “one must make mistakes” (P. 207).
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Quinn (1980), in a study conducted of ten major companies, found that 
strategy formulation is not “muddling through", as Lindblom found, but it is a 
process of logical incrementalism. As Quinn states: “It is conscious, 
purposeful, proactive, good management" (Quinn, 1978, p. 19). If the process 
is properly managed, it allows concepts of organisational behavior, theories of 
power and politics, and rational systematic analyses to be bound together by 
the executive. The process must:
"Proceed flexibly and experimentally from broad concepts toward specific 
commitments, making the latter concrete as late as possible in order to 
narrow the bands of uncertainty and to benefit from the best available 
information" (Quinn, 1978, p. 19).
Consequently, according to Quinn, the most effective strategies emerge from
opportunistically and incrementally blending together a series of strategic
subsystems “into a cohesive pattern that becomes the company’s strategy.”
As Quinn states:
"The real strategy tends to evolve as internal decisions and external events 
flow together to create a new, widely shared consensus for action among key 
members of the top management team. In well-run organisations, managers 
pro-actively guide these streams of actions and events incrementally toward 
conscious strategies ..." (Quinn, 1980, p. 15).
Incrementalism is viewed as a learning process (Mintzberg, 1978) and has 
also been seen as an outcome of social and political processes (Pettigrew, 
1977) within organizations. As Johnson (1988) summarises;
"... the underlying theme is that the strategic development of an organization 
needs to be seen as building on current practice and managerial beliefs 
about organizational competences within a political and historical context”
(Johnson, 1988, p. 91).
While Johnson does not take exception with the notion of “incrementalism” 
per se, he calls into question Quinn’s (1980) notion that incrementalism is 
logical. According to Johnson, strategy emerges from a combination of 
programs, symbolism and cognition, which, unlike the view of strategy 
formulation as a rational process constrained by paradigms and politics within
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the organization, is at times illogical. Based on a study of a firm referred to as 
Coopers, Johnson finds that the configuration of "organizationally relevant 
strategic responses” to environmental stimuli is shaped by the interpretation of 
the environmental stimuli. Interpretation of environmental stimuli, however, is 
shaped by the organisational paradigm; the commonly held assumptions and 
beliefs that weave through the organization and the explanations and stories 
of the managers.
Johnson uses Mintzberg’s (1978) concept of intended and realized 
strategy to help to distinguish between the organization’s “strategy” and the 
organisation’s “paradigm”. Johnson says:
“Realized strategy is taken to mean the observable output of an 
organization’s activity in terms of its positioning over time. By intended 
strategy is meant the strategy that managers espouse, perhaps in some sort 
of formal plan, public statement, or explanation. The paradigm, on the other 
hand, is a more generalized set of beliefs about the organization and the way 
it is or should be and, since it is taken for granted an not problematic, may be 
difficult to surface as a coherent statement. It is more likely to emerge in the 
explanations and stories of managers. The point is that both intended and 
realized strategy are likely to be configure within the parameters of the 
paradigm” (Johnson, 1988, pp. 84-85).
Johnson goes on to argue that, in the organization under study, the paradigm
resisted change for two primary reasons. First of all, it is internally consistent
with the accepted wisdom within the organization and it was observed to be
self-legitimizing and self-preserving. As Nathan (1998) points out, there is a
“perverse power of normalization”, which motivates people working in
organizations to preserve its past history, stability and traditions (Nathan,
1998) -  to preserve the status quo (Roux-Dufort, 2000). Secondly, the
paradigmatic system of beliefs and assumption is “preserved and legitimized
in a “cultural web” of organizational action in terms of myths, rituals, symbols,
control systems and formal and informal power structure which support and
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provide relevance to core beliefs” (Johnson, 1988, p. 85). Exhibit 3.2 
illustrates Johnson’s “cultural web of an organization”.
Exhibit 3.2 The cultural web of an organisation
fructures
Source: Johnson, 1988, p. 85.
Johnson (1988) observes that consciously managed logical incrementalism 
does not necessarily keep pace with environmental change, and indeed, in 
the case study of Coopers through the 1970s, the environment (i.e. market 
changes) and incrementally adjusted strategic change moved adrift. Logical 
incrementalism thus results in “strategic drift”. Strategic drift was also found in 
two other company studies, leading Johnson to account for it as the following:
1. Sensing of external stimuli is muted because the stimuli are not meaningful in 
themselves; they take on a relevance, and responses are operationalised in terms of 
the paradigm.
2. Managers believe they are adapting to a changing environment when in. fact they are 
adapting to signals, which coincide with the paradigm.
3. There is likely to be resistance to “deviant" interpretations of the environment if they 
threaten the paradigm. This results in political pressure for conformity or marginal 
adjustments to strategy.
4. Strategic drift is not easily discerned by managers. However, in the event of its 
detection remedial action is likely to take the form of solutions constructed within the 
bounds of the paradigm anyway.
5. Moreover these adjustments may well be enough to demonstrate the efficacy of the 
action to the satisfaction of stakeholders since, given the application of the familiar, 
there is a good chance that there will be some signs of performance improvement, at 
least in the short term. (Johnson, 1988, p. 88).
Chapter Three: Scenarios: From Planning to Thinking %
Counterfactual Reasoning In Strategy Context 79
Other researchers note the notion of strategic drift. Chandler (1962) and 
Grinyer and Spender (1979a) observe the resilience of structures and 
strategies and Mintzberg (1978) has also noted that organisations will 
infrequently require global changes but in the interim they go through periods 
of continuity, flux and incremental adjustment. Miller and Friesen (1980) also 
find that:
“Managers demand a large potential benefit before they are willing to destroy 
the order and complementarity of elements inherent in the old gestalt and 
begin to construct a new one. The price paid for this sluggish 
responsiveness to the need for reversals in evolutionary trends, and 
occasional revolutionary periods with all of their turmoil, expense and 
confusion” (Miller and Friesen, 1980; also quoted in Johnson, 1988).
Thus, Johnson (1988) concludes that: “managers are likely to espouse such
“logical incrementalism” but that such espousals may disguise a system of
management rooted in the currency of the paradigm.” (p. 89). According to
Johnson, this begs the question of how “strategic drift” can be avoided while
generating more effective adaptive incremental strategic management?
Johnson’s concept of organisational culture as a “complex web of 
individual assumptions and beliefs” (McKiernan, 1996, p.xx) is not original. 
Kuhn’s (1970) concept of the paradigm, which results from his research into 
the history of science, “re-established the term paradigm as an overall gestalt 
or coherent pattern of beliefs” (Grinyer and Spender, 1979a, p. 115), and, 
despite the many controversies of the terms meaning, has been used 
extensively in strategic management literature. McKiernan (1996), for 
instance, describes organisational paradigms as the culmination of manager’s 
interactions, and the shared beliefs that form from those interactions and grow 
to dominate strategic decisions. He says:
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"New managers enter into the organizations deal with uncertainty. Key 
frames of reference that forge beliefs can come from the functional or 
professional background of managers, from organizations or the industry 
itself" (McKiernan, 1996, p. xx).
Grinyer and Spender (1979a) similarly conclude from their survey of the
literature that empirically based models of managerial recipes are similar.
They state:
"The concept of industry recipe combines several features that seem to 
highlight managers’ own attitudes toward their work. It is dynamic, and 
consistent with a cyclical patter of growth and decay; it captures the 
managements’ experience and learning; and it allows re-orientation through 
both innovation and imitation” (p. 129).
These features are embodied in successive strategies. As the company 
learns “the recipe becomes consolidated and adopted as a cognitive structure 
that permits both screening and interpretation of environmental events” (p. 
118). It becomes reflected in institutionalizing behavior, procedures and 
programming. In the face of environmental change, this pattern of beliefs, the 
“paradigm” (Johnson, 1988), becomes increasingly obsolete, but the 
obsolescence is not recognised by the managers. Repeated failures of the 
strategies result in the decline of the firm and a loss of faith by management in 
the paradigm. Eventually it is vanquished and replaced.
Grinyer and Spender’s (1979a) account is similar to that of Argyris’ 
experiential model (Argyris, 1982) of comprehensive systems of belief 
impeding learning. The “recipes” that are formed by organisations for certain 
industries “constrain thinking and prevent change and adaptation, particularly 
when organizations face major crises” (McKiernan, 1996, pp. xx-xi). The 
result is that firms respond by doing more of the same. In their study of 
Newton Chambers engineering subsidiary, for instance, Grinyer and Spender 
found that management responded to a long-term decline in market demand 
for its products by “adding standardized products produced by the same
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processes and directed to the same major customers and, on the other hand, 
seeking to penetrate an entirely new market for project management services” 
(Grinyer and Spender, 1979a, p. 123).
Sheldon (1980) also subscribes to an organizational paradigmatic theory of 
organizational change. In the context of medical services, Sheldon observes 
that all organizations have a proclivity to adopt paradigms. Paradigms, in 
Sheldon’s view, reflect a perfect fit between an organization, its processes 
and its environment, “with all dimensions harmoniously directed toward some 
cherished end” (Sheldon, 1980, p. 62). The organisation, once it has reached 
a stable, harmonious “fit” with its environment, as was the case with Western 
Psychiatric Hospital, would “rather fight-or die-than switch” (Sheldon, 1980, p. 
62), Sheldon argues that when change is evolutionary, or when the 
organisation senses the onset of a change that will be disadvantageous, it 
triggers a normal process of organisational change and organisational 
learning. Organisations that are open to learn can be described as “open 
systems”.
Sheldon questions whether organisations can engage in continuous 
learning because of a profound tendency towards stability. Paradigmatic 
resistance to change can be strong. Sheldon draws a parallel between this 
“closed” paradigmatic state and the phenomena of groupthink noted by Janis 
(Janis, 1971). Referring to the case of South [medical] clinic, Sheldon says:
“Members of the organization collude to avoid any questioning of their 
ideology or what they do. They seem to experience “doublethink,” a state in 
which they simultaneously acknowledge and deny aspects of the 
organization that do not work ... An illusion of unanimity is created -  one in 
which people repeatedly make statements they believe are shared by others, 
yet with out checking this belief. Finally, any deviance from the norm is 
regarded as betrayal or desertion" (Sheldon, 1980, p. 63).
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While these perspectives emphasize the necessity of understanding the 
human mind and also the complexity and importance of understanding 
organizational culture, one criticism of this literature is that they have failed to 
learn from developments in cognitive social psychology, perhaps because 
cognitive social psychology has failed to address problems directly associated 
with strategic management, and conceptually, cognitive and cultural 
perspectives remain vague (Mintzberg et ai. 1998). As a consequence, the 
literature is descriptive and retrospective in content. What is needed is more 
prospective thinking on solutions to strategic management problems, rather 
than just useful vocabulary that is used to discuss the status quo.
3.33 Patterns and Common Themes in the Strategic Learning Literature 
In the strategy literature that pertains to learning, scholars adopt diverse 
perspectives. Pettigrew (Pettigrew, 1992; 1977; Child, 1972), and Hickson et 
al. (1971) see strategy formulation as a political process. Hurst et al. (1989) 
view strategy formulation as a process of visioning. Johnson (1988), Quinn 
(1978), Wildavsky (1973), and Lindblom (1959) conceive strategy as 
incremental, sometimes logical (Quinn, 1978), sometimes constrained by 
paradigms and politics (Johnson, 1988) and at other times over-stretched in 
its attempts to encompass every aspect of organisational activity and 
environmental complexity, and as such, some argue, strategy has 
deteriorated into nothing (Wildavsky, 1973; Lindblom, 1959 ). McKelvey and 
Aldrich (1983), following in the Darwinian (1860) tradition of natural selection, 
argue that organisations survive or perish based on their “fit” with their 
environments. A harmonious “fit” with an organisation's environment is
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dependent on the specific combination of power centres, systems, resources, 
processes and the culture of the organisation. Sheldon (1980), and Grinyer 
and Spender (1979a) analyse strategy formulation in terms of organisational 
paradigms (Sheldon, 1980) and the closely related industry and managerial 
recipes (Grinyer, 1979a). As McKiernan (1996) summarizes:
“Organizational culture is a complex web of individual assumptions and 
beliefs. These will have evolved through experiential learning in various 
management positions in the same or in different industries. As managers 
interact, a shared belief or ‘organizational paradigm’ is formed which can 
grow to dominate strategic decisions’’ (McKiernan, 1996, p. xx).
Each one of the perspectives reviewed in this section conceptualises 
strategy differently. However, there are some common patterns and themes 
that are similar in each one of the perspectives and can be extracted from the 
literature.
Sheldon (1980), and Grinyer and Spender (1979a) have a cultural 
perspective on strategy, which McKelvey and Aldrich (1983) also emphasise 
as being an important element in an organisation’s harmonious “fit” with its 
environment. Johnson (1988), who conceptualises strategy as being an 
incremental process, emphasises the importance of culture, mythology and 
rituals, and Lindblom (1959), another incrementalist, also recognises the 
importance of ‘values’ in organisations.
Pettigrew (1992; 1977), Child (1972), and Hickson and Hinings (1971) view 
strategy formulation in terms of the political process that underlie strategic 
decisions, but power also features prominently in Wildavsky’s (1973) analysis 
of strategy and in Johnson’s [Johnson, 1988 #219] incrementalist view of 
strategy, as it does, if less explicitly, in Sheldon’s (1980) notion of 
paradigmatic shifts, Grinyer and Spender’s (1979b) notion of managerial 
recipes and Prahalad and Bettis (1996) abstractions of dominant logics.
Chapter Three: Scenarios: From Planning to Thinking
Counterfactual Reasoning in Strategy Context 84
Notions of paradigms (Johnson, 1988; Sheldon, 1980; Grinyer, 1979a), 
managerial recipes (Grinyer, 1979a), dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis,
1996) cognitions, assumptions and beliefs (Johnson, 1988; Quinn, 1980), and 
causal knowledge (Wildavsky, 1973), conceived as patterns of belief that are 
often resistant to change (Nathan, 1998; Johnson, 1988; Sheldon, 1980; 
Grinyer, 1979a), which influence processes of strategic learning and strategy 
formulation, also feature prominently In the literature.
Despite the varying of perspectives on strategic learning and formulation -  
e.g. cultural, incremental, natural selection, political, visionary -  one can also 
conclude from the literature that there is interplay between each one of these 
common themes; there are patterns (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), which 
result in paradigms (Johnson, 1988; Sheldon, 1980) and recipes (Grinyer, 
1979a). However, despite these various themes being the vestige of 
hindsight -  patterns of belief, paradigms and recipes are formed from learning 
in the present, which is rooted in experiences and information from the past. 
A criticism of the literature on strategic learning is that there is no explicit 
treatment of how history is used by individuals and organisations, how 
individuals and organisations “remember the past in order to take more 
prudent action (indeed enact) the future?”* In other words, how does 
hindsight affect strategic learning, and ultimately, foresight?
* A theme of the International Conference at the University of Strathclyde Graduate School of 
Business, Glasgow,
United Kingdom, July 11 -  13, 2002
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3.34 Bounded Rationality
The studies conducted by Sheldon echo Kuhn’s (1970) observation “that
paradigmatic change is only partly rational”. Perfect, omniscient rationality,
assumed in neo-classical economic models of decision-making, has also been
disparaged by Child (1972). Child emphasises the importance of agency and
strategic choice in decision-making, and postulates that courses of strategic
action are decided through power-holders within the organization, making the
process of arriving at a strategic choice effectively a political one.
Like Sheldon, who observes that “paradigmatic change is only partly
rational” (Sheldon, 1980, p. 63), and Child, who disparages instrumental
rationality assumptions in classical economics and approaches to strategy
formulation (Child, 1972), Simon (1979) highlights such behavioral factors as
bounded rationality, learning, adaptation, searching for decision alternatives
and the replacement of optimization by targets and satisficing goals as
influential in the management of organizations. As Simon says:
“Bounded rationality is largely characterized as a residual category-rationality 
is bounded when it falls short of omniscience, And the failures of 
omniscience are largely failures of knowing all the alternatives, uncertainty 
about relevant exogenous events, and inability to calculate consequences”
(Simon, 1979, p. 502).
Classical theory, according to this view, finds situations where decisions must 
be made under uncertainty, or when there is imperfect competition, 
problematic. Simon (1979) argues that it might be possible to sufficiently 
patch up classical theory to:
“Handle a wide range of situations where uncertainty and outguessing 
phenomena do not play a central role -  that is, to handle the behavior or 
economies that are relatively stable and not too distant from a competitive 
equilibrium” (Simon, 1979, p. 497).
However, when situations characterized by uncertainty and imperfect
competition do exist, there is a strong case for replacing the central
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assumption of perfect rationality in decision-making enshrined in classical and 
neo-classical theory with a theory of bounded rationality. Simon argues that 
failures of omniscience consist of uncertainty about relevant exogenous 
events, failures of knowing all the alternatives, and inability to calculate 
consequences.
Under conditions of bounded rationality, Simon outlines (1955; 1956) “a 
more positive and formal characterisation of the mechanisms of choice" 
(Simon, 1979, p. 502). Simon proposes two central concepts in bounded 
rationality: search and satisficing. Bounded rationality must incorporate a 
theory of search, because if all the alternatives are not presented to the 
decision-maker, then he or she must search for them.
Using the example of a decision taken by a person to search for a second­
hand automobile, Stigler (1961) has sought to develop a search theory using 
the classical notions of utility maximization. Simon, conversely, marginalises 
the concept of utility maximisation because:
“It would have required the decision maker to be able to estimate the ■ 
marginal costs and returns of search in a decision situation that was already 
too complex for the exercise of global rationality” (Simon, 1979, p. 503).
North (1990b) agrees with this line of reasoning, arguing that people do trade
utility maximisation for other values and for ideological convictions. Rejecting
the concept of utility maximisation from the classical and neo-classical
program, Simon [Simon, 1979 #236] chooses to borrow the concept of
aspirations from social psychology because aspirations are not static, but tend
to rise and fall depending on circumstances, and they help to explain why
people search for alternatives. Once they find an alternative that resonates
with their level of aspiration, they will terminate the search. Simon labels this
process of searching for alternatives as satisficing.
Chapter Three: Scenarios: From Planning to Thinking
Counterfactual Reasoning In Strategy Context 87
Simon's notions of the role of behavioural factors in the strategic decision­
making process also reflect the earlier ideas expressed in Chandler's (1962) 
study of American enterprise. As Chandler says:
"[Strategy] can be defined as the determination of the basic long-term goals 
and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals. Decisions to 
expand the volume of activities, to set up distant plants and offices, to move 
into new economic functions, or become diversified along many lines of 
business, involve the defining of new basic goals" (Chandler, 1962. P. 13).
Pettigrew (1977) follows on from previous work with the view of the formation
of strategy as a continuous, Implicit, political process within the organisation.
Like Child (1972) and Simon (1979), Pettigrew also emphasis the role of
choice by individuals and sub-groupings in the strategy formulation process.
He argues that, because of the role that pattern of thinking and perceptions of
the world play, the analysis of strategy formation must also include identifying
and exploring decision events and the causal pathways to those events. To
quote Pettigrew:
"Choices are made and acted upon in processes involving Individuals and 
sub-groupings, at various organizational levels, that develop into the pattern 
of thinking about the world, evaluating that world, and acting upon that world 
that we call strategy. Study of the process of strategy formulation therefore 
involves analysis of both discrete and identifiable decision events and of the 
pathways to and outcomes of those decision events, together with the 
connections between successive decisions over time" (Pettigrew, 1977, p.
78).
Pettigrew points out that strategy formulation is also contextually based. One 
must understand strategy in the context of actions, events, values, 
organisational culture, environmental change and stability, and location in 
time. Indeed, contemporary strategies will comprise of remnants of 
yesterday's strategies as well as concepts of the future. As Pettigrew says:
“Yesterday's strategies will provide some of the pathways to and inputs for 
today's strategies; and today's strategies will have a concept of the future 
built into them. The consequences of the implementation of today's 
strategies will provide part of the context for tomorrow's strategies”
(Pettigrew, 1977, p. 79).
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The strategy formulation process, according to Pettigrew, involves the 
generation of demands by individuals or groups and the process of mobilising 
power associated with each demand. Conflicting demands by various 
individuals or sub-groups present dilemmas that require resolution. Partial 
resolutions of dilemmas may thus stimulate further disparities from individuals 
or sub-groups, depending on the structure, complexity, uncertainty, salience, 
value positions, styles of language use, problem-solving style, external 
pressure and history of relationships. In analysing what demands are 
presented, Pettigrew (1977) postulates that highly diffuse and moveable 
issues of legitimacy are crucial. Notions of meaning are constructed to either 
legitimise or de-ligitimise demands in this political process. The "management 
of meaning" can thus be analyzed using concepts of symbolism, language, 
belief, and myth. Myths, in particular, help to link past strategies with new 
strategies:
"Myths serve as ways of legitimizing the present (demands) in terms of a 
perhaps glorious past, of reconciling apparent dilemmas, and of explaining 
away the discrepancies that may exist between what is happening and what 
ought to be happening. As such, myths provide part of the social cement 
that links old strategies with new strategies and that justifies the very 
existence of the new strategy” (Pettigrew, 1977, pp. 84-86).
Again, Pettigrew reiterates the notion that strategy formulation is a continuous
process; new strategies are linked with old strategies through the temporal
connecting role of myths, language and beliefs. Strategy formulation within
organizations is thus "the reconstruction and re-labeling of old ways of
thinking about, evaluating, and acting upon the world” (Pettigrew, 1977, p. 86).
Traditionally, according to Hurst et al. (1989), the “old ways of thinking” in 
strategic management emphasise problems solving. This framework has 
implicitly stressed the role of a synoptic, senior executive, or executive group,
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who have a “dominant logic” (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) or a “causal map” 
(Weick, 1979) of the structure and functions of their business. This 
established understanding of the business is defined as “rational” and data 
that does not correspond to this shared understanding is treated as an 
aberration or ignored. Likewise, behaviors must also be consistent with 
rational thought. Those that have differing dispositions, relying on feeling, 
intuition and insight, do not fit within the rational paradigm. Those that are 
predisposed to planning, acting and evaluating do. Consequently:
“Intuition, insight and feelings are suppressed because they do not fit within 
the accepted SM process. Individuals openly exhibiting these types of 
behaviors cannot be accommodated within the conventional SM framework 
and are often excluded from the process, even though their contributions 
may be valuable” (Hurst et al., 1989, p. 87).
Thus, traditionally, SM has accommodated rationally thinking people that fit 
into its rational-analytic processes,
“Rather than expanding the process to fit the people, and their different 
abilities, predispositions and preferences” (Hurst ef a/., 1989, p. 87).
Hurst et al. (1989), using Jungian types (sensors, feelers, intuitives, thinkers)
posit that top management groups should be comprised of a mix of types and
styles because, if the diversity can be unified and focused, it can yield great
strength and catalyze continuous renewal of their business. Consequently,
one can argue that strategic management as a discipline has, in recent years,
begun to recognize other forms of intelligence (e.g. emotional intelligence,
intuition (Rowan, 1987)) within top management groups. Despite this recent
development in the literature, it is nevertheless important to point out that non-
rational processes have a much longer epistemological pedigree, and have
been long recognised (e.g. Barnard, 1938; McKenny and Keen, 1974;
Mintzberg, 1976; Hurst etal., 1989):
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"[Non-rational process] is helpful in the innovative, creative processes which 
allow organizations to enact fundamental change, to renew themselves"
(Hurst et al., 1989, p. 88).
Hurst et ai. (1989) nonetheless notes that rational analytic processes continue
to dominate “softer”, more intuitive processes:
"Facts evaluated by a rational analytic thinking process are regarded as more important than 
insight, feelings and even empirical experience!” (Hurst etal., 1989, p. 88)
Rational-analytic reasoning processes, however, even when based on past
experience, are frequently flawed. As Hurst et al. summarize:
"In short, because SM Is based on a logic developed from past experiences, 
it is an appropriate methodology for defending an established business, but 
is less able to prospect. It cannot deal well with novelty and ambiguity; it 
cannot bring into being those new activities which lie outside the structure of 
the managers’ current understanding of their existing business, but which 
may well be required as part of tomorrow’s business” (Hurst et al., 1989, p.88y
Logic that is derived retrospectively or based on the processing of past 
experiences in erroneous hindsight presents a significant shortcoming to 
strategic management process. For example, the paradigms (Johnson, 1988; 
Sheldon, 1980), recipes (Grinyer and Spender, 1979a; 1979b) and dominant 
logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) that people operate in will influence the logic 
developed from past experiences. It has even been shown that fictitious data 
that is consistent with the logic of existing mental models may be remembered 
as being real (March ef a/., 1996).
Shifting imbedded logic in well-developed strategic management process 
thus requires one to unlearn what has been learnt (Hurst ef a/., 1989). This 
view is consistent with the observations of Starkey and McKinlay (1996) in 
their case study of product development in Ford of Europe. They found that 
the majority of organisational learning during the 1980s at Ford, was geared 
towards understanding the Japanese challenge in the auto industry, and in 
introducing lean production, ‘Japan’s secret weapon in the global auto war'
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(Womack, 1990), into Ford. This led to managers at Ford having to ‘undo the 
past, and learn for the future’ (Starkey and McKinlay, 1996). As Starkey and 
McKinlay state:
"[Organizational learning In Ford of Europe] involved the company’s 
managers in a searching analysis of accepted managerial practice in the 
company which led to a gradual ‘unlearning’ of its past competences and to 
the learning of new modes of managerial behaviour" (Starkey and McKinlay,
1996, p. 214).
Flurst et al. (1989) argue that, traditionally, there has not been a means to 
unlearn learning incorporated into conventional SM processes. However, 
some progress has been made, through scenario thinking for example, in 
addressing this shortcoming (De Geus, 1988). To further these
developments, Hurst et al. (1989) have constructed a creative management 
(CM) model. Hurst et al. argue that:
"Organizational realities, like personal realities, consist of complex
interactions of the objective, tangible (‘out there’) and the subjective cognitive 
(‘in there’) elements’’ (Hurst et al., 1989, p. 89).
According to the creative management (CM) model, the CM process passes
through four modes or levels of cognition. As the authors say:
“When (subjective) time is considered, the model incorporates seven 
recursive and not necessarily completely sequential stages whereby an 
original Idea is transformed from an intuitive insight, a vision, into action -  
eventually to become a remembered ‘reality”’ (Hurst et al., 1989, p. 89).
Exhibit 3.3 illustrates the model:
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Exhibit 3.3 The Creative Management Model
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The logic follows that, when analysing the way organisations learn, it is 
important not to over emphasise the linear, recursive process of ‘planning, 
acting and evaluating’ (stages 3 through 5) to the exclusion of the cognitive 
levels of feeling and intuition. Strategic thinking, according to the CM model, 
is rooted heavily in antecedents from past experiences and expectations 
(Stages 4 through 7). The processes thus modify strategic thinking in stages 
1 and 2. Radical innovation occurs when thought breaks from the 
predominating logic and thought structures that are rooted in the past. The 
conceptual structures are constructed post hoc, feedback from stage 5 to 
stage 3 occurs and activities become routinised (Hurst et a i, 1989, pp. 88-91). 
The model illustrates the importance of emphasising the past in strategic 
thinking processes.
Simon’s theory of bounded rationality disputes the “hard core” of the neo­
classical research program (Eggertsson, 1990, p. 9). As North (1990b) 
argues, the importance of Simon’s (1979) work on bounded rationality is that it
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reflects the complexity of environments, “the fumbling efforts we make to 
decipher [those] environments,” the incompleteness of our information, and 
the importance of ideology, which Olson (1996) also highlights, and, as North 
says, is “derived from subjective perceptions' in our reasoning processes 
(North, 1990b, p. 183). It also allows for the possibility that ideological 
conviction, values (North, 1990b), political processes, organisational culture, 
mythology (Pettigrew, 1977), and subjective cognitions (Hurst et al., 1989) will 
influence the paradigms (Johnson, 1988; Sheldon, 1980), managerial recipes 
(Grinyer and Spender, 1979b), and dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986) that constrain managerial mental constructs and binds, as Simon 
argues, the processing of information (Simon, 1979). It also adds weight to 
the argument that the past, in particular the analysis of past experiences and 
routines in hindsight (Hurst et ai., 1989), needs to be emphasized in strategic 
thinking processes. This may entail ‘unlearning’ old competences (Starkey 
and McKinlay, 1996) for, re-iterating Pettigrew:
“The re-construction and re-labeling of old ways of thinking about, evaluating,
and acting upon the world" (Pettigrew, 1977, p. 86).
Argyris (1990; 1982) points out those individuals in decision-making 
processes, executives in the context of Argyris’s research, normally have 
significant reasoning abilities; yet, they are rarely conscious of their use. At 
best, when executives apply their reasoning processes to threatening issues 
they simultaneously lead to a successful short-term solution with the 
consequence of long-range problems -  local improvements with the 
consequence of global decline. In crises, executives see that there is ‘no 
other option’ which is true, Argyris argues, if they are willing to accept the 
world as it is ‘without seeking alternatives.’ Consequently, the capacity to
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identify and rectify errors is diminished. Argyris’s research is further
corroborated by Pentagon papers that expose what happens within the upper 
echelons of the State Department and Defense Department in the United 
States (Argyris, 1982). He explains the results of his research, which he 
argues has been empirically observed to transcend gender, race, age and 
culture, through a socialization process. Through socialization, people
acquire two sets of skills and values.
1. Espoused Theories Of Action: are the skills and values in which people are
conscious of. When in a threatening situation, or faced with a set of threatening
circumstances people’s espoused theories and behaviour will be inconsistent. As
Argyris says: "‘Do as I say, not as I do’ illustrates the point and at the same time 
proves that the point is not new."
2. Theory-in-use: is a theory that we use unconsciously. It is a theory of action that 
has been ingrained since childhood and is often at odds with the theories we 
espouse (Argyris, 1982).
In order for humans to process reality, Argyris explains, and Kolb’s (1991) 
experiential learning model corroborates, they must abstract from the 
complexity of daily life by using more abstract concepts. North (1990b) and 
Simon (1979) argue, and Argyris (1982) also contends that the human mind 
simply can’t process the myriad of complexities that are present in the 
environment at any one time. Argyris maintains that these concepts have two 
key features: A) they are learned at an early age and B) many different 
meanings can be covered by these concepts. We begin to take these 
concepts for granted, calcifying them from questionable abstractions into 
concrete and obvious concepts (Argyris, 1982), and according to Dearborn 
and Simon (1958), people will select information based partly on 
preconceptions (Dearborn, 1958). They search for information that confirms 
our mental models (Makridakis, 1990). This, combined with research on 
paradigms (Johnson, 1988; Sheldon, 1980), managerial recipes (Grinyer and
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Spender, 1979b), and dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), may partly 
account for bounded rationality, which can lead to error in human judgment, in 
particular when it pertains to foresight.
3.4 Chapter Conclusion
Ayton (Ayton, 1998) poses the question “how bad is human judgment?”
He recounts a story told by Arrow (1992) “that illustrates something of the
strength of people’s fondness for judgment even where its inadequacy is
clearly established” (Ayton, 1998, p. 239). Arrow, who was working as a long-
range weather forecaster for the American air force during the Second World
War, found that long-range forecasting was no better than pulling random
numbers from a hat. When the forecasters asked their superiors if they could
be relieved of the task, the reply that they received was: “The Commanding
General is well aware that the forecasts are no good. However, he needs
them for planning purposes” (Ayton, 1998, p. 239).
Ayton thus defines over-confidence in forecasting as:
“An unwarranted faith in the reliability of the forecast and has been attributed, 
at least in part, to a failure to recognize the fallibility of our own judgment”
(Ayton, 1998, pp. 239-240).
Drawing on studies conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1983; 1978; 1977; 
1974; 1973) linking mental heuristics to human judgmental error, Ayton 
argues that human judgment is influenced by arbitrary anchors, is 
insufficiently regressive, induces illusory correlations, and is over-confident, as 
offering a “plethora” of examples of human judgmental error. Because of 
limited mental processing and computational ability, according to this view, 
humans are required to create strategies of simplification to limit the
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complexity of judgmental tasks, thus making use of simplified, error-prone 
heuristics for strategic learning, which give way to biases.
More specifically, two biases, the hindsight bias (Carll, 1999; Sherman and 
McConnell, 1995; Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991; Hawkins and 
Hastie, 1990; Fischhoff, 1975) and creeping determinism (Fischhoff, 1975), 
(Florovsky, 1969), may account for the calcifying of paradigms (Johnson, 
1988; Sheldon, 1980), recipes (Grinyer and Spender, 1979a) and dominant 
logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), as well as for much of the assumptions 
(Sheldon, 1980; Grinyer and Spender (1979b), beliefs (Sheldon, 1980; 
Grinyer and Spender, 1979b), experiences (Hurst et al., 1989; Sheldon,
1980), understanding of history (Pettigrew, 1977), language, (Pettigrew, 
1977), myths (Johnson, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977), politics (Pettigrew, 1992; 
Pettigrew, 1977), routines (Porter, 1991; Johnson, 1988; Cyert and March, 
1963), and symbols (Johnson, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977) that they consist of, and 
resistance to altering them.
From the review and synthesis of research in strategic learning in this 
chapter, it can be concluded that there are sufficient areas of commonality 
within the strategic learning literature to build a conceptual framework for the 
purpose of illustrating how assumptions, beliefs, experiences, understanding 
of history, ideology, myths, routines and symbols coalesce to influence 
strategy formulation and decision-making. Despite an acknowledgment of 
the importance of perceptions and understanding of history and past 
experiences by many researchers (e.g. Hurst et al., 1989; Sheldon, 1980; 
Grinyer and Spender, 1979b; Pettigrew, 1977) in strategy formulation, 
learning and decision-making processes, what is lacking in the literature is an
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in-depth analysis of the various heuristics and biases used to analyse the past 
in hindsight, and the explicit role that hindsight plays in foresight. 
Furthermore, despite strategic management literature being descriptive and 
retrospective in their approach to strategic management research, a question 
that is rarely asked is: “What has already happened that will create the future” 
(Drucker, 1995 p. 62). In other words, the linkage between what we learn in 
hindsight and how that influences foresight is not broached. Yet, as De Wit 
and Meyer argue: “The essence of strategic thinking is the ability to break 
through orthodox beliefs” (1999, p. 70). This is because “we struggle with the 
baggage of history and the question thus becomes how do we escape from 
many of the old prejudices” (van der Heijden, 1996).
Undoing the past and learning for the future (Starkey and McKinlay, 1996; 
Hurst et al., 1989) thus requires an understanding of how error-prone 
heuristics can give way to bias in hindsight, and how these biases can 
influence foresight. The purpose of the following chapter is to further refine 
the role of assumptions, beliefs, experiences, understanding of history, 
ideology, myths, routines and symbols play in strategic thinking, and the role 
of hindsight biases on strategic thinking processes.
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“What we call the past was once the future; and the people of the past no more knew 
what their future would be then we know our own.“
~ Ferguson, 1997
“If things change rapidly and are unpredictable, today’s strategy may be tomorrow’s
disaster.”
-  van der Heijden,
1996
“Very few things happen at the right time, and others do not happen at all.”
~ Herodotus, ca. 450 BC
4.0 Chapter Introduction
The peculiarities of how strategies materialize through individual cognition, 
and how the various cognitive filters, distortions and biases influence the 
strategic process is an underdeveloped theme in strategy. Indeed, as 
Mintzberg et al. (1998) state: “The strategy-formation process is also 
fundamentally one of cognition”; yet, as a strategic “school” of thought, 
cognition remains a loose compilation of research and strategy has not gained 
sufficiently from the research, or insights, of psychology (Mintzberg et al., 
1998, p. 172).
The previous chapter, after reviewing the literature on strategic learning, 
identifies areas of consensus. Vestiges of the past, such as understanding of 
history, assumptions, beliefs, experiences, language, myths, paradigms, 
recipes, routines, stereotypes and symbols, constrain foresight. Learning for 
the future thus begins with ‘undoing the past’ (Starkey and McKinlay, 1996) or 
with a process of ‘unlearning’ (Hurst et al., 1989). Paraphrasing Whitehead
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(Whitehead, 1931), foresight is rooted in deep understanding, and part of that 
deep understanding, by necessity, has to do with understanding how we 
process the past and how that past influences the future.
4.1 Chapter Purpose and Contribution
The purpose of this chapter is to look at the research synthesized in the
last chapter in the context of two biases known as the hindsight bias (Carll,
1999), (Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Christensen-Szalanski and Willham,
1991; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; Fischhoff, 1975) and creeping determinism
(Fischhoff, 1975; Florovsky, 1969). Both biases are well documented in
cognitive and social psychology, but the contribution of this chapter to
understanding the role that hindsight plays in foresight, is to build a
conceptual framework of how these biases influence strategic thinking.
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This chapter contributes to the thesis an integrative framework that draws on 
received research in psychology to theoretically underpin literature on learning 
in strategy and to illustrate the linkages between the two.
4.2 Chapter Structure
This chapter begins by reviewing part of the legacy of Freud (1905) and
Jung (1994) on individual and collective learning in the context of strategic 
management. It suggests that there are various biases that will also influence 
perceptions about the world and prescience. Two biases, the hindsight bias 
(Carll, 1999; Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Christensen-Szalanski and 
Willham, 1991; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; Fischhoff, 1975) and creeping 
determinism (Fischhoff, 1975; Florovsky, 1969) are reviewed in detail, and 
experimental attempts to control for these biases are also explored.
4.3 Freud. Jung and Strategic Thinking
The father of modern psychiatry to many is Sigmund Freud (1856-1939).
Psychoanalysis resonates people’s attitudes towards sexuality with findings 
derived from examining the unconscious, and by extension, the mind through 
free association and dream analysis. Freud’s theories of the superego, ego, 
id, and unconscious established the psychoanalytic, or otherwise known, 
Viennese movement. The superego pertains to standards of behavior. The 
ego is reflected in the personality. The id corresponds to the primitive forces 
of the personality. The unconscious acts as a reservoir for sublimated and 
repressed memories and thoughts that we’ve been unable to address, but 
occasionally release themselves through unconscious actions or through 
dreams. While Freud’s theories, especially on infantile sexuality, were
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passionately, at times vehemently debated (Freud, 1905), the Viennese 
movement did produce several notable disciples, the most famous of which 
was Carl Jung.
Unlike Freud, Jung believes that the unconscious is a repository of 
archetypes, actions and heroes that were expressed in the world’s great 
myths. The world’s great myths reflect the “collective unconscious”. 
According to Jung, archetypes are an inherited symbolic imagery or a pattern 
of thought found in the individual unconscious but generated from the past 
collective experience. Similar experiences are measured against these 
patterns and the personality, in all of its complexity, is a structure that 
balances the persona, the ego and archetypal images such as the animus, the 
archetype or “parental model” that women carry with them in their 
subconscious, and the anima, which is the archetype of a women that men 
carry with them (Jung, 1994).
To Jung, the human consciousness, especially in the West, exists virtually 
unrecognized: “For the most part our consciousness, in true Western style, 
looks outwards, and the inner world remains in darkness” (Jung, 1994). 
While many of his ideas are controversial, the importance of Jung’s thinking 
for strategic management generally, and for this chapter in particular, is that 
they do much to establish the notion of schemas and patterns that are used 
as templates to process, compare and contrast new experiences, and have 
much in common with theories of paradigms (Johnson, 1988; Sheldon, 1980), 
dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), and recipes (Grinyer and 
Spender, 1979a) discussed in the last chapter. His theories also highlight the
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complexity of human cognitive behavior and the role of archetypes, 
stereotypes, symbols and myth in our processing of the world.
Conventional wisdom, for instance, might influence our processing of 
information, but it might also be based on unfounded beliefs:
“We have grown up in a culture where we accept certain statements as true, 
though they may not be. For instance, we believe that the more information 
we have, the more accurate our decisions will be. Empirical evidence does 
not support such a belief. Instead, more information merely seems to 
increase our confidence that we are right without necessarily improving the 
accuracy of our decisions ... In reality, the information found Is usually 
redundant and provides little additional value" (Makridakis, 1990, p. 38).
Furthermore, as Hodgkmson and Sparrow (2002), Makridakis (1990) and 
Schwenk (1984) observe, individuals will search for information that confirms 
their initial beliefs when identifying problems. These beliefs, re-enforced by 
confirming information, will restrain or anchor their judgments when looking for 
alternatives to problems, and in particular, when dealing with future 
uncertainty.
The repercussions of these biases can be disruptive to organisational 
learning. As Jack Welch, who initiated a Schumpeterian (1975/1942) e- 
business, creative destruction program entitled ‘destroyyourbusiness.com’, to 
address the increasing gap between General Electric and other companies 
more advanced in harnessing the internet, acknowledged at a shareholder’s 
annual meeting in 2000: “We thought the creation and operation of web sites 
was mysterious, Nobel Prize stuff, the province of the wild-eyed and purple- 
haired’’, and he blamed General Electric’s slow response to the internet 
challenge on ‘cognitive bias’ (Whittington, 2001, p. 110). IBM, who at one 
time predicted that there would only be a total demand for 15 computers, 
missed signals, such as computer chips becoming cheaper, smaller and more
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integrated, and breakthroughs in technology in, for example, communications. 
Consequently, they did not anticipate the advent of the PC and its 
repercussions on their business. As McMaster (1996, p. 151) says: “We all 
know in hindsight what IBM should have done", but it took huge losses, rather 
than foresight, for IBM to break out of its cognitive constructs of the world, 
which were rooted in a past history of developing the mainframe. As Johnson 
argues, “Taken for granted assumptions” feature prominently in organizations 
that have strong cultures, and they are “protected by a web of cultural artifacts 
... which embed the present in organizational history” (Johnson, 1992; p. 30).
4.4 Biases: Reflecting on the Past. Prescience into the Future
Research in behavioural decision psychology (e.g. Kahneman et al.,
1982b; Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff, 1975a; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) 
have identified a number of cognitive biases that influence decision-making 
and human judgment, which, as Hodgkinson and Sparrow 2002) point out, 
may have a bearing on strategic management processes.
Research in cognitive, decision and social psychology has found that 
humans use certain heuristic principles, or ‘rules of thumb’, for simplifying a 
complex world and facilitating information processing and decision-making 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). These heuristics can be beneficial to 
facilitating decision-making, but they can also lead to significant errors and 
biases (Prahalad and Bettis, 1996). Simon (1957), for instance, has shown 
that ‘saticificing’, which refers to people choosing the first alternative to a 
problem that conforms to basic requirements for solving the problem, is one 
such heuristic, but also has the disadvantage of constraining the number of 
alternatives considered.
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Research in psychology has shown that belief systems are remarkably 
resilient to change, even when evidence is presented to challenge them 
(Sherman et al., 1981; Ross et al., 1977). As Fischoff argues: “Confidence in 
present knowledge controls our pursuit of new information and interpretations” 
(Fischhoff, 1977b, p. 350). Research on interpersonal expectations and 
stereotypes, for example, has shown that after an interaction between an 
individual who has prior expectations about, or had stereotyped a target 
individual, there was no change, and in some cases the stereotype was 
strengthened after the encounter (Darley and Gross, 1983; Duncan, 1976; 
Langer, 1974; von Hippel, 1995; Munro, 1997). Social cognition research has 
also demonstrated that already held beliefs and attitudes influence information 
processing (Slovic and Lichtenteenstein, 1971; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 
Ross et a/., 1975; Ross et al., 1977; Munro and Ditto, 1997). Some 
researchers (e.g. Word etal., 1974; Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968) postulate 
that expectancy biases information processing by changing behavior “in ways 
that elicit expectancy-confirming information from the target” (Munro and Ditto,
1997). This helps to explain the resilience of the paradigms (Johnson, 1988; 
Sheldon, 1980), dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), and recipes 
(Grinyer and Spender, 1979b) discussed in the last chapter, as well as the 
resilience of assumptions, experiences, mythologies, routines and symbols, 
which paradigms, dominant logics and recipes are reliant on, and which, as 
Johnson (1992) argues, are imbedded in history.
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4.5 Scenario thinking
Scenario thinking is not immune to biases. Schoemaker (1995) points out
that when thinking about the future there are three classes of knowledge that 
are useful to contemplate.
They include:
1. Things we know we know;
2. Things we know we don’t know;
3. Things we don't know we don’t know;
Each class of knowledge is constrained by various biases. These biases can 
include an inclination to look for confirming information (Munro and Ditto, 
1997; Schwenk, 1995; Word et al., 1974; Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968), 
defensive pessimism (Showers, 1992; Cantor and Norem, 1989) and over­
confidence (Schoemaker, 1995; Russo and Schoemaker, 1992; Fischhoff, 
1982). Consequently, the things that we think ‘we know we know' may be the 
result of inaccurate prediction. The things ‘we know we don’t know' may be 
amplified by looking for confirming information of the things ‘we know we 
know’, and the things that ‘we don’t know we don’t know’ may be exaggerated 
through over-confidence. Flowever, bias in scenario thinking may not be 
solely negative (Schoemaker, 1995, p. 38). Tversky and Kahneman (1983) 
illuminated a bias termed the “conjunction fallacy”. This is a fallacy where 
individuals violate the laws of probability by deeming the likelihood of a 
conjunction of two events coming to pass more likely than one of these events 
in isolation (Schoemaker, 1995).
Despite there being some ‘positive externalities’ to bias, for the most part 
they are disruptive to effective foresight. Biases such as searching for 
confirming information, over-confidence and defensive pessimism can be 
derivatives of two disruptive biases known as the “hindsight bias” and
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“creeping determinism”. These biases constitute two foresightful thinking 
flaws.
4.51 The Hindsight Bias
The hindsight bias is a phenomenon that takes place after the occurrence 
of an event. It leads people to overestimate the likelihood that they could 
have predicted its outcome before its occurrence as easily using foresight, as 
it was using hindsight after its occurrence (Arkes et al., 1988). Thus, asking 
the question: “In the light of current knowledge, what was the probability in 
1988 that the Berlin Wall would be opened within a year?” would elicit a 
response that exaggerates the probabilities of such an event occurring. There 
is a discrepancy between prospective probabilities (the subjective probabilities 
that would have been given if the question had been asked before the event, 
and retrospective probabilities given if the question was asked after the 
outcome of the event was already known (Kahneman and Varey, 1990, p. 
1103).
The hindsight bias (Carll, 1999; Sherman and McConnell, 1995; 
Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; 
Fischhoff, 1975a; Fischhoff, 1975a) has been found in areas as diverse as 
employee evaluations (Mitchell and Kalb, 1981), psychotherapy case histories 
(Fischhoff, 1975a), politics (Leary, 1982), medical diagnosis (Arkes et al.,
1981) and historical judgment (Dawson et al., 1986). It results in 
overconfidence when analyzing the past, which reduces what one can learn 
from outcome knowledge because people claim that they ‘knew it all along’ 
(Arkes et al., 1988). Consequently, the driving forces from the past that have 
been identified to shape change in the future may be over-estimated and mis-
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clarified. This can dilute foresight ability. As Fischhoff (1975a) states, the 
formal demarcation between hindsight and foresight is that: “hindsight and 
foresight differ formally in the information available to the observer” (p. 288).
4.52 Creeping Determinism
Creeping Determinism, coined by Fischoff (1975a), is a phenomenon that 
can lead unknowingly to what Argyris (1982) has called miss-interpretation, 
self-fulfilling prophecies, self-sealing processes and escalating error through 
an inherent human tendency to gravitate towards determlnist explanations of 
history that result from the process of retrospection itself. One of the first to 
identify this phenomenon is the historian Florovsky, who notes:
“The tendency toward determinism is somehow implied in the method of 
retrospection itself. In retrospect, we seem to perceive the logic of the events 
which unfold themselves In a regular or linear fashion according to a 
recognizable pattern with an alleged inner necessity. So that we get the 
impression it really could not have happened otherwise” (Florovsky, 1969, p.
369).
In other words, the logic of past events leads us to believe that they could not 
have happened otherwise (Florovsky, 1969, p. 369). Fischhoff (1975a) terms 
the tendency to perceive received outcomes as having been inevitable as 
“creeping determinism”. It is used by Fischhoff (1975a) to describe a 
condition where outcome knowledge is automatically, quickly and 
unconsciously Integrated with a person’s mental representation of events. As 
Flawkins and Flastie state:
"The characteristic effect of creeping determinism was the tendency to perceive 
a reported outcome as virtually inevitable, reflected in retrospective probability 
estimates, because of the seemingly unalterable sequence of events leading up 
to it” (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990, p. 313).
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An example of creeping determinism would be when the question: "In the light 
of current knowledge, what was the probability in 1988 that the Berlin Wall 
would be opened within a year?” is asked, the respondent gives a list of 
reasons, such as internal and external pressures in the former Soviet Union 
and GDR, to why the fall of the Berlin Wall was predictable and inevitable.
Creeping determinism is pervasive in scholarship, especially in historical 
analysis and can lead to faulty reasoning. To correct it, as Argyris (1982) 
argues with his concepts of ‘theories-in-use’ and ‘espoused theories-of- 
action,’ requires a change in reasoning processes. This is not something that 
a quick fix or gimmick can rectify. It requires an awareness of common, but 
often unconscious, cognitive biases such as the hindsight bias and creeping 
determinism in past events and experiences, which, if unchecked, can result 
in the generation of path-dependencies (Booth, 2003; Teece et al., 1997) into 
the future, thus narrowing the range of possible alternative futures that can be 
perceived.
Fischhoff (1975a), in exploring the difference between judgmental 
differences in hindsight and in foresight, asks two questions: ‘‘How does 
receipt of outcome knowledge affect judgment?” and ‘‘How aware are people 
of the effects that outcome knowledge has on their perceptions?” (p. 288).
4.53 The Psychology of Creeping Determinism and the Hindsight Bias
Fischhoff (1975a; 1975b; 1977), in an attempt to understand the 
judgmental differences between hindsight and foresight, sought to explore 
Florevsky’s (1969) thesis through a series of experiments. To this end, 
Fischoff (1975a) gave four 150-word descriptions of a clinical or historical
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event to one ‘Before’ and four ‘After’ groups. In his first experiment, for 
example, he gave a passage from Woodward (1938). A typical passage read 
as follows:
"[1] For some year after the arrival of Hastings as governor-general of India, 
the consolidation of British power involved serious war, [2] The first of these 
wars took place on the northern frontier of Bengal where the British were 
faced by plundering raids of the Gurkas of Nepal. [3] Attempts had been
made to stop the raids by an exchange of lands, but the Gurkas would not
give up their claims to country under British control, [4] and Hastings decided 
to deal with them once and for all. [5] The campaign began in November,
1814. It was not glorious. [6] The Gurkas were only some 12,000 strong; [7] 
but they were brave fighters, fighting in territory well-suited to their raiding 
tactics. [8] The older British commanders were used to war in the plains 
where the enemy ran away from a resolute attack. [9] In the mountains of 
Nepal it was not easy even to find the enemy. [10] The troops and transport 
animals suffered from the extremes of heat and cold, [11] and the officers 
learned caution only after sharp reverses. [12] Major-General Sir D. 
Octerlony was the one commander to escape from these minor defeats" (p. 
383-384).
Four possible outcomes were also provided. They included:
“(a) British victory, (b) Gurka victory, (c) military stalemate with no peace
settlement, (d) military stalemate with a peace settlement.” For the After
group participants, Fischhoff appended the correct outcome to the passage in 
the form of an additional sentence, such as, “The two sides reached a military 
stalemate, but were unable to come to a peace settlement.”
Participants were then asked: “In the light of the information appearing in 
the passage, what was the probability of occurrences of each of the four 
outcomes listed below”. On the following page, Fischhoff listed each datum, 
which appeared on a separate line and was followed by a seven-point scale. 
Participants were asked to indicate, “how relevant or important each datum in 
the event description was in determining the event’s outcome” (Fischhoff, 
1975a, p. 289).
Fischhoff found that:
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“Receipt of outcome knowledge increased the postdicted likelihood of reported 
events and changed the perceived relevance of event-descriptive data, 
regardless of the likelihood of the outcome and the truth of the report" 
(Fischhoff, 1975a, p. 288).
Judges were also found to be unaware of the effect that outcome knowledge 
was having on their perceptions. Even though the historical judge typically 
“knows how things turned out”, outcome knowledge can affect judgment. So 
even without knowing what happened, judges come to believe that relative 
inevitability is largely apparent in foresight, “without the benefit of knowing 
what happened” (Fischhoff, 1975a, p. 297). As Fischhoff says:
“Making sense out of what one is told about the past seems so natural and 
effortless a response so natural and effortless a response that one may be 
unaware that outcome knowledge has had any effect at all on him. Judges 
who are aware that outcome knowledge has affected their perceptions still 
face the unenviable task of reconstructing their foresightful state of mind. 
‘Undiagnosed creeping determinism' would characterize the responses of 
subjects who, in reconstruction, were unable to adequately unanchor 
themselves from the perspective of hindsight" (Fischhoff, 1975a, p. 298).
The implications of the hindsight bias and creeping determinism are that, if 
unperceived or left undetected, hindsightful foresight, in the long run, can 
“impair our ability to judge the past or learn from it” (p. 298).
One of the reasons for this is that we have rules or hypothesis that we use 
to both interpret the world (and, in particular the past) and anticipate the 
future, which we implicitly test. If “creeping determinism” and the hindsight 
bias occurs un perceived and undetected, our hypotheses about how the world 
was, is, and will be are subjected to “inordinately weak tests, and presumably, 
finding little reason to change them” (Fischhoff, 1975a, p. 298). We will 
systematically underestimate the surprises that the past held for us, and, as a 
consequence, that the future holds for us. Hindsight, therefore, does not 
equal foresight, and indeed, can impair it. As Fischhoff states:
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“Undiagnosed creeping determinism not only biases people’s impressions of 
what they would have known without outcome knowledge, but also their 
impressions of what they themselves and others actually did know in 
foresight" (Fischhoff, 1975a, p. 297).
One mode of explanation for the hindsight bias is that the perceived “fit” 
between a situation preceding an event and the outcome is increased as 
outcome knowledge is assimilated. A second alternative explanation focuses 
on ‘structural differences between the tasks of hindsight and foresight” 
(Fischhoff, 1975a, p. 298). The ways in which events may not have happened 
may be obscured through scenario retroduction. In other words, the 
possession of outcome knowledge may lead judges to generate scenarios 
from the present backwards into the past, thus reversing their temporal 
perspective (Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975b, p. 298).
Making sense of the past is a pervasive and, often times, unconscious 
endeavor. Consequently, the bias that outcome knowledge creates and its 
affects on one’s perceptions frequently go unnoticed. For those that are 
aware that outcome knowledge has affected their perceptions, they, to re­
iterate Fischhoff, “face the unenviable task of reconstructing their foresightful 
state of mind” (Fischhoff, 1975a, p. 298). Undiagnosed creeping determinism 
on the other hand, “would characterize the responses of subjects who, in 
reconstruction, were unable to adequately unanchore themselves from the 
perspective of hindsight” (Fischhoff, 1975a, p. 299).
In a further study, Fischhoff and Beyth (1975b) asked participants to 
estimate the probability of several possible outcomes of former President 
Nixon’s trips to the USSR and China coming to pass. In the experiment, 
participants who had been asked to estimate the probability of various 
possible outcomes of President Nixon’s visits to Moscow and Peking coming
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to pass were unexpectedly asked to reconstruct their own predictions some 
time after Nixon's return. Consistent with the theory of creeping determinism, 
the researchers found that the postdictive probabilities (probabilities given 
after the event) were higher than the predictive probabilities (probabilities 
given before the event). This led the researchers to the conviction that:
“In real-life such retrospective increases frequently constitute little more than 
facile reductions in the "surprisingness” of what has happened. Rather than 
reflecting some "wisdom of hindsight," they seem to reflect what might be 
called a "knew it all" attitude" (Fischhoff, 1975b, pp. 1-2).
The importance of understanding this phenomenon is based on the 
assumption that Individuals that engage in predictive tasks are interested in 
improving their future performance through adaptive learning. The logical first 
step towards this end, as postulated by Fischhoff and Beyth, is “evaluating the 
accuracy of their own predictions in the light of what has subsequently 
happened” (Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975b, p. 1). As Hock and Loewenstein 
(1989) argue, feedback elicited from any judgmental task will elicit multiple 
cognitive responses that simultaneously produce adaptive learning and 
hindsight tendencies. However, if the surprisingness of past outcomes are 
reduced or distorted by memory, there is a danger that adaptive learning will 
be impaired and individuals will continue to be surprised by future events. To 
quote Fischhoff and Beyth;
“Although a causal link has not been established, it seems reasonable to 
speculate that once distorted in memory, knowledge of unexpected outcomes 
may actually encourage ineffective predicting instead of compelling the Judge 
who is insufficiently aware of the surprises the past held for him. and of the 
need to improve his performance, seems likely to continue being surprised by 
what happens in the future” (Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975, p. 15).
Fischhoff (1982a; 1982b; 1980; 1977; 1975a) established the standard 
paradigm of hindsight research (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990). However, further 
support for his interpretation of creeping determinism and the hindsight bias is
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provided by Wasserman et al. (1991). Wasserman et al. use material (e.g. 
the British-Gurka scenario) similar to that of Fischhoff (1975a) to conduct their 
experiments. The hindsight bias has been found to contribute to 
overconfidence (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; Davies, 1987; Slovic and 
Fischhoff, 1977), and, moving out of the laboratory, has been found to 
influence legal judgments (Casper ef a/., 1988; Carrette and Moreland, 1983), 
medical judgments (Arkes et al., 1988; Arkes et al., 1981; Pennington et al., 
1980), social judgments (Janoff-Bulman et al., 1985; Snyder and Uranowitz, 
1978), the evaluation of "good" and “bad” decisions (Baron and Hershey, 
1988; Buchman, 1985; Mitchell and Kalb, 1981), political election outcomes 
(Leary, 1982; Powell, 1988; Synodinos, 1986; Leary, 1981), and even “expert” 
pollsters (Tufte and Sun, 1975).
Theoretical psychologists, such as Hawkins and Hastie (1990), have 
concluded that the research into the hindsight bias and creeping determinism 
has implications for adaptive learning. Medical diagnosticians, for example, 
may believe that they knew it all along when they receive postdiagnosis 
feedback, and as a result, learn less from the experience than they should, 
and slow the development of medical expertise (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990). 
Sherman et al. (1981) and Ross et al. (1977; 1975) have found that once 
impressions are formed, they exhibit remarkable “perseverance”, even in the 
face of discredited information (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990).
Secondly, adaptive learning and proficient judgment in complex 
environments, particularly when decision-makers are confronted with large 
amounts of information, ambiguity and wide-ranging implications, have to 
simplify and order data (Pennington and Hastie, 1987; Patel and Groen, 1986;
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Hogarth et a/., 1980), which involves: “Constructing a mental model of the 
causal relations among evidence items deemed important by the decision 
maker. This causal model is the mediator between the raw evidence and the 
final decision” (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990, p. 324). Creeping determinism and 
the hindsight bias is an extension of this evaluative process (Nario and 
Branscombe, 1995; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990).
5.6 Foresightful Thinking Flaws
Foresightful thinking flaws, it is argued here, results from the hindsight
bias, creeping determinism, and a shallow perception of history. It occurs
when we take for granted perceptions and conceptions of what we think ‘we
know we know’ about the past, and it increases what we ‘don’t know we don’t
know’ about the future (see exhibit 5.1).
Exhibit 5.1 Foresightfui Thinking Fiaws: A Conceptuai Framework
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As Exhibit 5.1 conceptualises, perceptions and conceptions are generated 
through a combination of assumptions, beliefs, past experiences, cultural 
mythologies, ideology, politics, stereotypes, symbols and so on. They
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contribute to our mental constructs, which are developed using hindsight, and 
determinism of what we think we know about the past creeps in. An 
inclination to either anchor our mental constructs in ‘what we think we know’ 
about the past, and to search for information that confirms our beliefs, prevent 
the necessary feedback to challenge our mental constructs from ‘looping 
back’. The result is that foresightful hindsight and thinking is impaired and 
results in over-confidence or defensive pessimism, which creates misaligned 
routinised behavior, recipes/paradigms/dominant logics, and logical (and 
structural) path-dependencies.
Mintzberg et ai. (1998) identify several key premises for the strategy 
formulation process. They inlcude:
1. strategy formation is a cognitive process that takes place in the mind of the 
strategist.
2. Strategies thus emerge as perspectives -  in the form of concepts, maps, 
schemas, and frames -  that shape how people deal with inputs from the 
environment.
3. These inputs (according to the “objective” wing of this school) flow through 
all sorts of distorting filters before they are decoded by the cognitive maps, 
or else (according to the "subjective” wing) merely interpretations of a world 
that exists only in terms of how it is perceived. The seen world, in other 
words, can be modeled, it can be framed, and it can be constructed.
4. As concepts, strategies are difficult to attain in the first place, considerably 
less than optimal when actually attained, and subsequently difficult to 
change when no longer viable (Mintzberg etal., 1998, pp. 171-172)
The foresightful thinking flaws conceptual framework helps to illustrate the 
process by which strategy formulation processes are a confluence of factors -  
assumptions, experiences, ideology, political processes, language, myths, 
stereotypes and symbols -  which filter and distort ‘inputs’ from the 
environment. They emerge as perspectives, concepts, dominant logics, 
maps, paradigms, routines, and schemas, and can result in ‘considerably less 
than optimal’ forsightful strategies (Mintzberg etal., 1998).
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5.7 Chapter Conclusion
As Mintzberg (1991) writes:
"You cannot see ahead unless you can see behind, because any good vision 
of the future has to be rooted in an understanding of the past" (Mintzberg,
1991).
However, to understand the past, we must first understand the various biases 
that distort our perception of that past, and are reinforced by the various 
assumptions, experiences, ideologies, language, myths, stereotypes and 
symbols.
Understanding of the psychological processes involved in the creation of 
biases is required to protect us from them (Fischhoff, 1982). However, simply 
warning people of their dangers is not, in itself, an effective antidote to these 
biases (Fischhoff, 1977). Attempting to convince oneself that the past may 
have turned out differently than it did (Koriat et a/., 1980; Slovic and Fischhoff, 
1977), or more effectively yet, trying to “track down some of the uncertainty 
surrounding past events in their original form” by looking for alternatives to 
what we think we know about the future counterfactually (Fischhoff, 1982, p. 
343), is an important first step. This is because, if the hindsight bias and 
creeping determinism go unchallenged, and our hypothesis about the past go 
untested when constructing our “foresightful state of mind,” then, “we will 
remain anchored in our hindsight perspective” (Fischhoff, 1982, p. 343).
Psychologists have revealed certain cognitive heuristics that research has 
shown can be used to de-bias hindsight perspectives by challenging 
determinist assumptions of the past, and ‘tracking down some of the 
uncertainty surrounding past events’ through a process of generating 
alternative scenarios about how the past could have turned out differently than
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it did. One such cognitive heuristic is counterfactual reasoning (Roese and 
Olson, 1996; Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Gleicher ef a/., 1995; Markman 
et al., 1993; Mahajan, 1992; Wasserman et a/., 1991; Miller et al., 1990a; 
Wells et al., 1987; Kahneman, 1982). Counterfactual reasoning is a cognitive 
process where individuals will ask “if then” and “if only” questions about the 
past. From these questions people will construct alternative scenarios into the 
past. Researchers have found that counterfactual reasoning is a heuristic that 
people will use for adaptive learning and preparation for the future (Roese and 
Olson, 1995c; Johnson and Sherman, 1990; Folger, 1984). Counterfactuals 
have also been shown to be an effective de-biasing process for the hindsight 
bias and creeping determinism (Mahajan, 1992; Wasserman et al., 1991), 
although this is a controversial preposition, of which some researchers dispute 
(Carll, 1999; Roese and Olson, 1996). As such, the following chapter reviews 
received research in psychology on counterfactual reasoning.
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"O, call back yesterday, bid time return.”
- Shakespeare, 1669
“Whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter, let him think of what is past, for the 
world hath ever been in a circular revolution; whatsoever is now, was heretofore; and 
things past or present, are no other than such as shall be again: Redit orbis in orbem.”
- Ralegh, 1829
“W hatif...?
“With these words human beings achieve the capacity to catapult themselves beyond 
the muck and malignancy of the actual into the liberating realm of the possible.”
- Roese, 1995
5.0 Chapter Introduction 
As the words of Shakespeare and Ralegh illuminate, the past is not a
forgotten, static state in time and space, but an ever present, dynamic period
that ever shadows the present and the future. The human mind continually
wanders back over the trodden trail, searching for forks and alternative paths
that may have led one to a different place in the present. From these
imaginative cognitive journeys into our past, we simulate what we could have
done differently. It is these counterfactual (counter-to-factual) simulations that
help us to learn for the future. Indeed, linguistically, as Steiner states:
"It is unlikely that man, as we know him, would have survived without the 
fictive, counter-factual, anti-determinist means of language, without the 
semantic capacity...to articulate possibilities beyond the treadmill of 
organic decay and death" (Steiner, 1975, p. 227).
It is this ruminating of our past that helps us to create schemas for future 
action, or as Ingvar (1985) calls them, memories of the future. In this sense, 
our individual worlds are forever in a circular revolution, and as Lewis says:
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“There are ever so many ways that a world might be; and one of these many 
ways is the way that this world is” (Lewis, 1986, p. 2).
Counterfactual reasoning is the equivalent of asking oneself ‘what if,' ‘if 
then,’ and ‘if only’ questions after an event have occurred. They are quite 
literally contrary-to-fact conditionals. It is a cognitive process that is intimately 
familiar to every person from a very young age. To quote Dr. Seuss (1959):
I f  we didn't have birthdays, you wouldn't be you.
If you'd never been born, well then what would you do?
If you’d never been born, well then what would you be?
You might be a fish! Or a toad in a tree!
You might be a doorknob! Or three baked potatoes!
You might be a bag full o f hard green tomatoes.
Or worse than all th a t ... You might be a WASN'T!
A Wasn’t has no fun at all. No, he doesn’t  
A Wasn't just isn't. He just Isn’t present 
But you ... You are YOU! And, now isn't that pleasant”
(Roese, 1995, p. 1).
While the genesis of interest in counterfactuals within the domain of social 
psychology dates back to the early 1980s, interest in “possible worlds” dates 
back at least to ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle.
Aristotle’s dictum that actuality is prior to possibility encapsulates the 
conception that a cognitive substrate extracted from tactual experience is 
responsible for the fabrication of any possible world (Roese, 1995, pp. 2-3):
“Unrealized possibility ultimately roots in the mind-correlative capabilities of 
the real” (Rescher, 1975, p. 217). The seventeenth century German |
philosopher, Leibniz, contended that so long as no formal laws of logic are 
violated then an alternative world or reality is possible. Leibniz argued 
theologically that this world must be the best of all possible worlds because 
surely God contemplated all possible worlds before the creation of the one of 
which we currently inhabit (Roese, 1995, p. 3; Ferguson, 1997). Kant, while 
arguing that the focus of philosophical inquiry was to eliminate the role of
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contingency, allowed for the possibility of human arbitrariness in a parallel 
universe that he called “noumena”. However, for the most part, the belief was 
that universal laws determined the manifestations of human actions and all 
external events within the material world (Frost, 1989, p. 41).
Discourse on possible worlds and counterfactuals have been substantial in 
disciplines such as logic and linguistics throughout the 20^ *^  Century. 
Counterfactuals only found their way into social and cognitive psychology in 
the early 1980s, but the psychology studies that have been focused on the 
individual’s use of counterfactuals as a reasoning technique have become 
voluminous. As Roese & Olson state:
“Within a few short years, research on counterfactual thinking has 
mushroomed, establishing Itself as one of the signature domains within 
social psychology. This sudden popularity Is easily understood. 
Counterfactual thinking Is something familiar to nearly everyone. Even if 
they have not previously heard the term counterfactual, people Instantly 
recognize It, once It has been defined for them, as something with which 
they are Intimately acquainted” (Roese and Olson, 1995, p. vli).
Social and cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that an essential 
and pervasive element of an individual's social-cognitive functioning is the 
inherent human tendency to imagine alternative versions of past events 
(Miller et ai, 1990). Further, studies have also shown that there is a common 
counterfactual fallacy to ‘confuse what might have been with what ought to 
have been’ (Miller et al., 1990), thus reflecting the human propensity to search 
for information that corresponds with our perceptions of the world. Moreover, 
this burgeoning field of research proposes that counterfactual reasoning 
influence what we learn from our experiences (Morris and Moore, 1997^;
 ^ Unpublished manuscript, Stanford Graduate School of Business quoted
In Sim, D. L. H., and Morris, W. (June 1998), "Representativeness and Counterfactual 
Thinking:
Principle that Antecedent and Outcome Correspond In Magnitude, Personality & Social 
Psychology
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Roese, 1994; March et al., 1991), and thus serves a preparative function for 
learning for the future.
5.1 Chapter Purpose and Contribution
The previous chapter argues that foresightful thinking flaws results from
the hindsight bias, creeping determinism, and a shallow perception of history. 
Perceptions and conceptions, the argument follows, are generated through a 
combination of assumptions, beliefs, past experiences, cultural mythologies, 
ideology, politics, stereotypes, symbols and so on. They contribute to our 
mental constructs, which are developed using hindsight, and determinism of 
what we think we know about the past creeps in. An inclination to either 
anchor our mental constructs in ‘what we think we know’ about the past, and 
to search for information that confirms our beliefs, prevent the necessary 
feedback to challenge our mental constructs from ‘looping back’. The result is 
that foresightful hindsight and thinking is impaired and results in over­
confidence or defensive pessimism, routinised behavior, 
recipes/paradigms/dominant logics, and logical (and structural) path- 
dependencies.
The previous chapter concludes that hindsight influences foresight by 
biasing how we analyze and learn from the past. As such, some of the 
uncertainty surrounding past events must be ‘tracked down’ (Fischhoff and 
Tversky, 1982). It is proposed that counterfactual reasoning is a cognitive 
heuristic that may potentially be used for preventing some of the biases that 
contribute to foresightful thinking flaws. The link in the doctoral thesis value 
chain (exhibit 6.0) that this chapter adds to the research question. What roie 
Bulletin, Vol. 24, Issue 6, p. 595.
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does hindsight play in foresight?, is a review and synthesis of recent research 
into counterfactual reasoning, and its role in analysing the past and 
generating foresight into the future.
Exhibit 5.0 Doctoral Thesis Map
Context Content
Doctoral 
Thesis 
Conclusions
Researc
Outputs
(I ; ' ! ' ! I I ! '
■ O h, 2 C h .  3m3 ' ,;An ' 0|v|SIV«W
lilililllllllllll
Oh 5  Ch. 6 Ch. 7
flawW '
Counter-
factual Discussion
Posturing: And
Hindsight Synthesis:
Into The Foresightful
Future? Hindsight
The purpose and contribution of this chapter is to build on the argument 
presented in the last chapter, that hindsight can play a distorting role in 
foresight. This chapter argues that counterfactual reasoning influences our 
affective reactions (i.e. our emotional reactions to events), a range of 
judgments, and under certain circumstances aids, and under other 
circumstances constrains adaptive learning and preparation for the future. 
The chapter concludes that counterfactuals are not a panacea for foresightful 
thinking flaws, and can themselves have dysfunctional attributes, which can 
augment, rather than prevent foresightful thinking flaws.
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5.2 Chapter Structure
This chapter begins with a discussion of norm theory, which catalyzed
socio-cognitive research into counterfactual reasoning research (Kahneman 
and Miller, 1986; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), and affective reactions 
(emotional responses to events). Continuing on with the chronological 
evolution of counterfactual reasoning research, the following section presents 
research developments that propose that spontaneous counterfactual 
reasoning is a simulation heuristic that is frequently triggered by dramatic and 
“surprising” events (Wells and Gavanski, 1989; Gavanski and Wells, 1989; 
Taylor and Schneider, 1989; Wells et al,, 1987). The ‘un-doing' of scenarios 
affects a range of judgments [Miller etal., 1990; Gleicher et a i, 1990), but are 
also constrained by certain cognitive rules (Seelau et al., 1995; Boninger et 
al., 1994; Gleicher et al., 1990; Landman, 1987). As research into 
counterfactual reasoning has evolved, researchers have found that 
counterfactuals serve a “preparative” function for the future (Roese, 1994; 
Markman et al., 1993; Taylor and Schneider, 1989; Wells et al., 1987), and 
that people’s predisposition for considering alternative pasts may be 
correlated with their disposition to the future (Strathman et al., 1994).
Counterfactuals, however, are not always an effective learning heuristic, 
and they can have some dysfunctional attributes (Sherman and McConnell, 
1995; Dunning and Madey, 1995; Kruglanski and Freund, 1983), especially for 
foresight. The dysfunctional aspects of counterfactual reasoning are critiqued.
Finally, the relationship between counterfactual reasoning -  generating 
alternative pasts -  and prefactual reasoning -  generating alternative futures -  
is investigated (Sanna and Turley, 1996; Gleicher et al., 1995; Strathman,
1994) and a conceptual framework that incorporates the two is presented.
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5.3 Counterfactual Reasoning: Affective Reactions and Judgment
Counter-factual reasoning affects a wide range of judgments including our
assignment of blame (Miller et al., 1990; Miller and McFarland, 1986), causal
ascriptions (Gavanski and Wells, 1989; Wells etal., 1987), accident and victim
compensation (Macrae et al., 1992; Miller and McFarland, 1986; Turley et al.,
1995), the perception of criminal behavior (Macrae et al., 1993), social
perception (Miller et al., 1990) and our emotional responses to outcomes in
our lives (Gleicher et al., 1990; Landman, 1987; Kahneman and Miller, 1986;
Johnson, 1986). Two studies that catalyzed research into counterfactual
reasoning were entitled The simulation heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky,
1982) and Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives (Kahneman
and Miller, 1986). It is the former study that has traditionally been identified as
the genesis of counterfactual research in social and cognitive psychology. It
is in this study that the authors develop the metaphor of a “mental simulation"
that involves establishing initial conditions and then un-rolling scenarios
through to their possible outcomes (Roese and Olson, 1995c, p. viii). In the
former study, the authors theorize that, rather than changing an event within a
scenario from a normal state to an exceptional state, people have an
inclination to manipulate an event from an exceptional state to a normal state
when un-doing scenarios. Secondly, they argue that people are more inclined
to manipulate a sequence of events within a given scenario by deleting an
event from the sequence as opposed to adding an event to the sequence. In
their study, Kahneman and Tversky proffer three categories for the mental
manipulations that people use when deconstructing scenario outcomes
(Exhibit 5.1). They are:
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□ Horizontal changes: changes of a continuous variable from one
arbitrary value to some other arbitrary value.
□ Uphill changes: the addition of unlikely events.
□ Downhill changes: the deletion of unlikely events.
Exhibit 5.1 Three categories ofmentai manipuiations that people use 
when deconstructing scenario outcomesi +
U p h i l l  C h a n g e s
C h a n g e s  o f  a  c o n t i n u o u s  ^
v a r i a b l e
trarv Value
H o r i z o n t a l  C h a n g e s
D o w n h i l l  C h a n g e s
To test their theory of norms and normality, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) 
developed two versions of a story whose chief protagonist is Mr. Jones. In 
one of the stories, Mr. Jones leaves work at his regular time but takes a more 
scenic route home. At a traffic light, Mr. Jones is killed when a truck strikes 
his car. In the second story, Mr. Jones drives home on his usual route, but he 
leaves his work at an earlier time. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) presented 
their two narratives to two groups of participants and requested them to finish 
sentences that began with “If only ....”. The researchers found that, rather 
than introducing an exception, people have proneness for downhill changes -  
manipulating a variable towards normality (i.e. removing an event that is not 
normal and replacing it with an event that is normal such as ‘if only he had 
taken his normal route or left at his normal time’). Kahneman and Tversky
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(1982) concluded that horizontal changes are almost nonexistent and uphill 
changes are quite rare.
In a later study, Kahneman and Miller (1986) present a theory of normality 
and norms that could be applied to people’s emotional responses, otherwise 
termed affective reactions, to an event. They conducted their study under the 
assumption that people recruit certain representations and then construct 
norms in an ad hoc manner. They postulated that people have pre-computed 
frames of reference and schemas that are consulted and used to interpret the 
flow of experiences that every individual encounters. The authors go further 
and present the idea that norms are registered and processed after an event 
occurs rather than before.
The researchers (Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) expand their studies with their norm 
theory by arguing that people will create their own norms through 
comparisons with similar experiences that are stored in memory, or by 
comparing them to ad hoc counterfactual alternatives. In short, rather then 
pre-computing expectations, people will evoke norms after the fact. The 
authors applied norm theory to the enhanced emotional responses (affective 
reactions) driven by events resulting from abnormal causes, in their subjects, 
created by the generation of inferences and predictions from observed 
behavior and the role of norms in causal questions and answers. Abnormal 
events, as defined by the authors, are events that have easily available 
alternatives when thinking about, or processing the past. This means that an 
event that violates what people perceive to be normal, such as a freak
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accident, will elicit alternatives to how the past could have turned out 
differently in people's minds.
If events violate expectations and elicit strong counterfactuals, the event is 
seen to be abnormal. If events confirm expectations (which include 
anticipations and probabilities) then it is seen as normal. The authors outlined 
two ways that subsequent events can be affected by certain occurrences. 
Firstly, if a subsequent event activates ‘a trace’ of a previous event (Schank 
and Abelson, 1982), and secondly, if an expectation or hypothesis is 
extracted, which further events either disconfirm or confirm (Kahneman and 
Miller, 1986).
One assumption made by Kahneman and Miller (1986) in their testing of 
norm theory is that the affective reaction (emotional reactions) elicited by an 
event will be stronger the greater the availability of imagined alternatives. For 
example, a fighter pilot that is shot down on the last day of a war or a victim of 
a train crash who decided to switch trains minutes before departure elicit 
stronger reactions than a pilot shot down three years before the war ends and 
a victim of a train crash who had a ticket booked months in advance 
(Kahneman and Miller, 1986). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) tested the 
hypothesis that abnormal consequences tend to flow from abnormal actions, 
by probing subjects about the degrees of regret that they felt over a victim of a 
car accident that took an abnormal route home, as opposed to a victim that 
took an a-typical route home. Subjects overwhelmingly thought that the victim 
that took the abnormal route home would feel greater regret (Miller and 
McFarland, 1986). Miller and McFarland (1986) corroborate this assumption 
using two experiments, which analyse ‘compensation for victims of fates for
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which a positive alternative was highly available’. As predicted, and 
consistent with norm theory, if positive alternatives were available for a given 
fate, participants recommended higher levels of compensation [Miller and 
McFarland, 1986).
5.31 Counterfactuals and The Un-doing of Scenarios
Furthering the theory that people engage in mental simulations of events to 
evaluate dramatic scenarios, proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1982), 
Wells et al. (1987) argue that the concept of a simulation heuristic or a mental 
simulation “might be of considerable theoretical import for understanding how 
people evaluate scenarios” (Wells et al., 1987 p. 421). The authors attempt to 
acquire a greater understanding of the tacit rules that people use when they 
undo scenarios through the selection of events, which they mentally mutate. 
As discussed, when people are asked to undo the outcome of a scenario, 
according to Kahneman and Tversky (1982), they follow two general rules.
Firstly, they proffer that people are less likely to change an event from a 
normal state to an exceptional state than from an exceptional state to a 
normal state. Consequently, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) argue that the 
psychological distance from the violated norm to the exception is longer than it 
is from the exception to the norm that it violates (Wells et al., 1987). For 
example, if a person decides to change trains, opting for an earlier time, and 
that person is killed in an accident, it easily comes to mind that ‘if only’ the 
person had taken their scheduled train the tragedy would have been avoided.
Secondly, people are less likely to manipulate the outcome of a scenario 
by introducing a new antecedent event into the sequence than by deleting one
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(Wells et a/., 1987). For example, two people are in line at the departure 
check-in at an airport; Samantha, who is carrying two heavy bags, asks Kelley 
who is in front, if it would be possible to check in first. Kelley agrees. 
However, the flight is over-booked, Samantha gets on and Kelley is given a 
free trip anywhere in the world as compensation for taking a later flight. The 
most readily available mental simulation is one where the event is deleted. If 
Samantha had waited her turn, then she would be the person receiving the 
free flight. It is cognitively more onerous to add an additional event to the 
mental simulation, such as one where Samantha has to search for her ticket 
in her bag, and thus allows Kelley to proceed to the departure’s check-in 
counter.
Experiments conducted by Taylor et al. (1986) confirm Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1982) conclusions that people rarely use uphill changes. However, 
their results differ with their conclusions about horizontal changes. Indeed, 
the researchers found that horizontal changes are quite common. Using 
various vignettes about a motorcycle accident, the researchers found that 
both downhill and horizontal changes were used, depending on the context, or 
framing of the narratives. In the various narratives, the motorcyclist had either 
a 10 second or 25-minute conversation with a pedestrian, immediately prior to 
the accident. In the latter scenario, people tended to delete the conversation 
outright, while in the former, people changed the duration of the conversation 
(Wells et al., 1987).
In the second of two experiments. Wells et al. (1987), extend the research 
confirming that normal events are less mutable than exceptional events, thus 
confirming the observations of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Kahneman
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and Miller (1986). Using 116 student participants from the introductory 
psychology research pool at the University of Alberta, the researchers gave 
eight versions of a scenario that involved a man Tony, going to an aquatic 
center for his weekly swim, turning a corner, bumping into a man with a gun, 
knocking the man down, taking the gun and running away. In the scenario, it 
later turns out that the man was a police officer chasing a bank robber. Each 
vignette consisted of three events, which were framed as either an exception 
or a norm. For example, in one version, Tony either takes his typical route, 
Jefferson Avenue, to the aquatic center (norm), or he takes an unusual route, 
Campbell Boulevard (exception), to the aquatic center.
In their experiments, Wells et al. (1987) also observe that there is a 
relationship between the number of imaginable alternatives that people will 
generate, and their perception of past causes and prior sets of conditions 
driving the event. In other words, if people do not perceive there to be any 
inhibiting cause or prior condition (e.g. legal rules, habit, social rules -  rules to 
the game as neo-institutional economists term it) for an event, they will 
imagine a wider range of possibilities. As Wells et al. suggest “exceptions^'to
(Wells et al., 1987). Consequently, and most 
importantly for the purposes of this dissertation. Wells et al. argue that the role 
of imagination on the explanations that people generate to hypothetical 
outcomes and on the prediction of future outcomes may be influenced by their 
description of the undoing process. People may choose to manipulate, or 
undo, the events that simultaneously make the outcome easy to explain. 
Even more importantly for the purposes of understanding the role of hindsight
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in foresight, when predicting future events, if people perceive the prior events 
to an outcome to be immutable, then they will predict that future as being the 
most likely to occur (Wells et a/., 1987). As the authors state:
"It might be that when asked to explain an outcome, people run a mental 
simulation to see which events, if changed, would alter the outcome, and 
then use the occurrence of those events to explain the outcome. As for the 
prediction of future outcomes, the undoing process might be one of the 
heuristics that a predictor uses in evaluating the likelihood that a given 
outcome will occur" (Wells et al., 1987 p. 429).
These cognitive simulation processes and mental heuristics, depending on 
which antecedents are viewed as being mutable or immutable, may result in a 
kind of cognitive path-dependency, partially driven by the hindsight bias 
(Fischhoff, 1975a), and creeping determinism (Fischhoff, 1975a; Florovsky, 
1969).
While Kahneman and Miller (1986) propose that a guiding rule of 
counterfactual reasoning and mental simulation is that people have a 
proneness to change exceptional events in the direction of normality when 
manipulating outcomes or undoing scenarios, Gavanski and Wells (1989) 
further develop this reasoning by arguing that people will indeed change 
exceptional events in the direction of normality when manipulating outcomes 
or undoing scenarios when the outcome is exceptional, but when one wishes 
to undo an outcome that is normal, one will manipulate the outcome in the 
direction of exceptionality. In short, the processing of mental simulations is 
governed by the correspondence between antecedents (prior events) and 
outcomes (Gavanski and Wells, 1989).
In a series of experiments, Gavanski and Wells (1989) had participants 
read stories about exam outcomes. Consistent with their hypothesis, normal 
outcomes were undone by manipulating them in the direction of exceptionality
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and vice versa. This led the researchers to the suggestion that there is an 
internal cognitive heuristic that guides mental simulations in which normal 
events are presumed to cause normal outcomes and exceptional events are 
presumed to cause exceptional outcomes. They term this phenomenon the 
normality-correspondence hypothesis. To quote Gavanski and Wells:
In their normality-correspondence hypothesis, Gavanski and Wells argue that 
the correlation between exceptional events and exceptional outcomes, as well 
as normal events and normal outcomes, is a perceived correlation and does 
not necessarily reflect the true reality. One reason for the previous hypothesis 
that people generally undo outcomes in the direction of normality may very 
well be do to the fact that exceptional outcomes were generally used in the 
research methodology. Gavanski and Wells (1989) note that while an 
exception can be mutated towards normality or greater degrees of 
exceptionality, normal outcomes are only be changed towards greater 
exceptionality. While it has become generally accepted that counterfactual 
thinking is generally, and quite naturally, elicited by exceptional events, 
Gavanski and Wells (1989) argue that normal-outcome scenarios can also 
elicit counterfactual simulations, especially after negative outcomes. People 
are motivated to learn from past experiences and avoid negative outcomes (or 
replicate positive outcomes) in the future. Counterfactual mental simulations 
are one of the chief heuristics for achieving these goals: “The alternative, 
unrealized outcomes for contrast and comparison hinge on strategies of 
mutation” (Gavanski and Wells, 1989). Consequently, the development of
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strategies for future behavior is intricately bound with counterfactual 
reasoning.
5.32 Counterfactuals and Judgment
Gleicher et al. (1990) suggest that when someone experiences a negative 
outcome to an event, they will engage in a four-stage cognitive process:
1. They generate alternative counterfactual outcomes.
2. They generate alternative counterfactual routes to those outcomes.
3. They compare the judged probability of the actual event with that of the 
counterfactuals (based on the perceived probability of the possible routes).
4. They react affectively, based on these prior processes.
(Landman, 1995 p.235).
The counterfactuals that individuals generate are a key determinant in 
behavioral and affective responses to actual outcomes (Gleicher etal., 1990). 
Affective responses are the emotional response to a given outcome -  the 
affect that a comparison of reality to that of counterfactuals will have and the 
amplification of one's emotional response that may result from such a 
comparison, and may impact on judgment.
A human characteristic that counterfactuals help to highlight is that the 
evaluation of experiences is relative and often depends as much on what has 
not happened as on what has happened (Miller et al., 1990). The findings of 
Kahneman and Miller (1986) show that reality is frequently compared to post­
computed representations generated post-hoc by a given event. It is the post­
computed alternatives to reality that provide the bases for the schemas and 
action plans for future situations. It is the pre-computed representations that 
exist prior to the occurrence of events that provide the templates for the 
comparison of future events and the processing of information. The 
interaction between pre-computed and post-computed representations will
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determine what can be considered normal and what is considered abnormal. 
To quote Miller et al (1990):
The pre-computed representations that exist prior to an event, combined 
with the post-computed counterfactual thoughts, images, and scenarios 
that are evoked by the event itself, comprise what Kahneman and Miller 
(1986) have termed the vent’s norm. The discrepancy between an event 
and the norm that it evokes, defines the event’s normality. The more 
discrepant an event is from the representations (pre-computed or post­
computed) that it evokes, the less normal (more abnormal) the event is 
said to be (Miller etal., 1990 p. 306).
Miller et al. (1990) also propose that reactions to tragedies and misfortunes 
depend on their normality as well as their perceived deservedness and 
expected ness. They argue that the closer an unfortunate event was to not 
happening, according to one’s mental simulation, the more exaggerated will 
be the affective reaction to it and the more abnormal it will seem. 
Furthermore, counterfactuals can influence our social knowledge and 
sympathy reactions, and judgments relating to the two (Miller et al., 1990).
A controversial incident that took place in France many years ago 
illustrates the point. During a bomb attack on a synagogue in France 
numerous people were injured, including a passerby outside the synagogue. 
The prime minister publicly expressed his sympathy for both the innocent 
passerby and the Jews inside the synagogue and denounced the attack. 
However, controversy was ignited when many suggested that by 
differentiating between the Jews inside and the “innocent” passerby outside, 
the prime minister was suggesting that the Jews were not as innocent as the 
person passing by. Miller et al. argue that, counterfactually, it may have 
simply been the case that it was cognitively easier to remove the passersby 
from the area around the synagogue than the Jews that were attending (Miller 
etal., 1990 p. 317).
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Research by Miller et ai. (1990) also found that counterfactuals and 
concepts of normality also influence suspicions about the luck of the draw, the 
fairness of a contest, representativeness of an unexpected event and 
stereotype revisions. In one illustration, the researchers use the example of a 
child who loves chocolate chip cookies:
"Imagine that you have a young child who loves chocolate chip cookies.
Imagine further that you buy your cookies In packages that include oatmeal 
as well as chocolate chip cookies. Your child’s practice is to go to the 
cookie jar and select the chocolate chip cookies, leaving the oatmeal 
cookies to go stale. One day you think of a strategy to cope with the 
problem. You tell your child to close his or her eyes before reaching into 
the jar and to take whichever cookie is grabbed first. The child agrees to 
this and heads for the kitchen and the cookie jar. Returning shortly 
thereafter, the child explains that just what you said to do was done and a 
chocolate chip cookie was selected" (Miller etal., 1990 p. 319).
The selection of the chocolate chip cookie could elicit various judgments 
depending on knowledge held about the child’s prior behavior and other 
factors known about the child. Judgment could also be influenced by one’s 
knowledge of the contents in the cookie jar. If only 5% of the cookies in the 
cookie jar were chocolate chip, it is almost a certainty that your suspicion 
would be greater then if 50% of the cookies in the jar were chocolate chip 
(Miller etal., 1990).
In legal proceedings, asking juries to make sure that they are sure "beyond 
a reasonable doubt” before convicting someone is an invitation to consider 
how a given incidence could have unfolded without the accused being guilty 
of the offense in which they are charged. However, the ease by which the 
events can be cognitively replicated may be a determining factor of the 
probability that the accused committed the alleged offense (Miller et al., 1990; 
Johnson, 1986).
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In Miller et al’s (Miller, 1990) four studies, unexpected outcomes generated 
by chance or coincidental origins were treated with differential suspicion by 
the participants. The researchers argue that the reason for this is that people 
will decide whether or not an event came to pass by chance based on the 
ease of which they can imagine alternatives as well as a priori probability. 
One of the implications of their studies is that people’s willingness to alter their 
beliefs depends on the normality of the event as well as how their beliefs 
relate to how probable the evidence appears to be. In short, their research 
shows that in the domains of social perception and social judgments, post­
computed representations are an important factor through their influence over 
heuristic processing. People are frequently guided by the strength of their 
reaction to an outcome and feelings of surprise and normality provide 
‘ecologically valid clues to one’s a priori subjective probability estimates’ (p. 
326). To quote Miller et ai.:
“Normality, in this sense, would be functioning similarly to the availability 
heuristic in the memory process. On this point, Tversky and Kahneman 
[Kahneman, 1973 #11] have shown that estimates of an event’s probability 
are often dependent on the availability of similar events in memory. The 
more available similar events are in memory, the more probable they are 
assumed to be" (Miller etal., 1990 p. 327).
As John Greenleaf Whittier’s famous phrase quips: “For all sad words of
tongue or pen, the saddest are these: ‘It might have been!”’ (Miller et ai, 1990
p. 326).
5.33 Counterfactuals and Constraints
Replicating positive outcomes and avoiding negative outcomes is 
intimately linked with understanding causal roles, or antecedents, of 
proceeding events. To understand, to predict and to control are some of the
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reasons why humans indulge in counterfaotuai thoughts (Seelau et a/., 1995 
p. 58). Despite the ability of humans to imagine almost anything when 
pressed, researchers have found that “if only” and "what if” thoughts are 
governed by “remarkably disciplined” and constrained sets of finite 
possibilities that include information available to memory, basic laws of the 
workings of the universe, and higher-order purposes and goals (Roese and 
Olson, 1995c, p. ix). More specifically, Seelau et al. (1995) argue that 
knowledge of the workings of the universe, or natural-law constraints, 
encompasses people’s concepts such as the direction of time, gravity and the 
speed of light will normally be left unchanged. Secondly, operating through 
availability constraints (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) are inactions versus 
actions (Landman, 1987), non-salient versus salient events (Gleicher et al., 
1990), omissions versus commissions (Baron, 1992) and normal events 
versus exceptional events (Gavanski and Wells, 1989; Kahneman et al., 
1982).
Another category of constraints proposed by Seelau et al (1995) is purpose 
constraints. Purpose constraints consist of intent. People may use 
counterfactuals to understand the causality behind an event, or on the other 
hand, they might use counterfactuals to assess causal ascriptions (Wells, 
1987) blame (Boninger et a!., 1994; Miller and Gunasegaram, 1990b) and so 
on. Lucidity, they suggest, is also a factor in the generation of 
counterfactuals. In light of the context, non-lucid counterfactuals are those 
that appear irrational, implausible or inappropriate, whereas lucid 
counterfactuals are those that appear rational, plausible and appropriate. 
Thus, mutating an event that violates natural laws in order to change an
Chapter Five: Counterfaotuai Reasoning: What If...?
Counterfaotuai Reasoning In Strategy Context 138
outcome is not lucid. Undoing a plane crash, for instance, by violating the 
laws of gravity is not a lucid counterfactual, and consequently, would not 
make sense to the simulator. Moreover, even though there may be “an 
infinite” number of mutable junctures in a causal chain, some will 
automatically be eliminated by the simulator by virtue of being un-cotenable 
mutations.
On the other hand, research has shown that some counterfactuals are 
more available than others. People will use their explicit, and frequently 
limited knowledge of the factual events in their mutations (Wells and 
Gavanski, 1987; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Near misses or hits, such as 
winning a bronze, silver, gold or no Olympic medal (Medvec et al., 1995), or 
such as the winning goal scored by the opposing team in the dwindling 
seconds of a football match is fertile ground for generating counterfactuals 
based on an event that “almost happened” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). 
Research has also demonstrated that people are more inclined to mutate 
earlier events (primacy effect) as opposed to later events (recency effects) do 
to the perception that earlier events resulted in later events (Johnson et al., 
1989; Wells and Gavanski, 1987). People have a penchant for mutating 
exceptional rather than normal events (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Wells 
and Gavanski, 1987). Actions versus inactions, research also shows, 
influences judgments and are more mutable (Gleicher et a!., 1990; Landman, 
1987). Finally, as Seelau et al. (1995) conclude, if a person is under a large 
cognitive load and is consequently unable to undertake conscious processing, 
they will mutate the most available, salient events (Seelau et a!., 1995, pp. 64- 
66).
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5.34 Counterfactual Thinking: Future Preparation versus Present Coping 
While the sequence of events plays a role in the mutability of a causal 
event, other researchers have found that people will generate counterfactuals 
for many varying reasons. Markman et al. (1993), for instance, explore the 
spontaneous generation of downward counterfactuals, which worsen reality 
and upward counterfactuals, which improve reality (Markman et al., 1993). 
They investigated the spontaneous generation of counterfactuals through the 
use of a computer-simulated blackjack game. Each subject gained $5, but 
then the outcome was ‘framed to be perceived’ as a neutral outcome, a loss 
or a win. Some subjects were told that they could play again and others were 
told that they could not. Subjects that were told that they could not play again 
were more satisfied with their outcome than the subjects that were told that 
they could play again. Subjects that were told that they could not play again 
had a predilection towards generating more upward counterfactuals. 
Markman et al also found that both the “neutral” and the “win” frames 
produced less upward and more downward counterfactuals than did the “loss" 
frames. The goals of the researchers were to explore some of the emotional 
and cognitive counterfactuals for the generation of better and worse possible 
worlds and to Investigate and determine the conditions under which people 
compare their reality to worse and better alternatives (Markman et al., 1993, 
p. 88). They found that upward counterfactuals take the form of “if only” 
statements and these mental simulations to improved realities are used as 
learning heuristic for the future (Markman et al., 1993; Taylor and Schneider, 
1989; Wells and Gavanski, 1987). Downward counterfactuals, on the other
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hand, have the short-term effect of enhancing satisfaction, but frequently at 
the expense of learning for the future. As they state:
“In sum, both upward and downward counterfactuals hold trade-offs 
for the Individual: the upward counterfactual prepares one for the 
future at the expense of immediate feelings of dissatisfaction, 
whereas the downward counterfactual enhances satisfaction, often at
the expense of leaving one unprepared for the future” (Markman et
al., 1993, p. 90).
Further experiments by Roese (Roese, 1994) corroborate these findings. 
Using students from introductory psychology at the University of Western 
Ontario, in the first of three experiments, for example, the students were 
asked to think of, and to describe a single event over the past year that was 
especially disappointing or negative. They were then asked to generate 
counterfactuals, imagining how things could have turned out differently. The 
students were then asked to record their affective reaction to the 
counterfactuals (e.g. hostile-agreeable).
Roese (1994) finds that counterfactual thoughts, or as he terms them, 
“might-have-been” reconstructions of past outcomes (p. 805), serve as both a 
preparative function for future improvements, and an affective function for 
feeling better. This corroborates other research that has found that upward, 
often times additive counterfactuals serve a preparative function for the future 
(e.g. Roese and Olson, 1993b; Markman et al., 1993), and that downward
counterfactuals serve an affective function by making oneself, or others, feel
better after a negative event (Markman et al., 1993; Johnson and Sherman, 
1990; Taylor and Schneider, 1989).
Roese (1994) argues that counterfactual thinking appears to be a 
pervasive if not essential function of human consciousness. Upward 
counterfactuals: "May be taken as schemata for future action, making salient
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those scripts that are necessary to facilitate success” (Roese, 1994) and as 
such: “the realization of positive alternatives should make positive outcomes 
more likely in the future” (Johnson and Sherman, 1990, p. 512).
Roese and Olson (1994) and Johnson and Sherman (1990) postulate that 
upward counterfactuals in particular might enhance performance through the 
generation of scripts for the future. To quote Roese and Olson:
“These counterfactual subtypes are perhaps easily converted into 
conditional propositions focusing on future possibilities, which have 
been shown in previous research to influence intentions to perform 
success-facilitating behavior, and in turn, overt behavior. The term 
mental simulation embraces not only counterfactual reconstructions 
of the past but also constructions of future possibilities (scripts)”
(Roese, 1994, p. 807).
Boninger et al. (1994) point out that people compare their outcomes to 
imagined alternatives because there is no other objective standard for 
comparison. While Markman et al. (1993) have demonstrated the effects of 
counterfactual thought on coping, showing that there is a trade-off between 
“feeling better” and “preparation for the future”, Boninger et al. (1994) argue 
that “preparation for the future” in itself may have a positive result on 
affective reactions. As Roese and Olson (1995c) state, and Johnson and 
Sherman (1990), and Folger (1984) corroborate:
"By manipulating alternatives to past actions, individuals can 
scrutinize them into prescriptions that may facilitate success in the 
future" (Roese, 1995, p. 170).
Researchers have demonstrated the counterfactual identification of ‘a causally 
potent antecedent action’ as the mechanism driving the preparative function 
(Roese and Olson, 1995b). Identifying a causally potent antecedent action 
acts as an expectancy trigger (Roese and Olson, 1995b; Olson et a/., 1995; 
Anderson and Godfrey, 1987; Sherman, 1981) for the future consequences of 
a similar action. The final stages on this pathway are heightened intentions
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for performing the action in the future, which may reflexively ‘influence the 
behavioral manifestation of that action’, the link between behavior and 
intention being well documented (Ajzen, 1988). Future performance will be 
enhanced if the original causal inference is correct (Roese, 1995b, p. 171) 
Roese & Olson (1995b) visually illustrate their hypothesized mechanism 
linking behavior to counterfactuals in exhibit 5.2.
Exhibit 5.2 Counterfactuais and Behaviour
(Roese and Olson, 1995b, pp. 1 72 ,17 3)
BEHAVIOR
Doing X
'If I do X, then Y ’
EXPECTANCY
COUNTERFACTUAL
‘if I’d done X, then Y'
'i’m going to do X'
INTENTION
Whether counterfactuals worsen reality, as opposed to improving it,“ or 
whether counterfactuals subtract versus add antecedent events,*  ^ plays a 
significant role in whether counterfactuals play an affective (feeling better) or a 
preparative (future) function. Upward counterfactuals, those that represent an 
improved state of affairs over reality, have been found to provide greater 
preparative functionality, they make scripts that are needed to facilitate 
success more salient and may be viewed as schemata for future action
“ Often called counterfactual direction.
 ^Often called the counterfactual structure.
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(Roese, 1995b, p. 173). However, as research by Johnson and Sherman 
(1990) has demonstrated, people also strategically use counterfactuals, often 
downward, to improve affective reactions, or in other words, to feel better.
Markman et al. (1993) have shown that there is often a trade-off in the 
strategic use of counterfactuals. Where counterfactuals used for preparative 
purposes may have long-term benefits, such as performing better in the 
future, it may be at the expense of feeling better. Counterfactuals used for 
affective purposes, on the other hand, may be at the cost of future 
performance enhancement, (p. 174). However, Roese (1994) notes that there 
may be more interplay between the two, and generating more upward and 
downward counterfactuals can negate the trade-off, thus maximising both the 
preparative and affective functions.
Additive counterfactuals, those that add an additional antecedent, versus 
subtractive counterfactuals, those that, in order to reconstruct reality, remove 
some factual antecedent, have also been found to influence preparative 
versus affective purposes driving counterfactual thinking. As Roese & Olson 
(1995c) state: “Additive counterfactuals are, by definition, those that go 
beyond the original option set, forging novel options perhaps never 
considered in the past” (Roese and Olson, 1995b, p. 176). The Andrea Study 
(Roese and Olson, 1993b), adapted from a previous study by Gavanski and 
Wells (1989) participants were given a scenario depicting exam preparation 
by a student named Andrea. In the scenario, Andrea experiences obstacles 
and she also does some additional work over and above her routine exam 
preparation, thus giving a range of antecedents to construct counterfactual 
alternatives, some inhibiting success and others facilitating success.
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Participants were subsequently asked to record how the scenario could have
turned out differently on paper. The researchers manipulated two variables:
outcome frame and outcome valence (positive vs. negative outcomes).
Andrea’s exam outcome was described as either failing the exam, or passing
the exam with a good mark. Secondly, Andrea’s prior academic record was
depicted as either poor or good. The researchers hypothesised that the
prominence of additive counterfactuals would be greater following a failure
than success and that this situation would become more accentuated When a
history of past failure was used to frame the scenario.
As predicted, there was a significant two-way interaction and outcome
valence predicted the structure of counterfactuals. Success, as opposed to
failure, led more frequently to the generation of subtractive counterfactuals
and additive counterfactuals were more frequently generated following failure
(Roese, 1995b, p. 177). To quote Roese & Olson (1995b):
“In the failure conditions, additive counterfactuals suggested creative 
and novel response options that moved beyond the confines of the 
events described in the scenario (p. 177).
When failure was framed by a history of past failure, the preponderance of 
additive counterfactuals was augmented with the consequence of 
engendering a ‘reliable three-way interaction between outcome valence, 
outcome frame, and structure. As Roese and Olson (1995b) conclude:
"In this condition, participants seemed sensitive to the fact that 
Andrea was in real trouble and went out of their way to provide 
strategically creative solutions that were not so much as hinted at in 
the scenario itself. This generative creativity of counterfactual 
thinking has not perhaps been sufficiently appreciated in previous 
discussions” (p. 177).
And they go on to suggest that the results of their study illuminate:
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“The often exuberant originality inherent in counterfactual thinking, a 
uniquely functional propensity that is captured in particular by 
additive structures" (Roese and Olson, 1995b, p. 178).
Counterfactual thinking, therefore, may indeed serve three, as opposed to 
two, major functions. The first is regulating affective reactions, generally 
generated through the application of downward counterfactuals. The second 
is preparation for the future, most frequently generated through the application 
of upward counterfactuals. One can argue that the latter two functions served 
by counterfactual thinking are both functional, with the caveat that there can 
be trade-offs between improving affective reactions and improving future 
performance if spontaneous counterfactual generation is not compensated for 
through the generation of either upward or downward, deliberate 
counterfactuals.
A third functional area served by counterfactuals, as has begun to emerge 
in research programs (e.g. Markman et al., 1995; McMullen et al., 1995) is 
controllability. Perceptions of causality, Wells and Gavanski (1989) argue, are 
intimately tied to the generation of counterfactuals. Once an individual has 
reconstructed a representation of causality, the sequence of events in an 
actual scenario is perceived as predictable, sensible and controllable 
(Sherman and McConnell, 1995, p.201). Langer (1975) has demonstrated 
that the most important motivation driving human behaviour and judgment is 
the perception that the world is as predictable and controllable (Langer, 1975). 
However, there are dysfunctional implications carried by these perceptions of 
predictability and controllability, and the generation of counterfactuals. To 
quote Sherman and McConnell:
“In fact, the need to feel in control of one’s circumstances and 
outcomes may lead to such illusions of control even when these
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perceptions carry with them terrible affective consequences” 
(Sherman and McConnell, 1995, p. 201).
5.4 Counterfactual Reasoning: The danger of dysfunctional counterfactuals 
The importance of counterfactuals in human cognitive behaviour has been
well established by psychologists. As Sherman and McConnell state:
"Interestingly, a focus on the functions of counterfactual thinking 
seems to have left psychologists with the feeling that counterfactuals 
may be the greatest thing since ESPN. They are the panacea to 
brighten a person’s day, to give people hope, to empower them, and 
to improve their circumstances” (Sherman and McConnell, 1995, p. 
202).
For the most part, as the above quote highlights, research programs 
focussing on counterfactual reasoning have concentrated on the benefits of 
counterfactuals. But is there a dysfunctional side to counterfactual reasoning? 
The research program of Sherman and McConnell (1995) indicate that there 
might be. While the benefits of developing stereotypes, categories, schemas, 
heuristics and so on include enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
thought and simplifying and making sense of a complex world, the 
dysfunctional side to these processes include over-simplifying a complex 
world and leaving people vulnerable to errors of judgment and biases: “That 
can manifest themselves in unfortunate and self-defeating behaviours and 
perceptions” (Sherman and McConnell, 1995, p. 203).
Past research on counterfactuals (e.g. Markman et al., 1995; Markman et 
al., 1993; Roese, 1994), much of it discussed in this chapter, have shown 
counterfactuals to be a learning heuristic that helps individuals to understand 
the "causal structure of a chain of events in an action sequence so that a 
changed outcome in the future is a possibility” (Sherman and McConnell, 
1995, p. 203). Flowever, much of the same research, as Sherman and
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McConnell point out, has also shown people who display “systematic biases in 
their interpretations of events and explanations of causal relations,” and they 
“may mutate event features that played no role in the actual outcome and may 
fail to mutate features that were critical for the outcome to occur.” These 
counterfactuals, it is argued, can lead to erroneous understandings of 
situations in real time (Sherman and McConnell, 1995, p. 203), which, one 
may conclude, leads to incorrect causal analysis, self-fulfilling prophecies, 
escalating error, dysfunctional behaviour, and a perpetuation of poor 
performance in the future. To quote Sherman and McConnell:
“Such [dysfunctional] counterfactuals will lead to an incorrect causal 
analysis and an improper understanding of the situation and may 
thus instigate continued poor performance in the future as well as 
negative affect inappropriately directed at others or even at oneself"
(Simon, 1955, p. 203).
The well-documented “fallacy of composition” phenomena, for instance, 
may very well be perpetuated by erroneous counterfactuals. The following 
example cited by Sherman and McConnell illustrates the point:
"In addition to groundless scolding of children, Miller et al. (1990) 
suggest that this bias can help build and maintain stereotypes. For 
instance, consider two groups (a majority group of 500 members and 
a minority group of 50 members) that each claim to have the same 
small proportion of hostile members (e.g., they claim that only 2% of 
the members of the group are hostile). On encountering the first 
member of each group, you find both of them to be hostile. It is easy 
to imagine running into 1 of the 10 presumed hostile members of the 
majority group, and there is no reason to question the claim that the 
vast majority of this group are friendly. It is not easy to imagine 
running into the one and only presumed hostile member of the 
minority group by chance. Just as with the cookie jar scenario, fewer 
alternatives to the outcome make an event with fewer ways to occur 
(though probabitisticaiiy equivalent) seem more suspicious. Thus, a 
person might question the claim that only one member of the minority 
group is hostile and conclude that minority-group members must be 
more generally hostile” (Sherman and McConnell, 1995, p. 205).
Mutating the last action in a causal sequential chain of events might be the 
result of undue blame being placed on that event. Mutating the assassination 
of Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist in Sarajevo, for instance, is an
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example of a causal event often cited as a contributor to the First World War 
and eclipses many of the more powerful, but less salient, more subterranean 
and distant causes. These causes could include: the rise of social Darwinism, 
increased complacency towards peace, the development of a bi-polar alliance 
system, the rise of German strength, German policy, the rise of nationalism 
and consequential destruction of two declining empires, German politics, and 
even the personal idiosyncrasies of the leaders (Nye, 1993, p. 65).
Mutating an event to alter an event that was uncontrollable, such as 
changing the behaviour of the pilots in the September 11^ 2001 attacks on 
the World Trade Centre in New York, for instance, might have implications for 
decisions made by passengers and pilots in future hijacking situations. As 
Kahneman and Miller (1986) demonstrate, people are more prone to mutating 
exceptional events as opposed to less salient events. In short, mutating 
events in causal chains can lead to dysfunctional perceptions of blame, 
controllability and erroneous inferences of the causality of events in a 
sequential chain.
Many of the dysfunction aspects of the mutational elements in the process 
of generating counterfactuals are similar to those associated with biased 
hypothesis testing. Researchers have shown that when hypothesis are being 
tested, people tend not to rely on alternative possibilities, but on a biased 
subset of information that they consider to be only the focal hypothesis 
(Sherman and McConnell, 1995, p. 208; Klayman and Ha, 1987; Skov and 
Sherman, 1986; Wason, 1968. As Higgins argues, people have constructs 
that are ‘chronically accessible' (Higgins, 1982). These ‘focal stimulus 
dimensions’ will influence individual’s mutations by virtue of devoting greater
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cognitive resources to these dimensions and consequently, the likelihood that 
these features are encoded and will guide future construct retrieval is 
enhanced (Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Smith and Zarate, 1992; 
Nosofsky, 1987; Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Medin and Schaffer, 1978). 
These findings also help to explain how, in some cases, ‘memories of the 
future’ (Ingvar, 1985) are recalled, and subsequently, put into action. As 
Sherman and McConnell state:
"Consequently, counterfactuals can serve as a mechanism for the 
maintenance and reinforcement of chronic constructs because it 
should be easy for a person with a chronic expectancy to form 
chronic mutations about these well-encoded features of situations ...
Chronic mutations may lead a person down a biased counterfactual 
path, evoking many "what ifs" for features that would not have 
actually changed the outcome of the situation " (p. 209).
Sherman and McConnell conclude that it has been effectively demonstrated 
that individual’s use simple heuristic principles for mutating event features and 
outcomes. This begs the question, how can misperceptions and systematic 
biases in the counterfactuals generation process be avoided?
Kruglanski and Freund’s (1983) theory of lay epistemology suggests that 
an effective way of countering biased processing is by generating alternative 
possibilities. To quote Sherman and McConnell:
"In many ways, lay epistemology and counterfactual generation share 
much in common In that freezing (the cessation of generating 
additional alternatives) leads to a person’s accepting a state of affairs 
as irrevocable. Generating a counterfactual is dysfunctional when 
only highly accessible event features are mutated and a search for 
alternatives is thus prematurely terminated" (Sherman and 
McConnell, 1995 p. 210).
Lord et al. (1984) also found that asking participants in their studies to 
consider contrary alternatives to counterfactuals is a good strategy for 
avoiding biased processing. Sherman and McConnell (1995) take this one
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step farther by arguing that it is important for individuals to, not only consider 
alternatives to their counterfactuals, but to consider how alternative 
antecedents might have resulted in the same outcome. Some historians and 
international relations theorists that use counterfactual analysis in their 
discipline refer to the latter counterfactuals as second order counterfactuals 
(e.g. Lebow, 2000b).
Dunning and Parpal (1995) found that when it comes to causal potency 
inference of a specific antecedent, the framing of the causal questions posed 
to the subject influences it. Based on their recent laboratory work, Dunning et 
al. (1995) found that there are two different framing effects when people 
compare their current reality (the present) with counterfactual alternatives. 
The first arises from the psychological tendency to give less weight to the 
referent (the alternative) than the subject of the comparison. Consequently, 
respondents to surveys distributed by the researches gave more weight to a 
world that they have a rich array of information, such as the present, as 
opposed to a world in which they have less information, such as the past or a 
counterfactual alternative. However, when the subject was made the referent 
and the referent the subject, more difference and impact was perceived of the 
new subject than the referent, illuminated a framing asymmetry in 
counterfactual comparison.
A second psychological phenomenon that led to a mental subtraction- 
addition effect was the tendency of respondents to give less weight to features 
that would reduce the chances of achieving an outcome in question than one 
that would increase those chances. In other words, when the framing of 
counterfactual questions was framed in subtractive terms (“How much less
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satisfied would you be in your most likely alternative career than you are in 
your present one?”) people perceived less difference between two worlds 
being compared as opposed to when questions were framed in additive terms 
(“How much more satisfied are you with your present career than the most 
likely alternative?”) (Dunning et al., 1995). The theoretical implications, as 
articulated by the researchers:
"Suggest that the task of counterfactual reasoning is potentially more 
involved and complex than simply evoking or recruiting a 
counterfactual world ... The framing asymmetries observed here and 
elsewhere also portray the social perceiver as a “cognitive miser” 
with respect to counterfactual assessment. People do not perform a 
complete job when comparing their circumstances to a counterfactual 
world; that is, they do not conduct exhaustive simulations of both 
subject and referent when required to make a counterfactual 
assessment” (Dunning etal., 1995, p. 125).
Attention, the authors found, and which is also consistent with past research 
conducted by Tversky (1977) and Tversky and Gati (1978), is routinely drawn 
to the subject in the comparison (Dunning etal., 1995, p. 125).
Their results highlight a “short-circuiting” in the counterfactual assessment 
process and have significant application implications. Choosing a consumer 
product, for instance, “is often an act of comparing two counterfactual worlds” 
-  constructing mental scenarios that compare having something with 
foregoing something (Dunning et al., 1995, p. 125). These conclusions are 
also consistent with studies conducted by Dhar and Simonson (1991) who 
asked participants about whether they preferred Stanford Business School to 
Harvard Business School. When the question was framed in these terms, 
participants expressed a preference for Stanford and vice versa (Dhar and 
Simonson, 1991).
Another dysfunctional element in the counterfactual generation process is 
mutating antecedents that the individual has no control over. Frequently
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individuals will ask themselves what they could have done better or differently.
Leon Trotsky, while reflecting on his experiences in Russian during his exile in
Mexico, may have warn different clothes on his duck-hunting trip.
Dysfunctional mutations, or mutating antecedents that the individual has no
control over, carries with it emotional costs that can have a negative impact on
judgment and decision-making. Dysfunctional counterfactuals of this sort can
result in costly changes in behaviour and impair one of the major functions of
counterfactual reasoning -  preparation for the future (Sherman and
McConnell, 1995). As discussed. Miller et al. (1990) have referred to the
confusion between what might have been and what ought to have been, and
between what was with what ought to have been as the counterfactual fallacy
(Miller et al., 1990). As Shermon and McConnell point out:
"Such thinking and such a tendency to adopt upward counterfactuals 
in a prescriptive rather than in a descriptive way are tied to the fact 
that people are outcome-driven beings. People often judge the 
quality of decision making solely on the basis of the outcome.
Therefore, strategies that are followed by success should be 
maintained. Strategies that are followed by failure should be 
changed, and the change should be in the direction of the most 
accessible upward counterfactual" (p. 219).
In studies conducted by Baron and Hershey (1988). they found that 
outcome bias (i.e. the hindsight bias and creeping determinism) in decision­
making was ubiquitous throughout their studies. Participants in their studies 
indicated that the quality of decision-making was superior when decisions 
presented to them led to successes as opposed to failures, despite the 
antecedents being the same. In a similar vein, Roese (1994) gave 
participants a scenario based on World War I, and asked them what choices 
should have been made. The participants judged that the choices that should 
have been made were those that led to successful outcomes, despite knowing
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that the outcome should not affect their judgments. Counterfactual 
assessments thus have a bearing on whether governments will hold onto 
power, CEOs will keep their jobs, or programs will be cancelled to outcomes 
that, however isolated, are unsatisfactory. Again, to quote Shermon and 
McConnell:
Thus, sports managers will lose their jobs, CEOs will be fired, and 
prison furlough systems will be discontinued because of short-term or 
isolated, unsatisfactory outcomes (Sherman and McConnell, 1995, p.
219).
Finally, the spontaneous choice of antecedents to mutate can have serious 
implications for analysing past experiences, can exacerbate the hindsight bias 
and creeping determinism as shown in the Wells et al. (1987) study, and 
influence the development of schemas for future actions. As Roese (1995) 
writes:
“Miller and Gunasegaram (Miller et al., 1990) showed that later 
events are more mutable in chains consisting of independent events.
Thus, early events that are not explicitly linked in causal fashion to 
later ones tend to be presupposed, or taken as immutable parts of 
the causal background. Again, this effect may derive from the 
greater salience of recent events than of earlier events” (Roese and 
Olson, 1995c, p. 34).
Indeed, the ubiquitous problem of outcome bias, or hindsight bias as it is often 
referred to, requires strategies to remedy the dysfunctional elements in the 
counterfactual process in order to improve judgment, decision-making and 
foresight for the future.
Exhibit 5.3 illustrates the role of counterfactual reasoning in cognition.
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Counterfactuals influence a vast range of judgments (Gilovich and Medvec, 
1994; Landman, 1987; Roese and Olson, 1993a; Johnson, 1986; Lipe, 1991; 
Wells and Gavanski, 1989; Niedenthal et al., 1994; Miller, 1989; Macrae et al., 
1993; Miller and McFarland, 1986) and serves both an affective function 
(feeling better) (Gleicher et al., 1990; Landman, 1987) and a preparative 
function (preparing for improvement in the future) (Roese, 1994; Markman et 
al., 1993). However, counterfactual reasoning also has a future component, 
which can have dysfunctional implications for foresight.
5.5 Counterfactual Reasoning: Smelling the future?
The relationship between the past, present and future is well summed up
by a quote from the Danish poet and inventor Piet Hein:
"You'll conquer the present 
Suspiciously fast.
If you smell of the future 
-  and stink of the past."
(quoted in Gleicher et al., 1995, p. 283)
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Gleicher et al.'s (Gleicher et al., 1995) research postulates that while 
counterfactuals “stink of the past” they also “smell of the future” in their 
influence over attitudes, affective responses to events, preparation for the 
future and behaviour. They ask the question: “What might make an individual 
focus on the future implications of counterfactual thoughts?” (Gleicher et al., 
1995, p. 285). They acknowledge that the Consideration of Future 
Consequences Scale (CFC) (Strathman, 1994) which measures people’s 
disposition towards considering the future consequences of behaviour is one 
factor.
People who endorse such statements as: “I consider how things might be 
in the future and try to influence those things with my day-to-day behaviour” 
and “I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously 
even if the negative outcome will not occur for many years” are people who 
generally score high on the CFC scale. People who do not score as high on 
the CFC scale, alternatively, tend to expect that the future will take care of 
itself and are more concerned with their immediate concerns and needs than 
on the distant future (Gleicher et al., 1995, pp. 285-286). Statements that 
short-term thinkers might endorse are best summed up by the British 
economist John Maynard Keynes’ quip that: “In the long-run, we are all dead.”
Consideration of Future Consequences research (Gleicher et al., 1995; 
Strathman et al., 1994) demonstrates that the disposition that people have 
towards considering future implications of future events can moderate the 
influence of counterfactuals on affective responses to negative life events. 
People who have a propensity towards considering the consequences of 
future events, for instance, “spontaneously considered the future implications
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of learning about the other course” (Gleicher et al., 1995). Resultantly, when 
there was not a favourable course, they had a tendency to be more distressed 
than those that score lower on the CFC scale.
5.51 Prefactuals & Virtual Knowledge
Thus far we have explored research on counterfactuals that are generated 
in response to past events and subsequently influence attitudes, intentions, 
and behaviours. Another category of counterfactuals that has been identified 
by psychologists is that of prefactuals. Fazio and Zanna (1981) argue that 
one of the most powerful impacts counterfactuals have on behaviour is when 
they are generated in response to an experienced event. Gleicher et al. 
(1995) demonstrate that counterfactuals also have a significant impact on 
behaviour when they are generated in response to anticipated or imagined 
events. As they suggest:
"The individual imagines an anticipated (negative) outcome, along 
with alternatives to this imagined outcome. These alternatives lead 
to affective responses, which subsequently influence attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviour" (Gleicher, 1995, p. 294),
Based on data gathered in three studies, one testing counterfactuals and 
behavioural intentions, the second on prefactuals and condom use, and the 
third looking at prefactuals and insurance, Gleicher et al. (1995) found that the 
evidence indicates that there are two positive functions that are served by 
generating counterfactuals ‘with an eye to the future’ (see exhibit 5.4)
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Exhibit 5.4 Counterfactual Reasoning: Conceptual Framework B
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First, they facilitate adaptive behavioural choices in the future. As Miller 
and Taylor (1995) state, decision strategies might be affected, “not [by] 
people's recollection of the past, but [by] their contemplation of the future” (p. 
306).
Secondly, they ameliorate counterfactually induced negative emotions: 
‘Thus, the ‘stink of the past’ may well become the sweet smell of the future” 
(Gleicher et al., 1995, p. 302). Sanna and Turley (1996) agree, arguing that 
counterfactual thinking involves both a backwards processing from an 
outcome, and a foreword processing from a hypothesis or expectancies to 
revision or confirmation (Sanna, 1996).
A common characteristic of the ‘surprise’ element in every counterfactual, 
whether that counterfactual is generated in response to a negative life event, 
or whether it is generated by a historian to explore what might have happened 
had the English fireships been repulsed and the Spanish Armada triumphed
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on August 8, 1588 (Parker, 1999) is that they ‘both represent the causal 
texture of an environment’ (Kahneman, 1995, p. 376). Further, as Dawes 
(1993) points out, and Kahneman corroborates:
"In the social domain, a long history of disasters of planning and 
design demonstrates that the impossible sometimes happens and 
that the inevitable sometimes does not. Mental simulation is a form 
of scenario thinking ..." (Kahneman, 1995, p. 380).
After exploring whether or not the cold war would have come to an end as 
soon as it did had Gorbachev not come to power, Kahneman (Kahneman, 
1995) goes on to expand on the latter line of thought when he writes:
“The two modes of thinking invoked in this exercise correspond to 
approaches that were labeled the inside view and the outside view in 
an analysis of intuitive forecasting (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993, 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Forecasting by the inside view is an 
attempt to divine the history of the future by building relatively specific 
scenarios. Forecasting by the outside view is an attempt to estimate 
the statistics of a relatively large category to which the case at hand 
belongs. In the context of counterfactual reasoning, the inside view 
involves the mental construction of alternative histories, whereas the 
outside view consists of considerable appeal in evaluating both the 
past and the future, and it sometimes yields knowledge that is not 
accessible in other ways. However, the risk of the inside view is that 
our confidence in the conclusions it yields ultimately derives from the 
limits of our imagination" (Kahneman, 1995, p. 381).
Scenario thinking, then, can be re-conceptualized as a form of virtual 
knowledge, which influences the evaluation of various options in the decision­
making process. The decision maker will evaluate their options as if they will 
be ‘endowed’ with virtual knowledge of alternative relevant outcomes or with 
experience of the outcome in their decision (Kahneman, 1995, p. 392). As 
suggested by Kahneman: “There is a compelling intuition that the anticipation 
of regret is a significant factor in decision making”, which has led economists 
(Baron, 1994; Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982) to develop regret 
theories of choice between gambles. Further, it may be this virtual knowledge 
that causes, at least in part, harsh judgments based on hindsight (Kahneman,
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1995, p. 392-293) and the tendency to judge consequences that may not 
have been foreseeable in foresight, by their consequences (Baron and 
Hershey, 1988). As Sherman and McConnell write:
“The point is that foreseeability is a concept defined by iogic and 
objective standards. Even conditions and events are in fact 
objectively unforeseeable, people seem to believe that they should 
have foreseen them" (Sherman and McConnell, 1995).
If hindsight is the “wisdom after an event” (Swannell, 1986), or “the perception 
of the significance and nature of events after they have occurred” 
[www.dictionary.com], then counterfactual reasoning is a heuristic device for 
discovering the past leading up to an event after they have occurred. 
However, Sherman and McConnell’s research (1995) would suggest that 
spontaneous counterfactuals aren’t simply a heuristic for preparing for the 
future, but that they can also augment foresightful thinking flaws, such as the 
hindsight bias and creeping determinism.
5.6 Counterfactual Reasoning: A Conceptual Framework
Counterfactual propositions, as Roese and Olson (1995) point out, are also
causal propositions, and consequently imply “appropriate future actions”:
“For example, if Jake’s father comes to believe that Jake would have 
passed an exam had Jake bought a study guide, Jake’s father is 
highlighting the causal potency of owning a study guide. This belief 
suggests an expectancy for future actions. Jake’s father may 
recommend to his son that he buy the study guide, with the 
expectancy that by his making use of it, Jake will improve his 
performance on an upcoming exam. Thus, there is an intriguing 
reciprocal relation between expectancies and . counterfactuals.
Expectancies can influence counterfactuals, and these same 
counterfactuals may, in turn, influence subsequent, but more specific, 
expectancies” (Roese, 1995, p. 43). Also see (Boninger et al., 1994;
Johnson and Sherman, 1990; Sherman, 1991).
Prefactuals, simulating events before they occur, uses effectively the same 
process as counterfactuals. While some researchers have suggested that
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personality dispositions influence people’s predisposition towards using either 
prefactuals or counterfactuals, pessimists tend to use prefactuals more than 
optimists for instance, the point is that, as Sanna states:
"Simulating alternative possible outcomes, both before and after an 
event, appears to be a pervasive if not ubiquitous human tendency”
{Sanna, 1996, p. 1020).
As exhibit 5.5, which integrates exhibits 5.3 and 5.4 illustrates, the 
importance of counterfactual reasoning is that it has an effect on affective 
reactions (Gleicher et al., 1990; Johnson, 1986; Landman, 1987), our 
assignment of blame (Miller et al., 1990; Miller and McFarland, 1986), and our 
emotional responses to outcomes in our lives (Kahneman and Miller, 1986; 
Landman, 1987). Downward counterfactuals can be used as a ‘secret mood 
booster’, thus allowing people to cope with failures and maintain a cool head 
during stressful situations (Chatterjee, 1999). Counterfactuals, especially 
upward counterfactuals, also have an important influence on generating 
schemas for future action and salient plans for the facilitation of future 
success (Sarma, 1997; Sanna and Turley, 1996; Roese, 1994; Markman et 
al., 1993; Johnson and Sherman, 1990). However, counterfactuals can also 
have dysfunctional implications (Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Dunning and 
Madey, 1995; Miller, 1990) when applied spontaneously.
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Nevertheless, counterfactuals are a pervasive cognitive device. As Roese 
(Roese, 1995c) suggests:
“Counterfactual reasoning may also be directed toward problems in 
effortful attempts at troubleshooting. In general, the diversity of 
counterfactual effects reviewed here, embracing both heuristic and 
systematic modes of thought, underscores their pervasive 
psychological importance” (Roese, 1995c, p. 45).
As such, counterfactual reasoning processes can be an important device for 
troubleshooting if their dysfunctional attributes can be controlled.
5.7 Chapter Conclusion
Research has shown that counterfactuals influence a vast range of
judgments including regret (Gilovich and Medvec, 1994; Landman, 1987),
self-inferences (Roese and Olson, 1993a), happiness (Johnson, 1986), causal
ascriptions (Lipe, 1991; Wells and Gavanski, 1989), shame and guilt
(Niedenthal et al., 1994) suspicion (Miller et al., 1989) and victim
compensation (Macrae et al., 1993; Miller and McFarland, 1986).
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Consequently, research on counterfactual thinking has become focused on 
the functional aspects of counterfactuals in reasoning processes (McMullen et 
a!., 1995; Roese, 1994; Roese and Olson, 1993b; Markman et al., 1993; 
Johnson and Sherman, 1990). This functional theory of counterfactual 
reasoning theorizes that counterfactual thinking serves an affective function 
(feeling better) (Gleicher et ai., 1990; Landman, 1987) and a preparative 
function (preparing for improvement in the future) (Roese, 1994; Markman et 
al., 1993).
While counterfactual studies have helped to improve understanding of how 
adaptive learning from experiences occur (Sim and Morris, 1998), they may 
also have dysfunctional implications for foresight, such as a “short-circuiting” 
(Dunning and Madey, 1995; Dhar and Simonson, 1991), systematic biases in 
interpretations of causal relations and events (Sherman and McConnell, 
1995), the use of simplified heuristic principals (Sherman and McConnell, 
1995), and even, in certain circumstances aiding and abetting the hindsight 
bias, creeping determinism and over-confidence (Roese and Olson, 1996. 
They can thus lead to maladaptive strategies for the future (Sherman and 
McConnell, 1995). Shifting resources, for instance, in the future to improve 
performance based on “if only” counterfactuals can lead to “winning the battle, 
but loosing the war.” As Sim and Morris (1998) say:
“This is true when the antecedents are a set of investments drawn 
from a fixed pool of resources, for example, athletic events in which 
one’s energy is apportioned between different stages, politicai 
campaigns in which funds are apportioned across months and 
geographic regions, and business ventures in which one's capital 
must be budgeted into research, commerciaiization, marketing, and 
so forth” (p. 599).
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Further, the generation of counterfactuals, especially upward counterfactuals 
(comparisons with outcomes that are better than reality), can lead one to 
believe that, not only were past events controllable, but that future events are 
controllable (Nasco and Marsh, 1999; Roese, 1994; Markman etal., 1993). In 
many cases, this can lead to enhanced performance in the future, but it may 
also result in misperceiving one’s environment as being more controllable 
than it may actually be in reality.
In social and cognitive psychology, the research to date has been criticized 
by some authors (Roese and Olson, 1995c; Davis et a/., 1995; Markman et 
a/., 1995; Markman et a/., 1993) “for its reliance on simple, un-involving 
scenario studies” and for its reliance on “simple paper-and-pencil ratings” 
(Roese and Olson, 1995c, p. 46). Indeed, these methodologies have been 
summarised by Sanna and Turley (1996) as:
1. Participants read vignettes that describe two (or more) people 
who attain similar outcomes after either considering, or not 
considering, particular antecedents to those outcomes; 
participants are then explicitly asked to choose which of the 
people in the vignette would respond in a more extreme manner 
(e.g., who would experience greater regret; Gleicher et a!., 1990;
Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987; Lund berg and 
Frost, 1992).
2. Participants are asked to read (or to think) about a situation or 
set of outcomes, and then they are explicitly asked to change 
that set of circumstances by providing counterfactuals (Dunning 
and Parpal, 1989; Gavanski and Wells, 1989; N’gbala and 
Branscombe, 1995; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994;
Roese and Olson, 1993a, 1993b; Wells and Gavanski, 1989;
Wells etal., 1987).
3. in detail to participants, and then participants are explicitly asked 
to provide thoughts that give fit the given categories (Roese,
1994).
The latter criticisms have led researchers (Roese and Olson, 1995c; Roese, 
1994; Davis et al., 1995; Markman et al., 1995; Markman et al., 1993) to 
suggest that future research on counterfactuals will be more profitable and
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enhance the counterfactual paradigm if it proceeds using more realistic 
situations.
Despite these methodological criticisms of counterfactual reasoning 
research so far, the research on counterfactual reasoning reviewed in this 
chapter demonstrates that counterfactual reasoning is an integral, if not 
pervasive cognitive function (Sanna, 1996; Roese and Olson, 1995c), and 
consists of both forward and backwards processing (Sanna and Turley, 1996). 
The evidence shows that it plays an important role in preparing for the future 
by generating ‘what ifs’, ‘if only’s’ and ‘if then' by comparing a past event with 
possible alternatives. As such, hindsight plays a role in foresight, and 
counterfactual reasoning is one heuristic device that is used for 
understanding, and learning from the past.
Psychology research into counterfactual reasoning highlights critical 
aspects of cognitive processes that lead to strategy formulation. It also 
contributes to better understanding the mechanisms that strategic managers 
use for processing information and the functional aspects of bounded 
rationality first introduced by Simon (1947; 1957) and March and Simon 
(1958). Mintzberg et ai. (1998) argue that strategic management has not yet 
gained suffiently from cognitive psychology, perhaps because cognitive 
psychology “has yet to address adequately the questions of prime interest to 
stratetgic management, especially how concepts form in the mind of a 
strategist” (p. 172).
Counterfactual reasoning, in a few short years, has become a ‘signature’ 
domain in psychology (Roese and Olson, 1995c, p. vii). However, as an 
analytical tool in history and the social sciences, elaborative counterfactuals,
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counterfactuals used consciously and deliberately, as opposed to 
spontaneous or automatic counterfactuals, counterfactuals used as a 
cognitive heuristic (Kahneman, 1995) are controversial.
Understanding the reasons that people behave as they do is a 
fundamental objective in the social sciences. As Katz (1960) has stated:
‘The functional approach is the attempt to understand the reasons 
people [behave] as they do. The reasons, however, are at the level 
of psychological motivations and not the accidents of external events 
and circumstances” (Katz, 1960, p. 170).
Counterfactual reasoning is a component of that understanding. The 
contribution of this chapter to strategic management literature generally, and 
to this thesis in particular, is that it writes in a canon of knowledge from 
psychology into strategic management, which may help to address the 
question of how concepts (and strategies) form in the mind of the strategist.
The following chapter reviews the debate over the validity of counterfactual 
thought in history and the social sciences.
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Six: “PoétufiUt^ :
iMt» t6e "ptttwie?
“The greatest danger in times of turbuience is not the turbulence; it is to act with
yesterday’s logic.”
~ Peter Drucker, 1985
"Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who 
embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will 
encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is 
given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and
uncontrollable events."
~ Sir Winston Churchili (1874-1965)
“One can foresee a revolution or a war, but it is impossible to foresee the consequence
of an autumn shooting trip for ducks.”
~ Trotsky, 1924
6.0 Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter argues that counterfactual reasoning is a naturally
occurring cognitive function in human beings (Sanna, 1996; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1982). It argues that the counterfactuals that people generate 
influence their causal ascriptions (Roese and Olson, 1996; Gavanski and 
Wells, 1989; Wells et al., 1987), affective reactions (Gleicher et al., 1990; 
Landman, 1987), assignments of blame (Turley ai, 1995; Macrae et al., 
1992; Miller, 1986), expectancies and predictions (Sherman, 1991; Taylor and 
Schneider, 1989; Hoch, 1985; Sherman et al., 1981). As such, they serve a 
preparative function (Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Roese and Olson, 
1995c; Roese, 1994; Markman etal., 1993; Johnson and Sherman, 1990).
Counterfactual reasoning in the social sciences is concerned with non­
actualized causal possibilities in past historical events [Hawthorn, 1991 #296]. 
Counterfactuals, or asking ‘what if, ‘if then’ and ‘if only’ questions about what 
we think we know about history can illuminate the connections that an actual,
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located in a space of possibilities, has to other non-actual things. As 
Hawthorn (1991) says:
"The kind of understanding we gain, for instance, when we see how possible, 
even probable, other lines of species evolution were at some distant point in 
the past, and realize how improbable our own has been...we realize what we 
now think of as 'progress’ was by no means assured...in reflecting on our
own lives, we see how else we might have lived them" (pp. 17-18).
A counterfactual, or a counterfactual subjunctive conditional as it is sometimes 
called, is “one in which the antecedent (the term following the “if”) is in fact 
false, that is, it runs counter to the facts” (Bulhof, 1999, p. 146).
Like the naturally occurring, spontaneous, cognitive use of counterfactuals 
reviewed in the last chapter, counterfactual use in historiography and the 
social sciences have a range of applications and repercussions, and, this 
chapter argues, despite being contentious, are frequently, informally and 
pervasively used to underpin logic, assumptions and lines of argument, to test 
theories, to judge the importance of an event or idea, and to ascribe causality 
within scholarship.
6.1 Chapter Purpose and Contribution
The purpose of this chapter is to critique the arguments for and against the
use of counterfactuals in historiography and the social sciences, to emphasize
the importance of in-determinacy in past events and to draw a link between
contingency in the past, through to the present and into the future. The
contribution of this chapter to the doctoral thesis map (exhibit 6.0) is to
understanding the role that counterfactual analysis unconsciously plays in
historical and social science scholarship, argumentation and logic.
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This chapter also contributes to understanding the methodological issues that 
pertain to a disciplined application of counterfactuals to historical analysis and 
the linkages between modality in hindsight and contingency in foresight.
6.2 Chapter Structure
This chapter builds on the previous chapter on the sense-making use of
counterfactuals by reviewing the use of counterfactuals in the social sciences.
It begins by emphasizing the need to be sensitive to contingency in history
(Ferguson, 1997; Weber, 1996) and uncertainty in the future (Weber, 1996) by
illustrating that the past was no more fixed than the future (Lewis, 1991).
The following section addresses arguments by opponents of counterfactual
use in historiography and the social sciences (Carr, 1961/1990; Thompson,
1978; Croce, 1966) by presenting the argument that counterfactuals already
do, sometimes tacitly and at other times explicitly, influence argumentation
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and scholarship within historiography and the social sciences (Lebow, 2000b; 
Tetlock and Belkin, 1996; Hawthorn, 1991).
Counterfactuals, the argument follows, already play an important role in 
our cognitive and learning experience (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Roese 
and Olson, 1995b), and the decisions, policies and structures that result from 
them (Lebow, 2000a; Breslauer, 1996; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1996), 
and they can be used to challenge path-dependencies and path-dependent 
logic (Booth, 2003; Teece et ai., 1997; Hawkins, 1990). It goes on to review 
the current literature on counterfactuals and the various methodologies that 
scholars use when producing counterfactual alternatives and arguments.
The chapter concludes by arguing that counterfactual analysis, if 
deliberately applied and rigorously tested, is an effective ‘intervening tool’ or 
‘de-biasing technique’ (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; Fischhoff and Beyth, 
1975b) for undoing the past and learning for the future (Starkey and McKinlay, 
1996; Hurst et ai., 1989).
6.3 Why Use Counterfactual Analysis of History in the Strategy-Making 
Process?
Why use counterfactual analysis of history in the strategy-making process? 
What value does counterfactual reasoning have to add to strategy-making 
generally, and scenario thinking more specifically? The present is a 
consequence of the past. A deceptively simple answer to the question, but as 
Strange (1994, pp. 18-19) states within the context of the study of political 
economy:
"It follows that the study of political economy cannot avoid a close concern 
with causes. Consequences today -  for states, corporations, for individuals -  
imply causes yesterday. There is no way that contemporary international
Chapter Six: Counterfactual Posturing: Hindsight into the future?
Counterfactual Reasoning in Strategy Context 170
political economy can be understood without making some effort to dig back 
to its roots, to peer behind the curtain of passing time into what went before.”
Consequently, perceptions from the past have a powerful hold on perceptions 
of present issues and dilemmas and future solutions and choices. The key to 
releasing the historical shackles that bias present decisions and future 
solutions is not to allow history to fade into the shadows of passing time and 
space, but to strive for a better understanding of past events and of our 
perceptions of them. Indeed, as the metaphor used by Jared Diamond 
indicates, history is like an onion:
“[The] peeling back of the onion’s layers is fascinating, challenging ~ and of 
overwhelming importance to us today, as we seek to grasp our past’s lessons 
for our future” (Diamond, 1997, p. 11).
To understand the past, it is argued here, it is important to also take into
account contingency in the past and “traces” of events that did not come to
pass. This brings us to the question: Was the past “fixed” and otherwise
determined, and by logical extension, is the “open future" actually “open”, or is
it too fixed? This question drives straight at the heart of the controversy
between historians on whether the application of counterfactuals is simply
'self-indulgent fiction’ (Carr, 1991) or whether counterfactuals have some
explanatory power.
Analytically structured narratives in the form of counterfactual worlds are a 
vehicle that has been used to accommodate notions of possibility, 
contingency and chance within historical analysis (Ferguson, 1997). The use 
of counterfactuals, or more colloquially, “what ifs” in analytically structured 
narrative is also a vehicle that has its proponents and its detractors. Flowever, 
the value of applying “what if” counterfactuals to the study of causation in the
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social sciences has “value that goes beyond the ‘idle parlor game’” that 
historian E. H. Carr (1990) once dismissed them to be (Cowley, 1999).
6.4 Counterfactuals & the Social Sciences
Throughout the continuum of space and time, there is always a range of
decisions that can be made for any given issue; there is a decision field.
Within this decision field there are certain degrees of freedom to make
decisions, to act, to choose another course in history. The degrees of
freedom, as counterfactual analysis illuminates, will vary at any given
confluence of causal factors that result in an event. At times there will be a
higher degree of freedom because the future is still malleable and differing
options exist for the choosing. At other times there will be less of a degree of
freedom because decisions or events have already been taken, changing the
context and narrowing the range of decisions that can be taken in the future.
Some strategy scholars have termed this narrowing of choices as path-
dependencies (e.g. Teece et al., 1997) and others as “lock-in by historical
events” (Arthur, 1989). Path-dependent technological examples might include
Windows 95, the VMS video recorder and QWERTY keyboard as industry
standards (Booth, 2003). To quote Teece et al.:
“Choices about domains of competence are influenced by past choices. At 
any given point in time, firms must follow a certain trajectory or path of 
competence development. This path not only defines what choices are open 
to the firm today, but it also puts bounds around what its repertoire is likely to 
be in the future. This, firms, at various points in time, make long-term, quasi- 
irreversible commitments to certain domains of competence. Deciding, under 
significant uncertainty about future states of the world, which long term paths 
to commit to, and when to change paths, is the central strategic problem 
confronting the firm (Teece, 1997, p. 532).
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As an event looms closer, the range of decisions, or the degree of freedom 
to make certain decisions, will narrow. The case of Shell and the OPEC oil 
crisis illustrates the point.
By 1967, as Kleiner (1996) postulates, it was apparent that there was 
going to be a major shift in the oil industry:
“Yet anyone with a halfway sophisticated background in the industry couid, if they
cared to look, see the strain on the invisible pipes and pumps." (p. 153).
Demand for oil was beginning to outstrip supply; the percentage of oil put into 
strategic oil reserves to be used in times of crisis in the US had dropped from 
75% to 10%; for the Saudis who had more money than they could spend, the 
oil was more valuable left in the ground than the price that extracting it could 
bring them; the Shah’s regime in Iran was in political trouble because of 
growing poverty and only 20 years estimated of oil reserves; and the 
Japanese had begun to “wean themselves from their oil dependencies, 
beginning an energy efficiency improvement effort” (p. 154) in 1968. Indeed 
the signs were there, but the range of decisions was narrowing and time was 
running out. The counterfactual past is represented by the following 
illustration if one were to reflect on the oil crisis in 1973/74 (see exhibit 6.1).
Chapter Six: Counterfactual Posturing: Hindsight into the future?
Counterfactual Reasoning in Strategy Context 173
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If we were to take it through until 2000, the continuum would show the range 
of potential decisions available to decision makers and society generally. It 
would open back up again after 1973, but would then begin to close again 
slightly, as the oil shocks of 1978 shook the industry, and then would open 
back up again.
When one embarks on a counterfactual mental exercise, you are asking 
what might have been. Counterfactual reasoning as an academic tool for 
analyzing history requires a distillation of historical incidents down into a 
theory of what we think has happened in the past. Counterfactuals sensitize 
one to the role of contingency and uncertainty when connecting the resulting 
theory with history in order to enhance the student of history’s understanding 
and judgments in an uncertain world. It is a means for creating organization 
and coherence to our thoughts on a multitude of different factors and causes. 
It also helps to avoid random guessing when the data is incomplete.
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Using counterfactuals is sinnilar to speaking prose. Our minds are 
constantly using counterfactuals. Words such as "determinants”, “influences”, 
“roots”, “factors that shape or give rise to”, “origins” and “correlates” are all 
words that are used frequently, refer to causality (Fearon, 1996, p. 40) and 
infer counterfactual reasoning. Every time an individual asks himself or 
herself “if only I had done such and such, my life would be so different”, they 
are using counterfactual reasoning. One can imagine the managers of IBM 
sitting around in the late 1980s saying: “If only we had the foresight to move 
more quickly at developing the PC, which is the future of the computer 
industry, we would not be in this crisis". As Czechoslovakia’s President 
Vaclav Havel, who had been a political prisoner a mere six months previously, 
stated in his speech to the U.S. Congress in 1990:
“As a playwright. I’m used to the fantastic. I dream up all sorts of implausible 
things and put them in my plays. So this jolting experience of going from 
prison to standing before you today, I can adjust to this. But pity the poor 
political scientists who are trying to deal with what’s probable” (Havel, 1990 
February 21).
Counterfactual analysis is a useful tool in several ways. Firstly, 
counterfactual analysis helps to illuminate how individuals learn from the past 
and make plans for the future. As already mentioned, counterfactual analysis 
can be used as an antidote to the hindsight bias [Hawkins, 1990 #146] and 
creeping determinism (Fischhoff, 1975a), as well as logical path- 
dependencies (Booth, 2003, but more generally, counterfactual analysis is a 
useful tool for analyzing the range of historical possibilities and potential 
decisions, and how our decisions have reflexively created the world that we 
now live in. Counterfactuals are also a useful tool, frequently used in the 
social sciences, for testing causal hypothesis and theory (Fearon, 1996).
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The application of counterfactuals to historical analysis is a controversial 
technique, which begs two questions. The first question is, was the “fixed 
past” determined and unalterable? Secondly, how can counterfactual
historical analysis enhance the quality of foresight and strategic decisions at 
the levels of the individual, firm, industry and even nation? There is an implicit 
dilemma inherent in these two questions, because if the past is determined, 
and could not have evolved otherwise than it did, then it follows to reason that 
counterfactual analysis has nothing of value to offer the strategic literature or 
scenario thinking. If it is accepted that there was contingency in the past, and 
that our perceptions and beliefs about the future are constrained by 
foresightful thinking flaws rooted in historical biases, as has been argued in 
this dissertation, then counterfactual analysis is a useful intervening technique 
for controlling for bias and flawed logic, which constrains thinking about the 
future and understanding of the critical uncertainties facing organizations. 
The following exhibit (exhibit 6.2) illustrates the dilemma.
Exhibit 6.2 Past-Future Matrix
FUTURE 
Fixed Open
Fixed
P
A
S
I
Open
Source: Author.
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In a deterministic world, where the past is fixed and determined, and by logical 
extension, the future is forecastable and predictable, counterfactual analysis 
has little value to add to foresight. In a world where the past is fixed and the 
future is open, counterfactuals may also have little value to add to 
understanding the future. If the future is fixed, predictable and forecastable, 
then considering the past as open is not only philosophically untenable (as the 
future would by logical necessity also have to be open), but would add little 
value to foresight. In a world that is in-deterministic, where the past was at 
one time open, as is the future, counterfactual analysis is a useful analytical 
tool.
6.41 Asymmetry of Openness and Indeterminism
The vague contrast that we draw between the “fixed past” and the “open 
future” is one of an asymmetry of openness (Lewis, 1991). The past is often 
regarded as a distinct, unchangeable actuality, fixed in time and space, while 
the future is frequently considered to be a forest of forking trails and 
alternative possibilities. This begs the question: Is our world governed by in- 
deterministic laws, as can be inferred from Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle 
in physics, or alternatively, as Lewis (1991) has argued, is it more a function 
of asymmetry between open future and fixed past.
There is always an element of in-determinism, or uncertainty, in every 
circumstance. Disciplines such as economics have tried to isolate and 
neutralize uncertainties by listing assumptions for every given theory, and by 
assuming instrumental rationality in human behavior. To quote the 1993 co- 
Nobel Laureate in the economic sciences, Douglas North:
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“The rationally assumption that has served economists and all the social 
scientists well for a limited range of issues in macro economics theory is a 
devastating shortcoming in dealing with most of the major issues confronting 
social scientists and policy-makers, and it is a major stumbling block to the 
path of future economic progress" (North, 1998, October 12, p. 13).
Many models of political behavior also assume instrumental rationality in 
every day decision-making. However, evidence from the two world wars and 
the end of the cold war suggest that the series of decisions leading to system 
changes produced outcomes that were “diametrically opposed to those 
intended by key actors” (Lebow, 2000b). The emotional decision by Austrian 
leaders to remove foreign and domestic threats to their empires by crushing 
Serbia, the pathology of German decision making in both world wars and the 
policy decisions made by Gorbachev are all data-rich sources of deviance 
from instrumental rationality. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that 
decision outcomes might deviate from desired outcomes at the time (Lebow, 
2000b).
Rational expectations theory within the social sciences, and manifest within 
classical approaches to strategy formulation (e.g. Selznick, 1957; Chandler, 
1962; Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980) for instance, suggests that humans make 
decisions based on an objective, rational analysis of the potential costs and 
benefits of a given decision. But the work of Simon (1957) has demonstrated 
that rational expectations theory is often misleading because people’s ability 
to process information is bounded. Any number of influences can affect the 
processing of information, and consequently decisions, not the least of which 
being intuition (Rowan, 1987), but also inadequate or misleading information 
(Simon, 1957), myths and ideological beliefs (Johnson, 1988) bias (Sherman 
and McConnell, 1995; Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991; Hawkins
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and Hastie, 1990; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), groupthink (Janis, 1971), 
and ideas (North, 1998, October 12; Keynes, 1936).
The role of ideas in decision-making, for instance, is frequently overlooked 
in the social sciences. As North states:
“For the most part economists, with a few very important exceptions like 
Hayek, have ignored the role of ideas in making choices" (North, 1998,
October 12, p. 13).
And as another renowned economist, John Maynard Keynes, corroborates:
“The ideas of economic and political philosophers, both when they are right 
and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed the world is ruled by little else” (Keynes, 1936, Chapter 24).
Moreover, Hawthorn (1991) emphasizes that the whole process of 
rationalization Is not objective, but subjective and intricately intertwined with 
“conditional, subjunctive hypothesis, counterfactual judgments and reflexive 
beliefs”:
“Many explanations in History and the social sciences, however, turn not on 
causal connections between states of affairs that are beyond human control, 
but on the relevant agents’ own practical reasonings, practical reasonings are 
not pre-determined by nature, and certainly not by human nature, which 
always under-determines. Nor, except in the way in which these matters are 
seen in the most extreme of rationalisms, or sociologies, or sociological 
rationalisms, are practical reasonings entirely pre-ordained by rules or 
reasons. They are conditional, subjunctive hypotheticals, a matter of 
counterfactual judgment. They turn on what agents more or less reflectively 
believe in, in the light of their inclinations and the circumstances, to be 
possible” (Hawthorn, 1991, p. 15).
Hawthorn’s observations are substantiated by the counterfactual research 
in social psychology reviewed in the last chapter. Despite the import of 
counterfactual reasoning within decision-making, it has not been well explored 
in the social science literature. Scholars have, however, debated it as a 
useful and appropriate analytical technique within academia.
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6.42 Counterfactuals and Historiography: A “red herring” or legitimate tool?
Many professional historians dismiss the use of counterfactuals as fantasy, 
or, as Carr (1990) suggests, a “parlor game”, a “red herring”. Thompson 
(1978) has gone so far as to criticize counterfactuals as purely 
‘Geschichtswissenschlopff, unhistorlcal shit’. Others, such as Croce (1966), 
have been less colorful, but equally as hostile in their criticisms of 
counterfactual questions:
“For if we went on to such a full exploration of reality, the game would soon 
be up. When the attempt is made to play this sort of game on the field of 
history, where it is thoroughly out of place, the effect is too wearisome to be 
long maintained” (p. 557).
Indeed, as Tetlock and Belkin state: “The ferocity of the [counterfactual] 
skeptics is a bit unnerving” (1996, p. 3).
One observer summarizes the reaction from the majority of historical 
scholars towards counterfactual history by suggesting that 'what if questions 
are “strangely repugnant to many, if not all, professional historians” (Roberts, 
1997, August 1, p. 6). As Carr (1990) explains:
"In practice, historians do not assume that events are Inevitable before they 
have taken place. They frequently discuss alternative courses available to 
the actors In the story, on the assumption that the option was open ...
Nothing in history is inevitable, except in the formal sense that, for it have 
happened otherwise, the antecedent causes would have had to be different"
(p. 96).
Determinist assumptions, from Polybius through to contemporary views 
about the past, have been shown by proponents of counterfactual history 
(Ferguson, 1997) to be embedded in historical scholarship (McMahon, 2001, 
Winter). Determinism, to Ferguson (1997), is based on antiquated 
assumptions about linear causality, which has resulted in distortions in 
historical analysis and impairs foresight. Ferguson argues that we should 
view history as stochastic, uncertain and contingent as suggested by
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Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and other 20*^  Century scientific and 
mathematical developments such as chaos theory'^. Like the submicroscopic 
particles that jump from point to point in the quantum world, social phenomena 
is fuil of uncertainties and ambiguities that cannot be accounted for using 
traditionai analyticai techniques within history or the social sciences. As 
Ferguson (1997) has alluded, a revolt against determinism has been slowly 
building over two centuries with writers as diverse as Carlyle (1830/1988), 
Dostoevsky (1980), and Tolstoy (1978), and is forming the rationale for the 
legitimate consideration of chance and contingency in both historiography and 
social theory, and with such legitimate consideration of chance and 
contingency. Counterfactuals can be used for examining causation, testing 
theory, broadening perspective, and at times, filling in missing data.
Carlyle (1830/1988), for example, was one of the early critics of a 
determinist view of history. He launched a full broadside when he wrote:
“It is not acted, as it Is in written History: actual events are nowise so simply 
related to each other as parent and offspring are; every single event is the 
offspring not of one, but of all other events, prior or contemporaneous, and 
will in its turn combine with all others to give birth to new; it is an ever-living, 
ever-working Chaos of Being, wherein shape after shape bodies Itself forth 
from innumerable elements ... Alas for our 'chains', or 'chainlets’, of 'causes 
and effects’, when the whole is a broad, deep immensity, and each atom is 
'chain’ and connected with all!” (Carlyle, 1830/1988, p. 95).
Dostoevsky [1980] also indulges in an anti-scientific lambasting of rational
determinism in the social sciences, and the assumption by economists that
humans act out of self-interest. Dostoevsky’s objections to a deterministic
view of history helps to elevate uncertainty to the status of an accepted, if not
controversial principle in the social sciences:
"One's own free, unrestrained choice, one’s own whim, be it the wildest, 
one’s own fancy, sometimes worked up to a frenzy -  that is the most
See appendix #C for a historical overview of the debate about determinism in the physical sciences.
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advantageous advantage that cannot be fitted into any table ...” (Dostoevsky,
1980 p. 110).
Tolstoy (1978), in his attempt to reconcile theories of free will and 
determinism (Ferguson, 1997), maintains that the more the historian 
understands the relationship between subjects and the external world, the 
less likely s/he will be to dismiss ‘that endless chain of causation’. Tolstoy 
(1978) argues that:
“The third element influencing our judgment is the degree to which we can 
apprehend that endless chain of causation demanded by reason, in which 
every phenomenon capable of being understood (and therefore every human 
action) must have its definite place as a result of what has gone before and a 
cause of what will follow" (p. 1434).
As Ferguson (1997) points out, Tolstoy concedes that in historical writing: 
“there can never be absolute inevitability” because;
"To imagine a human action subject only to the law of necessity, without any 
freedom, we must assume a knowledge of an infinite number of spatial 
conditions, an infinitely long period of time and an infinite chain of causation"
(Tolstoy, 1978, p. 1438).
One of the more influential defenders of historical determinism is the 
English social historian E. H. Carr. Carr argues that:
“Everything that happened has a cause or causes, and could not have 
happened differently unless something in the cause or causes had also been 
different" (Carr, 1990, p.96).
Carr, best known for his chronicling of the Bolshevik revolution goes on to say:
"In practice, historians do not assume that events are inevitable before they 
have taken place. They frequently discuss alternative courses available to 
the actors in the story, on the assumption that the option was open ...
Nothing in history is inevitable, except in the formal sense that, for it have 
happened otherwise, the antecedent causes would have had to be different”
(Carr, 1990, p. 96).
Carr argues that the trouble with contemporary history is that, rather then 
adopting the historians’ attitude of history as a fait accompli, people remember 
the time when there was still a range of open options. Although this criticism 
is meant to be in defense of historical determinism, by acknowledging that the 
options were at one time open, Carr tacitly, if perhaps unwittingiy, concedes to
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a need for counterfactual history. Carr argues that ‘history is progress’ (Carr,
1990). The concept of progress, albeit a subjective one, infers a movement
forward. It also implies improvement, advancement and learning. If history is
analysed as a process that discards the range of open options that once
existed a priori for a closed system, thus making the assumption that history is
indeed a fait accompli, then historical analysis is reduced to a narrative of
what the writer thinks has happened in the past. However, as one delves into
the scholarship of even the most ardent critics of counterfactual history, one
finds that counterfactuals are frequently smuggled into their analysis. Thus,
Carr’s (1990) criticisms of counterfactuals, as Ferguson (1997) has countered,
are so elastic that one can almost infer an acceptance of indeterminacy. The
example of Trotsky’s hunting trip, for instance, is an example of the
importance of chance in historical events:
“In the middle of his maneuverings with Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin and 
Stalin, [Trotsky] might not (as he did) have caught a cold, gone to bed, and 
missed a crucial move in the fight to succeed Lenin" (Hawthorn, 1991, p. 8).
It is chance events such as this one that once led Carr to concede that it was 
“futile to attempt to spirit chances away, or to pretend that in some way or 
another they had no effect” (Carr, 1961/1990, pp. 98).
Moreover, in Carr’s factual narrative on the Soviet Union (Carr, 1958), he 
propounds that Stalin hijacked the Bolshevik Revolution. He thus implies that 
had he not hijacked the Revolution, socialism would have developed 
differently [Lebow, 2000b #301] -  a tacit counterfactual!
Hawthorn suggests that:
"Most historians and social scientists, if they have considered counterfactuals 
at all, have done so only nervously, In asides" (Hawthorn, 1991, p. 4).
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This statement, however, is not entirely accurate. The majority of 
professional historians and social scientists frequently use counterfactual 
conditionals to underscore the importance of certain lines of argument, in 
particular, when assigning causality (Bulhof, 1999). As Giddens argues:
"The concern is with a singular set of events, traced through and analysed 
counterfactually. The researcher asks, ‘What would have happened to 
events B, C, D, E ... if A had not occurred?’ -  thereby seeking to identify the 
role of A in the chain or sequence” (Giddens, 1984, p. 13).
Loewen (1995), for instance, known to dismiss the arguments of other 
scholars by damning them as ‘what if history’, substantiates his own 
arguments using just that:
“If there had been no plague, the Europeans would not have been able to 
'settle' the Americas” (Loewen, 1995, p. 83).
In Overly’s explanation of why the allies won the Second World War, and in
his defense of Allied tactics, he states:
“Without the defeat or neutralization of the German air force the Allies might 
well have hesitated to take the risk [of landing on the Continent]. Without the 
successful diversion of the heavy-bomber force to the job of pulverizing 
roads, railways and bridges, D-Day might have failed at the first attempt... All 
of these factors ... belie the view that bombing was a strategy of squandered 
efforts. It is difficult to think of anything else the Allies might have done with 
their manpower and resources that could have achieved anything else at 
such comparatively low cost” (Overly, 1995, p. 130).
Indeed, as exhibit 6.2 illustrates, to underpin their rationale, historians use 
covert modality pervasively.
As a consequence, one can see where even the least friendly historians to 
counterfactual conditionals have a penchant for developing the logic of their 
own narratives, and often times assign the causality of certain events, using 
counterfactuals. As Bulhof points out: “Counterfactuals, causes, and 
explanations are three sides of the same strange three-sided coin; you cannot 
have one without the other two” (Bulhof, 1999, p. 147). This has led Lebow 
(2000) to comment: “Every good counterfactual thus rests on multiple factuals.
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just as every factual rests on counterfactual assumptions -  and these 
assumptions too often go unexamined” (Lebow, 2000b, p. 556).
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Exhibit 6.3 Covert Counterfactuals & Modality in Historical Scholarship
statement One
“Rebels [In the English Peasants Revolt of 1381] threw prisoners open, sacked the homes of the king’s ministers, 
ransacked the Tower, and tried to frighten Richard II into making far-reaching concessions which, if implemented, 
would have broken the remaining bonds of serfdom and revolutionized landholding in Church and State’’[Overly, 1995 
#287] (p. 190).
Counterfactual
/f reforms had been implemented, then the remaining bonds of serfdom would have been broken and the landholding 
in Church and State would have been revolutionized.
Statement Two
"[The perpetrators] were overwhelmingly and most importantly Germans. While members of other national groups 
aided the Germans in their slaughter of Jews, the commission of other national groups aided the Germans in their 
slaughter of Jews, the commission of the Holocaust was primarily a German undertaking. Non-Germans were not 
essential to the perpetration of the Holocaust, and they did not supply the drive and initiative that pushed it forward. 
To be sure, had the Germans not found European (especially eastern European ) helpers, then the Holocaust would 
have unfolded somewhat differently, and the Germans would likely not have succeeded in killing as many Jews'" 
[Goldhagen, 1997 #289] (p. 6).
Counterfactual
If the Germans had not found European helpers, then the Holocaust would have unfolded somewhat differently. 
Statement Three
"But the advance was painfully slow, for the men were laden like beasts of burden. Each staggered under a weight of 
66 lbs., more than was borne under full marching orders. They carried 220 rounds-of ammunition, two bombs, and 
two sand bags; a proportion were further encumbered with picks and shovels, boxes containing carrier pigeons and 
telephone apparatus. In some places where no-man’s land was wide, four of these lines were out together in the 
open, stumbling over the shell-pocked ground. Thus it has been argued with some justification that "the battle was 
lost by three minutes," for such a saving in speed would have allowed the machine gunners no time to man their 
weapons before the enemy was among them [Cruttweli, 1986 #290] (p. 266).
Counterfactual
If there had been a three-minute saving in time, then the machine gunners would have had no time to man their 
weapons.
Statement Four
"If Montgomery had mounted a confused and costly battle of pursuit, Rommel and the Afrikakorps might have profited 
by their cunning in mobile operations to muddy the outcome of Alamein, and Montgomery would have incurred 
criticism far more severe than he has suffered retrospectively at the pens of literary strategists" [Keegan, 1989 #291] 
(p. 337).
Counterfactual
if Montgomery had mounted a confused and costly battle of pursuit, then Rommel might have profited by their 
cunning in mobile operations.
Statement Five
if the Sarajevo crisis had not precipitated a particular great war, some other crisis would have precipitated a great war 
at no distant date [Hinsiey, 1995 #292] (p. 4).
Counterfactual
If the Sarajevo crisis had not ignited the Great War, then another crisis would have.
* Adapted from Bulhof (1999), and Lebow (2000)
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There is no shortage of examples of modality or use of counterfactuals in 
historical scholarship. This is because the study of history is the study of what 
happened and why something happened. Counterfactuals help to explain 
events in history by identifying causes. They are also used to highlight certain 
events and defend or criticize judgments about people. Claims about what 
might have been are thus important in our logic, reasoning and understanding 
(Bulhof. 1999, p. 146)
6.5 The “Methodological Rathole”
Critics of counterfactuals, such as Fisher (1970, p. 18), suggest that
pursuing metaphysical, age-old riddles that revolve around fate, free will and 
determinism through the use of counterfactual thought experiments leads 
scholars “down the methodological rathole” (Tetlock and Belkin, 1996, p. 3). 
Determinism and modality are not necessarily mutually exclusive, however. 
As Bulhoff says: “We can make perfect sense of what might have been, and 
of what cannot be, in a deterministic world” (Bulhof, 1999, p. 147). Nor is 
counterfactual thought necessarily a “methodological rathole”.
Counterfactual thinking has been a characteristic of human reasoning for 
thousands of years. As Tetlock and Belkin point out:
“Fueled the grief of Tacitus when he pondered what would have happened if 
Germanicus had lived to become emperor: “Had he been the sole arbiter of 
events, had he held the powers and title of king, he would have outstripped 
Alexander in military fame as far as he surpassed him in gentleness, in self- 
command and in other noble qualities. Social scientists -  from Max Weber 
(1949) to Robert Fogel (1964) -  have also long been aware of the pivotal role 
that counterfactuals play in scholarship on such diverse topics as the causes 
of economic growth and the diffusion of religious and philosophical ideas” 
(Tetlock, 1996, p. 3).
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As a scholarly tool, however, there are various ways that counterfactuals 
can be used and, by extension, different styles of counterfactuals. Each 
counterfactual style requires a set of criteria to judge them by.
Tetlock and Belkin have proposed that there are five distinct styles of 
counterfactual argumentation. They are:
1. Idiographic case-study counterfactuals that highlight points of indeterminacy at 
particular junctures in history (reminding us of how things could easily have worked 
out differently and of how difficult it is to apply abstract hypothetico-deductlve laws to 
concrete cases);
2. Nomothetic counterfactuals that apply well-defined antecedent conditions (reminding 
us that deterministic laws may have been at work that were invisible to the original 
historical actors as well as to contemporary scholars who insist on a radically 
idiographic focus on the particular);
3. Joint idiographic-nomothetic counterfactuals that combine the historian’s interest in 
what was possible in particular cases, thereby producing theory-informed history;
4. Computer-simulation counterfactuals that reveal hitherto latent logical contradictions 
and gaps in formal theoretical arguments by rerunning “history" in artificial worlds that 
“capture" key functional properties of the actual world;
5. Mental-simulation counterfactuals that reveal hitherto latent psychological 
contradictions and gaps in belief systems by encouraging people to imagine possible 
worlds in which causes they supposed irrelevant seem to make a difference, or 
possible worlds in which causes they supposed consequential seem to be irrelevant 
(Tetlock and Belkin, 1996, pp. 6-7).
Ideographic case-study counterfactuals focus on how the path-dependant 
logic of events (Hawthorn, 1991) could have been re-directed through the 
alteration of “conceivable” causes (Tetlock and Belkin, 1996, p. 7). Some 
scholars, such as Breslauer (1996) argue that counterfactual reasoning is not 
just a “parlor game" or “idle speculation”. The historical profession is not 
monolithic in this sense. Indeed, there are many that feel that counterfactual 
reasoning is a worthwhile step in accumulating knowledge. Those that 
subscribe to counterfactual reasoning as a worthwhile venture, however, are 
more nomothetic, or theory oriented in their approach to knowledge building 
(Breslauer, 1996, pp.71-72).
The criticism of those that study history but are more ideographic is that 
the study of history requires the study of causes; the study of causes requires
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counterfactual assertions. The question becomes: What are reasonable 
standards for counterfactual reasoning? Breslauer (1996) argues that some 
minimal combination of:
1. a data-rich evidentiary base sufficient for tracing causal connections within and 
among social, economic, and political processes; and
2. a theoretical apparatus based on assumptions or analogies that are sufficiently 
relevant to the empirical context under discussion to permit one plausibility to bridge 
the inevitable gaps in the evidence. This apparatus may be based upon deductive 
models or statistical generalizations, but the critical issue will be its contextual 
relevance: Are the assumptions built into the models relevant to the context at hand 
(e.g. revolutionary Russia or the Soviet Union in the 1920s or 1980s)? Are the 
statistical generalizations based on contexts sufficiently analogous to the 
Russia/Soviet context in question? In short, is the theoretical apparatus based on a 
tight analogical fit, a loose fit, or a nonfit? (Breslauer, 1996, pp 72-73).
Breslauer asks: “which methodological standards are reasonable to invoke 
under these conditions?" (p. 74). He concludes that the criteria outlined by 
Tetlock and Belkin -  clear specification of independent and dependent 
variables; co-tenability of antecedents and connecting principles; consistency 
with well-established historical facts; and invocation of theories or statistical 
generalizations that are in principle falsifiable -  are reasonable even in the 
circumstances of theoretical uncertainty and data scarcity.
Borrowing from Nash’s (1991) survey, some scholars go even further. 
According to Breslauer (1996) and Nash (1991), methodological standards for 
which counterfactuals can be invoked also include:
1. the focus should be on identification of the decisive factor in a historical sequence, by 
considering which factor, if removed, would have made the sequence inconceivable;
2. the consequent must stand in relatively close temporal proximity to the antecedent; 
and,
3. the counterfactual antecedent must have been an available option (Breslauer, 1996, 
p. 74).
The first two criteria of the additions proposed by Breslauer (1996) and 
Nash (1991) are reasonable and subscribe to the “minimal-rewrite-of-history” 
rule that many of the ideographic scholars (Breslauer, 1996; Khong, 1996; 
Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1996; Lebow and Stein, 1996) agree upon, and
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which Weber (1949) also advocates. In other words, there seems to be a 
consensus amongst the latter scholars that counterfactuals should not undue 
many events. For example, a counterfactual that imagines a democratic 
Soviet Union at the end of World War II or Soviet possession of strategic 
nuclear superiority at the time of the Cuban missile crisis would require too 
many events to have been “undone" (Breslauer, 1996, pp.7-8). “Minimal re­
write” counterfactuals do not change what was culturally, technologically, 
temporally or otherwise plausible and they entail small, plausible changes in 
history (Lebow, 2000a).
The third criterion borrowed from Nash (1991) has also been reiterated by 
Fearon (1996) and Ferguson (1997), but is more controversial. Ferguson 
argues that:
"We should consider as plausible or probable only those alternatives which 
we can show on the basis of contemporary evidence that contemporaries 
actually considered” (Ferguson, 1997, p. 86).
His argument follows thus:
“What we call the past was once the future; and the people of the past no 
more knew what their future would be than we can know our own. All they 
could do was consider the likely future, the plausible outcome. It is possible 
that some people in the past had no interest in the future whatever, it is also 
true that many people in the past have felt quite sure that they did know what 
the future would be; and that sometimes they have even got it right. But most 
people in the past have tended to consider more than one possible future.
And although no more than one of these actually has come about, at the 
moment before it came about it was no more real (although it may now seem 
more probable) than the others. Now, if all history is the history of (recorded) 
thought, surely we must attach equal significance to all the outcomes thought 
about. The historian who allows his knowledge as to which of these 
outcomes subsequently happened to obliterate the other outcomes people 
regarded as plausible cannot hope to recapture the past 'as it actually was'.
For, in considering only the possibility which was actually realized, he 
commits the most elementary teleological error. To understand how it 
actually was, we therefore need to understand how it actually wasn’t -  but 
how, to contemporaries, it might have been. This is even more true when the 
actual outcome is one which no one expected -  which was not actually 
thought about until it happened" (Ferguson, 1997, pp. 86-87).
For the most part, the logic of Ferguson’s argument Is sound. People In 
the past could not predict their future any more than we can today. People In
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the past must have considered more than one possible future in any given 
circumstance. Indeed, it seems only reasonable that we attach equal 
significance to all the recorded outcomes thought about. Perhaps the most 
important point is that to understand how the past actually was, we need to 
understand how it actually wasn't. Further, Fearon (1996) concludes that 
counterfactual scenarios:
"May provide the controlled comparisons necessary to support causal 
inferences when researchers restrict themselves to a small number of actual- 
world cases” (Fearon, 1996, p. 65).
This leads Fearon to be pessimistic about using counterfactual 
methodologies. However, there are two faults that can be found in the logic of 
arguments propounded by Ferguson (1997) and Fearon (1996). The same 
faults can be applied to the third set of criteria proposed by Breslauer 
(Breslauer, 1996) and Nash (1991). Firstly, the argument is too limiting, and 
secondly, one takes for granted that all the possible futures thought about 
were indeed recorded and recorded accurately. As Lebow asserts:
“Even when evidence is meager or absent, the difference between 
counterfactual and "factual” history may still be marginal. Documents are 
rarely smoking guns that allow researchers to establish motives or causes 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Actors only occasionally leave evidence about 
their motives, and historians rarely accept such testimony at face value.
More often historians infer motives from what they know about actors' 
personalities and goals, their past behavior, and the constraints under which 
they operated” (Lebow, 2000b, p. 553).
Some scholars, such as Ferguson (1997), Breslauer (1996), and Nash 
(1991) insist that only those counterfactual scenarios that have been accepted 
by historians as a valid source and committed to some form of record be 
considered. But as Lebow (2000b) criticizes, this criterion would put 
counterfactuals in a straightjacket. According to Lebow, restricting the 
counterfactuals to this criterion would:
“Exclude entire categories of plausible-world counterfactuals. It would limit 
counterfactuals to elites who made written records, to self-conscious
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decisions in which alternatives are likely to be carefully considered, and to 
political systems in which leaders and other important actors feel secure 
enough to write down their thoughts or share them with colleagues, 
journalists, family members, or friends. It would rule out all counterfactuals 
that were the result of Impulsive behavior (or lack of it), of human accident, 
oversight, obtuseness, or unanticipated error, of acts of nature, or of the 
confluence (or lack of it), or of independent chains of causation” (Lebow, 
2000b, p. 569).
The second fault in the argument that the counterfactual antecedent must 
have been an available option proposed by Ferguson (1997), Breslauer 
(1996) and Nash (1991), is that there are rarely "smoking guns” in recorded 
history. To quote Lebow:
“Even when evidence is meager or absent, the difference between 
counterfactual and “factual” history may still be marginal. Documents are 
rarely smoking guns that allow researchers to establish motives or causes 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Actors only occasionally leave evidence about 
their motives, and historians rarely accept such testimony at face value.
More often historians infer motives from what they know about actors’ 
personalities and goals, their past behavior, and the constraints under which 
they operated” (Lebow, 2000b, p. 553).
Compounding this problem is the problem of representing the past and the 
relationship between history and memory outlined by Ricoeur (2002).
6.51 The Problem of Representing the Past
The work of Neustadt and May (1986) suggests that decision-makers 
develop the logic for their decisions using analogies that are frequently based 
on counterfactuals. For example, Lebow (2000) has argued, and Neustadt 
and May (1986) seem to concur, that the ‘mother of all counterfactuals’ are 
the policy lessons derived by the allies from the 1930s. They are that 
appeasement not only does not work, but indeed, can encourage dictators. 
The result of these lessons is deterrence theory and containment. For half a 
century it was thought that the Soviets had to be contained through resolve 
and military capability. A large portion of the post-war international structure
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was created from the counterfactual ‘if we had stood up to Hitler in the 1930s, 
then Nazi Germany could have been restrained.’ As Neustadt and May state:
“The “lessons of the thirties” have provided, among other things, the 
underlying theme for every argument supporting stern approaches toward 
Communist regimes abroad from Truman’s time forward. As a form of 
advocacy, nothing is more familiar to Americans of any age” (Neustadt, 1986, 
p. 23).
Former American President Truman’s memoirs underpin this assertion:
“I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I re­
remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had 
encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in 
Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and 
twenty years earlier” (Truman, 1955/56, pp. 332-333).
Scholars that dismiss counterfactual analysis as an uncritical rearguard 
action protecting some rationalized notion of what history is, or protecting 
some cherished belief or assumption, risk retarding their own learning, and 
foresight into the future. Learning can be enhanced from an understanding of 
other plausible pasts, and consequently presents and futures. Furthermore, 
the linear historical analysis can be distorted through the lens that each 
historian looks through. As Ricoeur points out:
“The reader of history takes for granted that the historian is offering ‘a true 
account’ and not a fiction. The question arising from this Is that of knowing 
whether the fact which is implicitly present in any form of reading is respected 
when we read historical narratives” (Ricoeur, 2002, p. 51).
Ricoeur describes historical narratives, or history, as a story-telling 
discipline. The problem of representing the past in historical writing does not 
begin with history itself, but with memory. Memory and history carry on a kind 
of running dialogue in which the memory, in this ‘simple form of childhood 
recollection’ maintains a certainty that an event transpired as it is 
represented.* Herein lies the paradox: the present image of something
* The idea that history and recollection are entwined resonates with Plato’s Idea that 
knowledge is really a form of recollection presented in his dialogue Meno
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absent, or transpired, is the recollection; however, the transpired or absent 
thing is related to something that once existed. Consequently, the paradox 
evolves through many stages including memory that is directed, blocked or 
manipulated, through the effort of recollection, spontaneous memory and so 
on. The paradox is resolved ‘by the precious experience of recognizing 
authentic images of the past.’ Any interpretation of history is bound 
inextricably with the memory of the interpreter.
Difficulties connected with historical knowledge can compound the 
problem. As Ricoeur (2002) argues, the prime modality of truth in 
historiography commences with the search for documentary and archival 
proof. Moreover, the writing process creates a certain distancing from the 
subject. As Carr states:
“From the multiplicity of sequences of cause and effect, [the historian] 
extracts those, and only those, which are historically significant; and the 
standard of historical significance is his ability to fit them into his pattern of 
rational explanation and interpretation. Other sequences of cause and effect 
have to be rejected as accidental, not because the relation between cause 
and effect have to be rejected as accidental, not because the relation 
between cause and effect is different, but because the sequence itself is 
irrelevant. The historian can do nothing with it; it is not amenable to rational 
Interpretation, and has no meaning either for the past or the present” (Carr,
1990, p. 4).
The extraction, and indeed the choice of what is historically significant and 
what constitutes the pattern of rational explanation and interpretation is part of 
the difficulties that encompass the process of historiography. Moreover, 
within the historical archive, Ricoeur (2002) argues that there is a crisis of 
attestation. Each document is based on a deposition, which has been 
confided from one to another, and although a witness may be able to attest to 
the event, that witness could either have decided to believe or disbelieve the
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declaration. Furthermore, throughout the historiographical process there have 
been several intermediary agencies and processes that have been Involved 
in the quest for causes and motives.’ Moreover, throughout the literary phase 
of historiography, a process of dramatic staging, narrative elaboration and 
rhetorical construction meant to ‘heighten visibility with readability’ occurs and 
influences representation. Consequently, historical writing (even for the 
determinists) can involve an endless approximation which involves an 
unending labour of re-writing, which deforms and represents screens, and 
ultimately involves a series of narrative scenarios!’ Representing, and 
learning from the past is a competition between history and memory, which is 
left as an open question. To quote Ricoeur:
“The advantage of memory is its recognition of the past as having been, but 
as no longer present; history, on the other hand, is able to enlarge the scope 
of our gaze in space and time, the strength of its critique in the order of eye­
witness accounts, of explaining and comprehending the past, and above ail, 
the exercise of equitable discernment in respect of the competing claims of 
wounded remembrances” (Ricoeur, 2002, p. 65).
Furthermore, as Degler (1975) suggests and Fischhoff paraphrases: “We
have our own points to prove when interpreting a past that is never sufficiently
unambiguous to avoid the imposition of our ideological perspective”
(Fischhoff, 1982, p. 349). Perhaps it is this notion that leads Castells to write:
“There is no sense of history other than the history we sense” (Castells, 1997,
p. 3). As such, Becker admonishes that historians do “play tricks on the dead
in every generation” (Becker, 1935).
Carr’s (1990) critique of counterfactuals and uncertainty in historical 
analysis, as Ferguson (1997) has criticized, is one that is so elastic that one 
can almost infer an acceptance of indeterminacy. Indeed, as one delves into 
the scholarship of even the most ardent critics of counterfactual history, one
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finds that counterfactuals are frequently used in their historical analysis. As 
can be inferred from Ricoeur (2002), the demarcation between “factual” 
history and “counterfactual” history is a fine line. Historical actors rarely leave 
behind clues about their motives. Consequently, without documents that are 
“smoking guns” historians are forced to use what evidence they can find on 
personalities, objectives and past behavior to infer what their motives may 
have been (Lebow, 2000b). The demarcation becomes shadier still when we 
recognize, and the social psychology research previously discussed 
substantiates this claim, that to understand historical actor’s past behavior it is 
imperative that we account for both their factual and counterfactual beliefs 
(Lebow, 2000b). The process of historiography, one can thus conclude, is 
inextricably linked with cognitive and learning processes.
6.52 Putting the “What i f  into historiographical and social science 
methodology
Counterfactual interventions are intuitively compelling because they are 
part of “the psychology of the human learning experience” (Booth, 2003, p. 
100; McMahon, 2001; Kahneman, 1982). When they are not explicit in 
historiographical and social science arguments, and in particular, in the 
identification of causality leading up to events, they are frequently smuggled in 
implicitly (Lebow, 2000a; Bulhof, 1999). They are also “standard fare” in 
Western logic, legal theory and science (McMahon, 2001). However, there is 
little consensus on what constitutes a good counterfactual. and some 
controversy, as stated, on the criteria that should be used to test them.
Lebow, whose criticisms of the criteria proposed by Nash (1991) Tetlock 
and Belkin (1996), Breslauer (1996), and Ferguson (1997), has proposed
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eight criteria for plausible-world counterfactuals. Numbers 1, 2, 4, and 5 are 
variants of the Tetlock-Belkin criteria, while numbers 3, 7, and 8 are additions 
by Lebow (2000b, pp. 581-584):
1. Clarity. All causa! arguments should define as unambiguously as possible what is to 
be explained (the consequent in counterfactual arguments), what accounts for this 
outcome (the antecedent), and the principle (s) linking the two. Good counterfactuals 
should also specify the conditions that would have to be present for the 
counterfactual to occur (Tetlock and Belkin, 1996),
2. Logical consistency or cotenability. Every counterfactual is a shorthand statement of 
a more complex argument that generally requires a set of connecting conditions or 
principals. The hypothetical antecedent should not undercut any of the principals 
linking it to the consequent (Tetlock and Belkin, 1996).
3. Enabling counterfactuals should not undercut the antecedent. Counterfactuals may 
require other counterfactuals to make them possible. Researchers need to specify all 
important enabling counterfactuals and consider their implications (Lebow, 2000b).
4. Historical consistency. Max Weber insisted that plausible counterfactuals should 
make as few historical changes as possible on the grounds that the more we disturb 
the values, goals and contexts in which actors operate, the less predictable their 
behavior becomes. The nature of the changes made by the experiment are 
nevertheless more important than the number of changes (Tetlock and Belkin, 1996).
5. Theoretical consistency. There are few, if any, generally accepted theories in the 
social sciences, and none in international relations, comparative politics, or history. 
For purposes of counterfactual analysis, it is nevertheless useful to reference any 
theories, empirical findings, historical interpretations, or assumptions on which the 
causal principles or connecting arguments are based. This will provide readers with a 
more explicit perspective from which to evaluate the counterfactual’s plausibility 
(Tetlock and Belkin, 1996).
6. Avoid the conjunction fallacy. The laws of statistics indicate that the probability of any 
compound counterfactual is exceedingly low. This does not mean that the current 
state of affairs was overdetermined, only that it is very unlikely that hypothesized 
antecedents will produce specific consequences at any temporal distance. Social 
and political developments are highly contingent, and the future is undetermined -  as 
was the past before it became the present.
7. Recognize the interconnectedness of causes and outcomes. Surgical 
counterfactuals are unrealistic because causes are interdependent and have 
important interaction effects. History is like a spring mattress: If one of the springs is 
cut or simply subjected to extra pressure, the others will also to varying degrees shift 
their location and tension (Lebow, 2000b).
8. Consider second-order counterfactuals. Even when there is good to reason to 
believe that the antecedent will produce the desired consequent, the possibility 
remains that subsequent developments will return history to the course from which it 
was initially diverted by the antecedent. No counterfactual argument is complete 
without some argument about “alternative” alternative futures and some assessment 
of their likelihood and implications for both the consequent and its value as a 
consequent (Lebow, 2000b).
Lebow’s criteria provides a framework in which disciplined counterfactual 
analysis can be undertaken without having to rely solely on recorded 
alternatives considered by historical actors. The appeal of this criterion is 
that, when considering options, especially in crisis situations such as the
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Cuban Missile Crisis, decision-makers use counterfactual argument "to 
structure their problem and evaluate the likely consequences of the options 
they are considering" (Lebow, 1996). One criticism that can be made is that 
the eight points that he highlights can be reduced into six. Numbers 7 and 8 
both refer to second-order counterfactuals, whereas, with nurribers 2 and 5, it 
is hard to imagine circumstances in which a counterfactual argument is 
logically consistent but theoretically inconsistent or vice versa.
Fearon (1996), somewhat pessimistic about counterfactual methodologies, 
acknowledges that:
“Exploring counterfactuais opens up a range of difficult and often 
philosophical questions concerning what we are doing when we try to explain 
particular or recurrent International political outcomes. A final benefit of 
thinking about counterfactuais is that doing so brings some of these 
foundational issues out into the open. Faiiing to carefully specify the requisite 
counterfactuals is a way of sweeping such questions and problems under the 
rug. The more we keep these problems hidden from view, the more our 
“explanations” will have the character of persuasive rhetoric rather than 
empirical discovery" (Fearon, 1996, p. 67).
Fearon suggests that a proximity criterion should be added to
counterfactual methodological guidelines. He argues that the hypothetical 
antecedent and outcome should be close together, separated by only a 
limited number of causal steps. The problem with this criterion is that not only 
would it render many important counterfactuals as un-assessable, but it may 
also undermine many of the benefits of counterfactual arguments, including 
bringing foundational issues into the open and failing to specify requisite 
counterfactuals. Furthermore, as Exhibit 7.1, the Decision Field, illustrates, 
the further back in time from an event one goes, the more malleable the
future, the more opportunity for alternative decisions. The closer the
antecedent is to the outcome, the more narrow the range of possibility for
alternative futures to come into existence.
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Weber (1996) is critical of attempts by Tetlock and Belkin (1996) Lebow 
(1996), Ferguson (1997) and Nash (1991) to apply criterion or plausibility tests 
to counterfactuals. He argues that one of the reasons that social scientists 
are so often surprised by events is that they do not take into consideration the 
variety of possible pasts that could have occurred, or the possible futures that 
still might occur. There is a lack of divergent thinking, a ‘deterministic tunnel 
vision’ (Tetlock and Belkin, 1996). Citing Schoemaker (1991), Weber (1996) 
argues that prudent policy makers should entertain a host of plausible 
scenarios, both into the future and the past. Tetlock and Belkin (1996) do not 
dispute this point, but argue that there has to be some means of distinguishing 
‘scenario snake oil from serious scholarship’ (Tetlock and Belkin, 1996, p. 16). 
However, there is no reason why counterfactuals can’t be given freer reign, 
and still be subjected to rigorous plausibility tests, as scenarios are.
6.6 The Uncertainty Principle in historv and the social sciences: Rolling the 
dice?
Notions of agency, chance and contingency have challenged the traditional 
conceptions of the scientific method. As Lebow (2000b) has pointed out:
“Counterfactuals are also taken seriously In the physical and biological 
sciences, where researchers routinely use them to develop and evaluate 
sophisticated, nonlinear models" (Lebow, 2000b, p. 550).
Examples include counterfactual computation (Mitchison and Josza, 1999), 
determining the presence of an object by using interaction-free measurements 
with a test particle (Kwiat et a i, 1995), testing nuclear weapons using 
information from non-events (Penrose, 1994), and quantum-mechanical 
interaction-free measurement (Elitzur and Vaidman, 1993). In quantum 
mechanics, for instance, an observation can only lead to a certain number of
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predictions due to the ‘uncertainty principle’, and consequently, the best that 
quantum scientists can do is suggest which outcome is more likely (Ferguson, 
1997). Hawking suggests that the uncertainty principle ‘introduces an 
unavoidable element of unpredictability or randomness in science’ (Hawking, 
1999). Many of the greatest minds of the 20^ *^  century, including Einstein, 
have remained steadfastly committed to a completely explainable world:
“You believe in the God who plays dice, and I in complete law and order in a 
world which objectively exists, and which I, in a wildly speculative way, am 
trying to capture" (Born, 1971).
However, uncertainty has continued to outlive Einstein, and while this
chapter does not suggest that historians or social scientists should play dice
with their universe, or that analysis of the past is a mere toss of the dice, it
does suggest that counterfactual analysis is a tool that allows us to question
our assumptions and protect against the debilitating effects of foresightful
thinking flaws rooted in history. History may be a closed chapter, but the past
was no more “fixed" than the future. Including an “uncertainty principle” in our
ruminations of the past can only make historical analysis more robust.
6.61 Counterfactuals and The Butterfly Effect
Chaos theory, developed in the early 1960s by Edward Lorenz, in an 
attempt to mathematically model meteorology, describes “stochastic behavior 
in deterministic systems that are sensitive to minor changes in initial 
conditions” (Tucker, A., 1999, p. 269) in the physical sciences, and has been 
adopted in the social sciences, and in particular in the limited literature on 
counterfactuals e.g. (Tucker, A., 1999; Ferguson, 1997; Turner, 1995), as a 
metaphor. Chaos theory is a good illustration of the quagmire that the 
sciences generally find themselves in.
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When meteorologists and mathematicians use chaos theory, they are not 
adopting the assumption that there are no laws in the natural world. Chaos 
simply means that accurate predictions are difficult, if not impossible to make, 
because the laws are so complex that what is happening around us is 
perceived as being chaotic and random. Consequently, chaos theory reflects 
stochastic behavior (seemingly random behavior) within deterministic systems 
(Bulhof, 1999), and is often used by economists to explain why their 
predictions, based on linear equations and econometric models, are so often 
wrong (Ferguson, 1997; Kay, 1995). As Bulhof (1999) explains:
"Chaos theory comes from a mathematical concept, which physicists have 
applied to a variety of systems. Under certain conditions, systems display 
great sensitivity to initial conditions, making the system unpredicatable for 
humans" [Bulhof, 1999 #285] (p. 160).
Thus, in one classic example, under the right conditions, a butterfly flapping its 
wings can cause a storm somewhere else in the world (Bulhof, 1999). 
Stewart (1990) therefore concludes:
"God can play dice and create a universe of complete law and order in the 
same breath,” because, “even simple equations [can] generate motion so 
complex, so sensitive to measurement, that it appears to be random” 
(Stewart, 1990, p. 293).
Breslauer (1996), p. 73) and Gould (1981, p. 262) have argued that 
certain social and natural sciences suffer from “physics envy”. While there are 
some useful metaphors in physics that can be applied to the social sciences, 
such as chaos theory, scholars in both history and the social sciences must 
guard against losing site of the importance of human stochastic behavior in 
favour of generalizations and theoretical covering laws. As Henry Kissinger 
stated five years after entering government, in January 1974:
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"As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But 
when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make" 
(quoted in Isaacson, 1992, p. 13).
So while history may be a closed chapter, phenomena such as the 
confluence of elements that comprise foresightful thinking flaws mean that a 
world that was once random, complex and sensitive to measurement now 
appears fixed in hindsight. However, there is a problem with historical 
analysis and the social sciences. As Lebow states:
“In history and political science [the] outcomes are always uncertain because 
we can neither predict the future nor rerun the tape of history" (Lebow, 2000b, 
p. 561).
We can, however, be sensitive to contingency in the past, “traces” of past 
events, and alternative futures (Weber, 1996). As Tucker (1999) argues, 
counterfactual analysis is one tool for accomplishing this end.
6.62 Counterfactuals and Path Dependent Processes
Structural arguments, according to Lebow (2000), assume that human 
behavior is a product of the opportunities and constraints generated by a set 
of conditions. As a result, most structural arguments use human behavioral 
“principals” as anchor points and construct the argument on a chain of 
inference rooted in these principals. When the orthodoxy runs contrary to 
these principles, the argument may be dismissed regardless of the evidence. 
To account for behavior, we need to understand both counterfactual and 
factual beliefs (Lebow, 2000b, pp. 554-555). Lebow argues that:
“Counterfactuals can combat the deeply rooted human propensity to see the 
future as more contingent than the past, reveal contradictions in our beiief 
systems, and highlight double standards in our moral judgments" (Lebow,
2000b, p. 558-559).
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Counterfactual interventions can also guard against path-dependencies 
that both structure and perception fall prey to (Booth, 2003). As Teece et al. 
propound:
"Path dependencies are simply not recognized. This is a major limitation of 
microeconomic theory. The notion of path dependencies recognizes that 
"history matters" ...Thus a firm’s previous investments and its repertories of 
routines (its “history") constrain its future behavior” (Teece et al., 1997, p.
522-3).
Path-dependencies thus affect organizational learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990), because their ability to recognize, elicit and utilize information from 
their environments, their “absorptive capacities", rests on having had previous 
experience and learning in a particular area in the past. Path dependencies 
thus “ensure that firms tend to do what they have done in the past” and 
“enable firms to operate under familiar conditions but introduce significant 
rigidities in novel circumstances” (Booth, 2003, p. 98).
As the foresightful thinking flaws model, outlined in chapter four illustrates, 
organizational routines (Nelson, 1982) managerial recipes (Grinyer and 
Spender, 1979a), and biases towards over-confidence (Mahajan, 1992; 
Kahnman Tversky, 1982; Fischhoff, 1982) and defensive pessimism (Norem 
and Illingworth, 1993; Showers, 1992; Cantor and Norem, 1989; Norem and 
Cantor, 1986a) feed off of cultural (and organizational) mythologies (Johnson, 
1988) stereotypes (Neustadt and May, 1986), ideas and philosophy (North, 
1998; Keynes, 1936), and past experiences (Ingvar, 1985), which are 
reflected on in hindsight, and are often viewed as over-determined 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Fischhoff, 1975).
A disciplined application of counterfactual analysis to the past 
accomplishes many of the same ends that scenario thinking does, but in
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reverse (Weber, 1996). They sensitize us to contingency, possibility, and 
allow us to understand historical processes in strategy and, by identifying key 
decisions, whether they concern firms’ product/market choices, technological 
investments or structures and systems, and can be used to analyze path 
dependent processes (Booth, 2003). Indeed, as Dening (1996) suggests, and 
Booth (2003) affirms, counterfactuals “return to the past the uncertainty 
removed by our privileged position of hindsight.” Furthermore, analysis of 
path-dependent processes may suffer from “creeping determinism” and the 
hindsight bias, which research in social and cognitive psychology has shown, 
albeit controversially, can be controlled through the disciplined application of 
counterfactuals (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982).
Events that were at one time deemed improbable by experts, such as the 
end of the cold war, are often deemed overdetermined after the fact, 
diminishing scholarly sensitivity to alternative outcomes and possible paths. 
As Lebow states:
"Many psychologists regard the certainty-of-hlndsight effect as deeply rooted 
and difficult to overcome. But the experimental literature suggests that 
counterfactual intervention can assist people in retrieving and making explicit 
their massive but largely latent uncertainty about historical junctures, that Is, 
to recognize that they once thought, perhaps correctly, that events could 
easily have taken a different turn. The proposed correctives use one 
cognitive bias to reduce the effect of another" (Lebow, 2000b, p. 559).
Counterfactuals thus “tease out the assumptions -  often unarticulated—which 
theories and historical interpretations rest” (Lebow, 2000b, p. 563). Weber’s 
(1996, p. 270) argument that counterfactuals are best used as “learning 
devices” and “mind-set changers” which have mind-opening implications also 
highlights the importance of counterfactuai experimentation in processes 
deemed path dependent in hindsight.
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6.63 Counterfactual Analysis in Policy Formulation and Social Science 
Researcfn A few examples
Herrman and Fischerkeller (1996) have used the Iran-Contra affair, The 
Tower Commission and investigations into the National Security Council 
(NSC) operation during the Iran-Contra affair as a case for illustrating the use 
of counterfactuals by policy makers. The Iran-Contra affair, initiated when 
Oliver North and Robert MacFarlane arrived in Tehran with HAWK missiles in 
May of 1986, erupted into a scandal when MacFarlane and North’s attempts 
to establish a new chapter in Iranian-US relations and thwart attempts by the 
Soviet Union to take advantage of the post-Khomeini succession struggle in 
Iran and establish influence in the northern Gulf was revealed by Mehdi 
Hashemi, a principal operator in one of the factions allied with Hizbollah in 
Tehran and who was opposed to Iran allying itself with the “Great Satan” (the 
United States of America) (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1996, p. 149). The 
Tower Commission reveals that counterfactuals were prominently used in the 
subsequent public relations battle that ensued. Three examples include:
1. Oliver North argued that if the Iranian initiative had not gone forward, then Lawrence 
Jenco, one of the American hostages held in Lebanon, would not have been 
released.
2. Other supporters of the initiative argued that had the mission’s cover not been 
blown, then Washington would have had more leverage inside Iran when Ayatollah 
Khomeini died in 1989.
3. Both Secretary Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, on the other hand, 
opposed the mission from the outset and argue that its tactics were amateurish and 
the hope for moderation in Iran naïve. They noted that after Jenco's release, three 
new Americans were seized in Lebanon -  perhaps as a consequence of the 
perception that Washington would trade arms for hostages (Herrmann and 
Fischerkeller, 1996, p. 150).
Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1996) also note the role that counterfactuals 
played in generating alternative visions of the future. At the root of
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"counterfactual scenarios regarding what might be possible in Tehran” was 
the belief in Washington that, despite Gorbachev’s “new thinking”, it was more 
likely that “moderates” in Iran could be found than nonagressive communists 
in Moscow. According to Hermann and Fischerkeller:
"In the 1990s, Americans typically see the search for moderates In Iran as 
ridiculous. The “rogue state" stereotype is now firmly in place. In 1985, 
however, images of Iran were less rigid than perceptions of the Soviet Union” 
(Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1996, p. 150).
Hence, an entire initiative was begun by US national intelligence to distinguish 
between messianic leaders and nationalistic leaders in Tehran, and to 
generate scenarios. Throughout the Reagan administration in the US, the 
stereotype of an expansionist Moscow wishing to establish its influence in the 
Persian Gulf was firmly entrenched. However, since the Vietnam era, many 
scholars and policy makers had begun to change their beliefs, raising the 
possibility that Moscow was at worst opportunistic, and possibly defensive or 
even committed to the status quo. This, within the policy community, raised 
questions about the strategy that Washington should be pursuing with 
Moscow. Reassurance and détente strategies would be appropriate if
Moscow was indeed defensive and or committed to the status quo. 
Deterrence, on the other hand, would be the optimal strategy if Moscow were 
in fact expansionist (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1996, p. 151). The one 
certainty was that there was considerable uncertainty over Moscow’s 
disposition. As Herrmann and Fischerkeller state:
“Although policy makers may at times close the question about another 
state’s motivation, quite often they recognize a high degree of uncertainty.
When this is the case, contingency planning and scenario construction are 
common exercises. Forward-looking conditional reasoning becomes 
counterfactual reasoning as officials reflect on the paths not taken. For 
example, Reagan administration officials argued that if Moscow had truly 
been motivated by a desire for détente, then it would not have deployed new 
medlum-range missiles in Europe and new MIRVed ICBMs, and it would not 
have intervened in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. These tests of Soviet
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motives may have been biased and simply reinforced existing views, but they 
nevertheless supported arguments that many Americans thought provided 
insight into Soviet motives” (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1996, p. 151).
Counterfactuals, as the Iran-Contra affair illustrates, are used in allocating 
blame and causality (which the psychological research previously discussed 
also substantiates (Turley et ai., 1995; Macrae et al., 1992; Gavanski and 
Wells, 1989; Wells and Gavanski, 1989; Wells and Gavanski, 1987), in 
justifying arguments, shaping expectations and influencing actions, but they 
are also inherent in many of the theories that are used in history and the 
social sciences.
Bueno De Mesquita (1996) argues that when counterfactuals are “carefully 
grounded in a coherent structure” (p.211) they have a role to play in 
evaluating international affairs. He points out that the focus of social science 
research, both historical and empirical analysis, is not on what might have 
happened, but on what really did happen. However, he also acknowledges 
that what really happened is often, if not always, “the product of expectations 
about what would have happened had another course of action been chosen” 
(Bueno De Mesquita, 1996, p.212).
Game theory approaches to the social sciences highlight the Importance of 
counterfactual reasoning in choosing a strategy. As Bueno De Mesquita 
states: “Game theory is a body of thinking that encourages the systematic 
examination of counterfactuals” (1996, p. 229). The “Nash equilibrium”, which 
is the central mechanism for resolving noncooperative games, is based on a 
player choosing a plan of action or strategy which would not allow for a player 
to become better off through a “unilateral defection” from the strategy. Each 
player must think through the repercussions of the unchosen alternative, or 
counter-to-factual, “off the equilibrium path” strategies. This means that:
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"Each such expectation involves an analysis of counterfactual realities that 
were rejected because some decision maker viewed the alternative state of 
the world as less beneficial than the chosen reality" (Bueno De Mesquita,
1996, p. 216).
One of the features that distinguishes game theory from most historical 
analysis is that game theory suggests that: “we cannot understand what 
happened in reality without understanding what did not happen but might 
have happened under other circumstances." The argument thus follows that:
“What might have happened’ is a driving force behind the analysis of games 
in extensive form and is at the heart of the fundamental solution concept in 
game theory, the Nash equilibrium” (Bueno De Mesquita, 1996, p. 229).
Bueno De Mesquita (1996) proposes game theory as a plausible 
foundation for assessing the empirical relevance and logic of counterfactual 
analysis. Game theory not only has strong guidelines, but it provides a 
hypothesis that: “can be tested against the historical record and projected to 
predict future actions” (p. 217). However, it is also constrained by its 
assumptions -  expected utility maximisation, rationality and Nash equilibrium 
criteria (i.e. that every player believes that they are making optimal choices, 
given that everyone else is also choosing the best strategies that they can) -  
and while, once again, it demonstrates the importance of counterfactual 
analysis in individual cognition, it falls into the trap of predicting the future 
rather than understanding the complex forces and critical uncertainties that 
will ultimately shape the future (See Exhibit #7.4 for description of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma).
It has long been recognized by game theorists modelling strategic 
interaction that there is a need for actors to, at the very least, to agree on what 
kind of game they are playing, or better still, to share a common framework. 
They assume that a common framework is established through a Bayesian
Chapter Six: Counterfactual Posturing: Hindsight into the future?
Counterfactual Reasoning in Strategy Context 208
process of learning by updating estimates of one another’s preferences. In 
practice, actors can communicate for long durations without realizing that they 
are actually playing different games. This is possible because actors 
commonly assimilate new information into their existing frameworks. The 
results are that signals are missed and/or actors grasp their import after it is 
too late to counter effectively or respond appropriately. Over the course of 
strategic interactions between actors, frameworks also change, and these 
changes can affect behaviour with profound consequences (Lebow, 2000b).
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Exhibit 6.4 The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Cooperation is usually analysed in game theory by means of a non-zero-sum game called the 
“Prisoner’s Dilemma”. The two players in the game can choose between two moves, either 
“cooperate or defect”. The idea is that each player gains when both cooperate, but if only one of 
them cooperates, the other one, who defects, will gain more. If both defect, both lose (or gain 
very little) but not as much as the “cheated” co-operator whose cooperation is not returned. The 
whole game situation and its different outcomes can be summarized by the following table, where 
hypothetical "points” are given as an example of how the differences in result might be quantified.
Action of A/Action of B Cooperate Defect
Cooperate Fairly good f+5] Bad [-10]
Defect Good [+10] Mediocre [0]
Outcomes for actor A (in words, and in hypothetical “points”) depending on the combination of A’s 
action and B’s action. In the “prisoner's dilemma” game situation. A similar scheme applies to the 
outcomes for B.
The game got its name from the following hypothetical situation: imagine two criminals arrested 
under the suspicion of having committed a crime together. However, the police does not have 
sufficient proof in order to have them convicted. The two prisoners are isolated from each other, 
and the police visit each other one will be freed. If none of them accepts the offer, they are in fact 
cooperating against the police, and both of them will get only a small punishment because of lack 
of proof. They both gain. However, if one of them betrays the other one, by confessing to the 
police, the defector will gain more, since he is freed; the one who remained silent, on the other 
hand, will receive the full punishment, since he did not help the police, and there is sufficient 
proof. If both betray, both will be punished, but less severely than if they had refused to talk. The 
dilemma resides in the fact that each prisoner has a choice between only two options, but cannot 
make a good decision without knowing what the other one will do.
Such a distribution of losses and gains seems natural for many situations, since the cooperator 
whose action is not returned will lose resources to the defector, without either of them being able 
to collect the additional gain coming from the “synergy” of their cooperation. For simplicity we 
might consider the Prisoner’s dilemma as zero-sum insofar as there is no mutual cooperation: 
either each gets 0 when both defect, or when one of them cooperates, the defector gets + 10, 
and the co-operator -  10, in total 0. On the other hand, if both cooperate the resulting synergy 
creates an additional gain the makes the sum positive: each of them gets 5, in total 10.
Source: pespmc1.vub.ac.be/PRISDIL.html
Furthermore, for game theory to be effective, one must assume that the 
objectives of the players are the same and that expectations about the future 
are the same. In the context of a counterfactual, making assumptions about 
the assumptions of a historical actor is risky and may not yield accurate 
results.
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Counterfactual posturing, or “objective reality” as Weber calls it, are 
indispensable in analysing social science history. To quote Weber’s argument 
for using counterfactuals in historical work:
“The judgement that, if a single historical fact is conceived of as absent from 
or modified in a complex of historical conditions, it would condition a course 
of historic events in a way which would be different in certain historically 
important respects, seems to be of considerable value for the determination 
of the “historical significance” of those facts. It is clear that this situation had 
to call forth a consideration of the logical nature of such judgments” ([Weber, 
1905/1949, p. 166).
Kiser and Levi (1996) concur, arguing that counterfactuals are an essential 
tool in the analytical tool bag for analysing events, such as revolutions, that 
have developed over a long period of time and are characterized by a 
multiplicity of factors resulting from multiple interactions. Social scientists, 
they contend, rely on counterfactuals to deal with the multiplicity of 
interactions, often implicitly, and consequently fail to explicitly recognize their 
reliance on counterfactuals. Kiser and Levi state that: “It is important to use 
counterfactuals explicitly in historical research”, especially when empirical 
data is limited (Kiser and Levi, 1996, p. 188). They go on to argue that:
“The lack of explicit recognition of the role of counterfactuals Increases the 
probability that scholars will use them inappropriately or fail to use them to 
advantage” (Kiser and Levi, 1996, p. 188).
Used appropriately, counterfactuals can reveal additional implications of 
theories and “aid in the logical evaluation of theory” (Kiser and Levi, 1996, p. 
188).
Social psychologists are primarily concerned with spontaneous 
counterfactual thinking and its influence on affective reactions, assignments of 
blame, victim compensation, effects on self-efficacy and a whole range of 
judgments. Counterfactual thinking, according to the cognitive and social 
psychology literature, is constrained and guided by cognitive and motivational
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processes (Olson et al., 1996, p. 296). These biasing factors, according to 
the literature reviewed in Chapter Five, can, in the words of Olson, Roese and 
Delbert “introduce systematic distortions into counterfactual reconstructions” 
(Olson etal., 1996, p. 296).
The major difference between spontaneous counterfactual thinking by the 
lay person or in everyday experience and counterfactual reconstruction in 
history and social science research and scholarship is the spontaneity of 
counterfactual reconstruction in day-to-day naturally occurring cognitive 
processes, and the deliberateness by which historians and social scientists 
construct counterfactuals. Kahnman (Kahneman, 1995) has called the latter 
“automatic” counterfactuals, and the former “elaborative” counterfactuai 
thinking. Despite these differences, Olson, Roese and Delbert (1996) argue 
that many of the biasing factors uncovered by cognitive and social 
psychological research into naturally occurring counterfactual thinking also 
applies to counterfactual reconstruction in the social sciences. For instance, it 
has been shown in Chapter Five that negative outcomes tend to generate 
counterfactuals (Roese, 1995) and that the lions share of spontaneously 
produced counterfactual thoughts are a response to negative outcomes. 
Likewise, in social science research, negative events, such as the failure of 
Enron and World.com are more likely to capture the attention of scholars in 
the social sciences than positive outcomes (Olson et al., 1996, pp. 299-300). 
However, it is difficult to classify many events in the social sciences as 
positive or negative (i.e. was the Cuban missile crisis negative, because it 
brought the world to the brink of war, or positive, because it was resolved 
peacefully (Olson et al., 1996, p. 300). In social science research it might be
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more accurate to say that salient events tend to capture the attention of 
scholars more than non-salient events (i.e. events such as the First World 
War has garnered far more scholarly attention than studying the reasons for 
the undefended border between the United States and Canada (Olson et a!., 
1996; Christensen and Snyder, 1990).
Psychological approaches to counterfactual thinking, as Olson etal. (1996) 
argue, thus have relevance for counterfactual thought experiments in history 
and the social sciences.
6.7 Counterfactuals: Back to the future
According to Popper, many of the historical determinists, or historicists as
Popper calls them, do not have the ability to “imagine a change in the
conditions of change " Indeed, Popper did not deny that events are caused by
‘initial conditions’, but he did object to deductive certainty. In Popper’s
(Popper, 1957, p. 122-128) words:
“There are countless possible conditions; and in order to be able to examine 
these possibilities in our search for the true conditions of a trend, we have all 
the time to try to imagine conditions under which the trend in question would 
disappear."
Berlin agrees. Berlin argues that:
“The notion that one can discover large patterns or regularities in the 
procession of historical events is naturally attractive to those who are 
impressed by the success of the natural sciences in classifying, correlating, 
and, above all, predicting. They consequently seek to extend historical 
knowledge to fill in the gaps in the past (and, at times, to build into the 
limitless gap of the future) by applying "scientific" method: by setting forth, 
armed with a metaphysical or empirical system, from such islands of certain, 
or virtually certain, knowledge of the facts as they claim to possess” (Berlin,
1954, p. 5).
This serves as a warning to avoid simple theories and patterns, because, 
again, to reiterate Stewart: “Simple systems do not necessarily possess 
simple dynamic properties’’ (Stewart, 1990, p. 21). This is as true for
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historiography as it is for economic and political predictions or weather
forecasts. Penrose (1994), in a similar vein, suggests that, rather than rely on
prediction, the best that the long-range (political and economic) forecaster can
do is to simulate typical outcomes and to admit that the choice between these
plausible scenarios can only be a guess and not a prophecy (Ferguson,
1997). Again, returning to the analogy of the “Butterfly Effect” (a butterfly
flapping its wings in one part of the world, causes a hurricane in another part
of the world) used by Lornenz, illustrates the climate’s sensitive dependence
on initial conditions and also on chaos theory in action (Ferguson, 1997).
However, as Penrose states:
"The predicted weather may well not be the weather that actually occurs, but 
it is perfectly plausible as a weather” (Penrose, 1994, p. 23).
In the social sciences, like the physical sciences, the statement that 
“simple systems do not necessarily possess simple dynamic properties” 
(Stewart, 1990, p. 21) is equally true. Chaos theory and stochastic behavior 
helps us to understand the perils of over-simplified analysis of politics 
(Stewart, 1990), elections, consumer behavior and so on.
Lebow, using similar logic, also highlights the potential pit-falls of 
inevitability in the past and predicting the future. He suggests that ‘conditional 
forecasting’ may be a more appropriate strategy for coping with the complex 
uncertainties:
"Conditional forecasting may be a more appropriate strategy for attempting to 
cope with the manifold uncertainties associated with the complex events 
responsible for system transformations. Conditional forecasts use existing 
theories and behavioral regularities as a starting point to develop alternate- 
scenarios of likely future developments or of a system transformation. They 
consider multiple chains of causation and look at some of the possible 
interactions that might take place among them, as well as the paths that 
might lead from one scenario to another. They also stipulate the kind of 
information or events that will be used to determine the extent to which 
events track according to expectations of any of the scenarios. As events 
unfold, researchers repeatedly revise their scenarios and expectations in light 
of the new information. Such a process is messy and time consuming, but it
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is the only reasonable way of taking into account coincidence and random 
events. At the very least, it can provide early warning of major changes in a 
system or of faulty expectations of those who are tracking its performance" 
(Lebow, 2000b, p. 613).
Lebow’s rationale for “conditional forecasting” closely mirrors scenario- 
thinking methodologies (van der Heijden, 1996; Schwartz, 1991) already in 
use. The thesis, however, is no less salient: Scenario thinking is a necessary 
antidote to the perils of single point forecasting in the same way that 
counterfactual analysis is a necessary antidote to historical inevitability and 
determinism.
Humans are conscious beings that seek, “prior to acting in the present, to 
make sense of the past and on that basis to anticipate the future” (Ferguson, 
1997). Moreover, as some historians such as Ferguson (1997) and Cowley 
(1999) points out, frequently throughout history the counterfactual scenario 
has seemed more likely to occur to contemporaries than the official past. 
Decision-makers base their decisions on theories and predictions 
underpinned by assumptions, analogies and stereotypes, which are often 
driven by spontaneous counterfactual reasoning, and as often as not, those 
predictions and theories are flawed.
Despite the perils of trying to deal with uncertainty and complexities 
through over-determined and simplified views of the past, or through 
forecasting the future, these methodologies remain the dominant models. But 
as Kuhn (1970) argues,^ the nature of scientific revolutions is such that even 
after obsolescence, outdated paradigms have a tendency to endure for some 
time. In a world where stochastic behavior dominates, and one in which the 
future is increasingly influenced by complexities that are too vast to be
Keeping in mind the Kuhn-Popper debates at the London School of Economics.
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understood in their entirety, Kuhn may be right. Thus, to paraphrase Cowley 
(1999), for historians the maxim is that the dominos fall backward. In order to 
improve foresight, they have to be made to fall forward!
6.8 Chapter Conclusion
“History,” Cowley writes, “is properly the literature of what did happen”
(Cowley, 1999, p. xi). Or is it? Benson (1972) argues that the reasons for 
studying the past fall into four categories. They are: to construct a group, or 
national identity, to entertain, to reveal the extent of human possibility, and to 
develop systematic knowledge about the world, “knowledge that may 
eventually improve our ability to predict and control” (Fischhoff and Tversky, 
1982, p. 335).
Counterfactuals, historians such as Carr (1961/1990), Thompson 
(Thompson, 1978), and Fisher (1970) might argue, fall into the second 
category, that of entertainment. After all, they are ‘unhistorical’ (Thompson, 
1978), a ‘parlor game’, a ‘red herring’ (Carr, 1961/1990), a ‘methodological 
rathole’ (Fisher, 1970). Or are they?
Psychologists, who generally restrict themselves to the last category 
(Fischhoff and Tversky, 1982), have demonstrated that the analysis of history 
is often distorted through various biases, two of which are the hindsight bias 
(Carll, 1999; Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Christensen-Szalanski and 
Willham, 1991; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; Fischhoff, 1975), and creeping 
determinism (Fischhoff, 1975; Florovsky, 1969). Counterfactuals, in 
psychology experiments, have been found to reduce the hindsight bias and 
creeping determinism (Mahajan, 1992; Wasserman et al., 1991), although 
research by Roese and Olson (1996) has been less clear on this point, and
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may suggest that ‘spontaneous’, or ‘automatic’, unregulated counterfactuals, 
as opposed to deliberately reconstructed ‘elaborative’ counterfactuals 
(Kahneman, 1995), may indeed increase these biases. Even if this is the 
case, it does not change the main force of the argument presented in this 
thesis, that hindsight does play a role in foresight, and counterfactual 
reasoning in particular, can either be a trip-wire for scenario thinking, by 
amplifying certain biases if left unchecked, and reducing the possibility of 
picking up weak signals in organizational environments, or a trigger, which 
expands possibility and understanding of both history and of the future. If 
rigorously applied, elaborative counterfactuals eliminate the hindsight bias 
(Cowley, 1999).
Counterfactuals not only play an important, cognitive role in our everyday 
learning experience, but scholars also use them regularly, often implicitly, 
when they assign causes (Tucker, A., 1999). The contribution of this chapter 
is in bringing to the fore research that concludes that counterfactuals and 
counterfactual hypothesis testing, as Fearon (1996) concludes, play an 
important, often-unacknowledged role in confronting key assumptions in 
hypothesis. Path-dependencies and path-dependent logic, which in form and 
outcome closely resemble the psychological phenomena of the hindsight bias 
and creeping determinism first introduced by Fischhoff (1975) and Florevsky 
(1969), can also be challenged by looking for critical decisions and junctures 
in the past through counterfactual analysis (Booth, 2003).
Carr, in his offensive against counterfactuals, defends what Popper termed 
‘historisicm’ by arguing that historiography is a matter of selecting historically
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significant facts which fit into a pattern of rational explanation and 
interpretation;
“Just as from the infinite ocean of facts, [the historian] selects those which are 
significant for his purpose, so from the multiplicity of sequences of cause and 
effect he extracts those which are historically significant; and the standard of 
historical significance is his ability to fit them into his pattern of rational 
explanation and interpretation" (Carr, 1961/1990, p. 105).
Leaving aside the problems of selecting ‘historically significant facts’ identified 
by Ricoeur (2002, advocates of counterfactuals (Lebow, 2000b; Cowley, 
1999; Tucker, 1999; Ferguson, 1997; Tetlock and Belkin, 1996; Weber, 1996; 
Fearon, 1996) counter arguments set forth by historians such as Carr, 
Thompson and Fisher, by arguing that judgments concerning what facts are 
chosen, and the explanations supporting a ‘pattern of rational explanation and 
interpretation’, are often a matter of ‘counterfactual judgment’ (Hawthorn, 
1991, p. 15).
Whether we choose to acknowledge it or not, counterfactuals already play 
an important role in our cognitive and learning experience (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1982; Roese, 1995; and the decisions, policies and structures that 
result from them (Lebow, 2000a; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1996). 
Research on the cognitive use of counterfactuals reviewed in the last chapter 
has shown that counterfactual mental simulations serve a future preparative 
function, and examples from history and the social sciences, such as the 
policy lessons derived by the allies from the 1930s, reviewed in this chapter, 
provide strong evidence that there is a formidable link between hindsight and 
foresight.
Counterfactuals, in the foreign policy literature, have been used to 
justify preferred policies (Breslauer, 1996). Breslauer (1996) argues that this
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is because the “extreme data poverty” and a “heavy emphasis on explicit 
policy prescription,” as is the case with classical approaches to strategy 
formulation and implementation, has lead scholars of foreign policy to 
embrace theoretical perspectives in their attempts to influence the policy 
community, and bolster their arguments using counterfactuals. Indeed, 
counterfactual arguments, whether implicit or explicit, have been influential in 
policy formation, from the policy lessons derived from the Second World War 
(Lebow, 2000a; Neustadt and May, 1986), to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Lebow, 
1996), to the Tower Commission and investigations into the National Security 
Council [Herrmann, 1996 #305], to name three examples.
As an intervening tool for ‘undoing the past and learning for the future,’ the 
application of elaborative counterfactuals, if deliberately thought out and 
rigorously tested using the criterion discussed in this chapter, can challenge 
path-dependent logic (Booth, 2003; Hawkins, 1990), reduce disruptive biases 
such as the hindsight bias (Kahneman, 1995), and can be used as a 
‘debiasing’ tool (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975b) for 
phenomena such as “creeping determinism”, while still meeting rigorous 
academic standards of scholarship. They can be, and frequently are used to 
assign causality (Tucker, A., 1999), challenge long-held assumptions (Cowley, 
1999), mindsets, and ‘prime the pump of learning’ (Weber, 1996). As Cowley 
(1999, p. xii) states, “The road not taken belongs on the map.”
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‘'Foresight Is a unique and highly-valued human capacity that is widely recognized as a 
major source of competitive advantage and cultural renewal within nations and
corporations."
~ Chia, 2002
"Timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater
disbursements to repel it  ”
~ George Washington, 1732 -1799
"It was ordained at the beginning of time that certain signs should prefigure certain
events. "
-  Cicero, 106-43  BCE
7.0 Chapter Introduction
Research in cognitive psychology has found that humans use certain heuristic
principles for simplifying a complex world and facilitating decision-making
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). These heuristics can be beneficial to facilitating
decision-making, but they can also lead to significant errors (Prahalad and Bettis,
1996).
Psychology research has shown that belief systems are remarkably resilient 
to change, even when evidence is presented to challenge them. Research on 
interpersonal expectations and stereotypes, for example, has shown that after an 
interaction between an individual who has prior expectations about, or had 
stereotyped a target individual, there was no change, and in some cases the 
stereotype was strengthened after the encounter (Darley and Gross, 1983; 
Duncan, 1976; Langer and Abelson, 1974; von Hippel et al., 1995; Munro and
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Ditto). Moreover, social cognition research has also demonstrated that already 
held beliefs and attitudes influence information processing (Slovic and 
Lichtentenstein, 1971; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Ross et a!., 1975; Ross et 
ai, 1977; Munro and Ditto, 1997). Some researchers (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 
1968; Word et ai, 1974) postulate that expectancy biases information processing 
by changing behavior “in ways that elicit expectancy-confirming information from 
the target” (Munro and Ditto, 1997).
Biases are not isolated, but interwoven, and they are often derivatives of, or 
closely linked with the “hindsight bias” (Carll, 1999; Sherman and McConnell, 
1995; Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991 Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; 
Fischhoff, 1975a) and “creeping determinism” (Fischhoff, 1975a; Florovsky, 
1969), which have long been recognized in theories of historical inevitability 
(Carr, 1961/1990; Berlin, 1954). These biases influence our analysis of 
assumptions, beliefs, experiences, understanding of history, ideology, 
mythologies, stereotypes, and symbols, all of which are vestiges of the past. 
They result in over-confidence and defensive pessimism, which can lead to 
maladaptive routines, recipes, paradigms, logical (and structural) path- 
dependencies, and dominant logics. They thus result in foresightful thinking 
flaws, which can lead to “big-miss” errors (Weber, 1996). These biases have 
been found to be prevalent in areas as diverse as psychotherapy case histories 
(Fischhoff, 1975a), employee evaluations (Mitchell and Kalb, 1981), medical 
diagnosis (Arkes et ai, 1981; Dawson et ai, 1986), historical judgment 
(Fischhoff, 1980; Berlin, 1954) and politics (Leary, 1982). Hindsight influences
Chapter Seven: Discussion and Synthesis: Foresignful Hindsight
Counterfactual Reasoning in Strategy Context 222
foresight, but does not equal foresight (Fischhoff, 1975a). To innprove foresight, 
hindsight must first be accounted for.
7.1 Chapter Purpose and Contribution
Counterfactual reasoning, while a controversial proposition within history and 
the social sciences (Thompson, 1978; Carr, 1961/1990; Croce, 1966) has been 
found by psychologists to be an effective de-biasing technique (Mahajan, 1992; 
Wasserman et al., 1991; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990) although there is some 
controversy about whether it is a trigger for reducing bias, or a trip-wire for 
augmenting it (Roese, 1996; Sherman and McConnell, 1995).
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize the research reviewed so far.
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The chapter's contribution to the doctoral thesis (exhibit 7.0) is a critical appraisal 
of the application of counterfactual reasoning techniques for de-biasing hindsight 
and improving foresight.
7.2 Chapter Structure
The chapter begins with an explanation of ‘causal fields’ (Einhorn and
Hogarth, 1986; Mackie, 1965), which is a diagnostic concept for assessing 
alternative explanations for events, the causal relevance of causes and 
conditions leading to outcomes, and the use of counterfactual reasoning for 
assessing context. The concept of causal fields is then illustrated using data 
collected by Seaton (2003, February 19) from interviews with 12 historians, 
discussing the use of historical analogy by those advocating and opposing War 
with Iraq.
The following section links counterfactual reasoning into the past, scenario 
thinking into the future, and context by drawing on research by Ingvar [Ingvar, 
1985 #334] into cognitive schemas and the relationship between past, present 
and future. Ingvar’s (1985) concepts are used to conceptually integrate the 
relationship between the past, foresightful thinking flaws such as the hindsight 
bias and creeping determinism, and the dysfunctional implications that hindsight 
can have for foresight, such as the generation of over-confidence, defensive 
pessimism, erroneous routines, recipes, paradigms, logical path-dependencies, 
and dominant logics.
The succeeding sections analyse the role of counterfactual reasoning in de­
biasing foresightful thinking flaws (Mahajan, 1992; Wasserman et ai, 1991;
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Koriat et a/., 1980). Counterfactual generation, while often viewed as a heuristic, 
has also been found to have some dysfunctional implications. Specifically, some 
researchers have found counterfactual mental simulations to have a positive 
correlation, rather than a negative correlation with biases such as the hindsight 
bias and creeping determinism (Roese and Olson, 1996; Sherman and 
McConnell, 1995). This research is considered, and some methodological 
problems with their studies are emphasized.
The chapter concludes that while it is important to be mindful of the 
dysfunctional implications of counterfactual mental simulations, they are useful, 
in conjunction with “mini-methods” proposed by historians Neustadt and May 
(1986), as effective hindsight de-biasing techniques.
7.3 The Causal Field and Context: A diagnostic concept
The concept of a ‘causal field' has been proposed as a diagnostic concept for
assessing the salience of alternative explanations for events, assessing causal 
relevance and differentiating causes from conditions. The term ‘causal field’ is 
interchangeabie with the context that people make judgments about probable 
cause (Einhorn, 1986; Mackie, 1965). Context is a concept that, until recently, 
has been accepted as “self-evident, as a given attribute in the world, something 
that is stable, clear and sufficient, and not requiring any qualification of its own” 
(Dilley, 1999). Dilly argues that the word context suggests a derivation of the 
Latin verb texere, ‘to weave'. Further, the Latin verb contexere has the meaning 
of ‘to interweave’, ‘to weave together’, or ‘to join together’ (Dilley, 1999, p. 4).
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Individuaily then, social actors weave their own contexts for various purposes. 
However, there is also a body of common knowledge, or inter-subjective 
knowledge, that allows individuals to negotiate a common understanding. This 
‘foreknowledge’ is the navigational instrument, or the receptive rod that allows 
people to pick out what is salient and achieve a common context. As Dilley says: 
“Such foreknowledge could be conceived as a body of inter-subjective 
knowledge, what ethnomethodologists recognize as the means by which social 
actors negotiate and achieve a common context” (Dilley, 1999, p. 16).
Prince and Riches (1999), for instance, have argued that context is a sociaily 
constructed political process that is used to legitimize and justify the 
contextualised’ (Prince and Riches, 1999, p. 169). In a study of the New Age 
movement, they found that there is a construction of a domain that is external to 
the phenomenon at issue, and that external domain is somehow responsible for 
the issue taking the shape that it has. They offer the idea of ‘context 
determination’ to describe the process. They argue that:
"In the process of construction, It Is the phenomenon at issue -  where political 
contentiousness lies -  that is primary, its contextualisation a political gambit in its 
support” (Prince and Riches, 1999, p. 184).
As Goodwin and Duranti (1992) contend: “As strategic actors, individual 
participants can actively attempt to shape context in ways that further their own 
interests” (Goodwin and Duranti, 1992, p. 6.). Thus, Prince and Riches argue 
that with the New Agers, holistic ideas are produced and reproduced through the 
process of constructing context, and their individualistic practices attain 
legitimization through the process of constructing a context that differentiates 
them, however subtly, from ‘mainstream society’ (Prince and Riches, 1999, p.
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184). According to this view, speech and context “stand in a mutually reflexive 
relationship to each other" (Dilley, 1999, p. 19).
In a similar vein. Rapport (1999) has found, for the people that populate 
Wanet village in England that mutual adjustments in both ‘individual’ and ‘public’ 
contexts occur through communication and discourse. They argue that 
conversations reveal a mental mind-map (s) that serve as existential contexts in 
people’s lives. They delineate and detail the landmarks in these maps, and take 
actions by them. People codify and explain the world in terms of tautologies. 
Through conversing, people “express jointly their common experience and 
realize jointiy their shared experiencing” (p. 124). As Rapport says:
"With a common outlook on the environment and a common location within It, by 
treating other objects and events and being treated alike by them In return, they 
have a shared reality, a type of context for their knowing and acting, over and 
above their logical, bodily separation” (Rapport, 1999, p. 124).
Furthermore, Rapport argues that:
“Conversation Is not simply a realization of a mapping of the world and their 
contexts of action within it, but also an ostentatious guarding and maintaining of 
that world” (Rapport, 1999, p. 125).
This is because there is a certain comfort in finding that the world is the same old 
world, and a satisfaction in finding that mental mind-maps continue to be 
accurate, even if the context has changed markedly, and it is empowering to 
know that similar situations have been experienced in the past and there are 
action plans for what to do. As a result, people will desire to find what they know 
they will find: “Their information coincide with their evaluation” (Rapport, 1999, p. 
205).
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Dilley thus argues that context is both a generative and an emergent property 
of knowledge. He also warns that:
“Context is expandable, Indefinitely so; and we must never lose sight of the fact 
that a claim about context is precisely that -  an articulation concerning a set of 
connections and disconnections thought to be relevant to a specific agent that is 
socially and historically situated, and to a particular purpose” (Dilley, 1999, p. 39).
Contexts are thus sets of relations that “are not self-evident things in themselves” 
(p. 38):
“It reminds us in short that the agents who frame or contextualise perform a 
social practice. It recognizes context as a process, and its definition as a species 
of social action entails relations of power. The very act of interpretation, evoking 
a specific frame in preference to another, is an act of power” (Diiley, 1999, p. 35).
The terminology “causal field” is one that was coined by the philosopher
Mackie who postulates that there is a link between variables, or “difference in
background” and judgments of causal relevance (Mackie, 1965). As Einhorn and
Hogarth (1986) points out, differences-in-a-background consist of events that are
surprising, unusual or abnormal, and these events should theoretically arouse
causal interest. Whether or not an uncertain event comes to pass determines
whether or not causal interest is aroused, which provides a suitable test for
Mackie’s concept of causal fields. Weiner, for instance, states:
“There is reasonabie consensus in the reviewed research (6 of the 8 pertinent 
publications) that search is elicited by an unexpected event -  a win by an 
underdog, a loss by a favored team, more or less profits than anticipated, 
unexpected academic success or failure, unusual willingness or unwillingness to 
help, and inconsistent behavior” (Weiner, 1985, p. 81].
In the social and cognitive psychology studies reviewed in Chapter Five,
evidence is provided that people make sense of the world through a process of
causal reasoning (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Hastie, 1984; Abelson, 1981;
Schank and Abelson, 1977) that involves counterfactual mental simulations. A
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pervasive element in people’s socio-cognitive functioning, research in psychology 
has shown, is imagining alternative versions of past events (Kahneman and 
Miller, 1986; Miller and McFarland, 1990; Roese and Olson, 1996), or simply put, 
asking ‘what if s’ about the past. Evidence has shown that when events violate 
one’s expectations (i.e. abnormal events), a cognitive search for explanations is 
triggered. Effectively, a change in context challenges people’s assumptions 
about the past, and by extension, the present and future. This is because, as 
Wasserman (Wasserman et al., 1991) states: “Events in the past usually appear 
simple, comprehensible, and predictable in comparison with events in the future” 
(Wasserman et a/., 1991, p. 30). This helps to explain why individuals at the 
micro level, and organizations, regions and countries collectively, fail to anticipate 
changes within their environments. In times of relative stability there is not an 
incentive to search for causal factors that could lead to an abnormal outcome. In 
effect, there is a counterfactual bias. Even our “memories of the future”, 
cognitive schemas for future action generated from past experiences and then 
stored in memory for recall in the future when similar circumstances arise 
(Ingvar, 1985), are based on our experiences of abnormal events.
Cues-to-causality, as Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) maintain, will determine a 
person’s perception of the strength of cause X to effect Y once a context, or 
causal field, has been invoked. The strength of the cause is determined by 
contiguity in time and space, co-variation and temporal order. In other words, 
every individual cue illuminates a sign of causal relation that is fallible. 
Consequently, people will mitigate against the fallibility of single cues through the
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use of co-variation between multiple cues when making causal inferences. 
Contiguity and temporal order are variables, as highlighted by philosophers such 
as Hume (1964/1739) and Mill (1872) that indicated causal relations (Einhorn 
and Hogarth, 1986). The importance of understanding cues-to-causality and a 
causal-field (or context) has implications for understanding the process of 
foresight and is a useful diagnostic tool. Changes in the causal field (or context), 
for instance, will change the cues-to-causality, alternatives and counterfactuals 
that people will look at. A shift in the causal field, for example, has the ability to 
highlight or de-emphasize entire classes of alternatives (or plausible worlds). In 
other words, the causal field, or context, is what contains the class of alternatives 
that any given causal possibility is compared to and evaluated by (Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1986).
Consider the following scenario*: War with iraq. Before the recent war with 
Iraq (2003), both advocates and opponents of the conflict used their knowledge 
of history to justify their position. Those advocating war with Iraq, for example, 
warned against appeasement, invoking the lessons of the 1930s and the 
counterfactual that, ‘if only France and Britain had stood up to Germany in the 
1930s, rather than appeasing it. World War II could have been averted’. They 
constructed contexts by eliciting and projecting lessons taken from past 
experiences onto current circumstances:
• Hussein has invaded his neighbors.
• Hussein has gassed his political and racial enemies.
• Hussein has tortured and brutalized his own people.
* Data collected by Seaton (2003, February 19) from intei'views with 12 leading historians on the use of 
historical analogy by advocates and opponents of war with Iraq. See appendix E for a list of those 
interviewed.
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• The United Nations is proving as ineffectual as the League of Nations was 
after Poland was invaded.
• Rumsfeld seems to think that Churchill advocated a ‘pre-emptive’ war 
against Hitler.
Advocates for war with Iraq construct a context, or a causal field that elicits 
certain counterfactuals. Based on these cues to causality, one might infer that 
because Hussein has invaded his neighbors in the past, gassed political and 
racial enemies and tortured his own people, he is therefore an imminent threat, 
likely to try and acquire weapons of mass destruction, and if he does so, use 
them. A powerful causal field has been developed that sets a context complete 
with cues-to-causality that buttresses their argument (see exhibit 7.1).
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Opponents of war with Iraq counter advocates by invoking a second causal field 
containing a different set of cues-to-causality. They argue:
The Iraqi people may not be thankful for liberation. 
Defeating Hussein could fuel Islamic terrorism.
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• There is no proof that Iraq is building weapons of mass destruction (Hitler 
was known to be building weapons of mass destruction).
• The war is about securing oil supplies.
• Hitler’s third Reich was the most militarily capable state in the world, 
whereas you could hardly say that about Hussein’s Iraq.
In short, they construct a context, or a ‘causal field’ that elicits a whole new class 
of alternatives (see Exhibit 7.2).
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However, in both cases, advocates and opponents alike selectively 
emphasize cues-to-causality that correspond to their respective bias, while de­
emphasizing or ignoring others (see exhibit 7.3).
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Exhibit 7.3 The Causai Field and War with iraq
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History, and in particular, counterfactual history has been used as a template for 
processing information. In each case, certain signals have been surveyed, 
selected as corresponding with a view of history, and used to construct a future 
context. Forward processing is thus rooted in a perception of the past.
7.4 Linking Scenario Thinking. Counterfactual Reasoning, and Context
Assessing probable cause for a wide range of events is a cognitive function
that is closely linked with both forward and backwards processing of experiences.
To quote Kahneman and Miller:
“Reasoning flows not only forward, from anticipation and hypothesis to 
confirmation or revision, but also backward, from the experience to what it 
reminds us of or makes us think about” (1986, p. 137)
Research into counterfactual reasoning does much to highlight the fact that
not all observations and events can be explained by a forward ‘Bayesian’
processing of hypothesis and anticipation, confirmation, disconfirmation and
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revision, but also by a backward processing of counterfactual alternatives. 
Sanna and Turley (1996) summarize the link between counterfactual reasoning 
and scenario thinking when they state:
“Counterfactual thinking, therefore, can be affected both by a forward processing 
from expectancies or hypotheses to confirmation or revision, and by a backward 
processing from the outcome itself to what it reminds one of or makes one think 
about” (Sanna and Turley, 1996, pp. 906-919).
Counterfactual alternatives are generally evoked when an event deviates from 
a cognitive weighting of knowledge that has been extracted from past 
experiences and expectancies (Kahneman and Miller, 1986). In other words, 
when the target outcome deviates from our norms, we create counterfactual 
alternatives. Scenarios use the same methodological process to enhance 
understanding of the future. As van der Heijden (1996) points out:
“Stories about the future are in a way historical accounts but seen from a future 
perspective. They explain how the world has ended up in a future end-state, by 
a causal train of events, linking back to the well-known present. Scenarios make 
sense of future events In the same way as historical accounts make sense of the 
past” (p. 116).
Breaking time down into segments of past, present and future, however, is in 
itself problematic. As the research of Ingvar (1985) shows, the cognitive 
processes that people engage in when generating explanations for the past and 
strategies for the future are interwoven. Ingvar's research also helps to 
demonstrate the intimate relationship between hindsight and foresight.
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7.4 f Memories of the Future 
Ingvar (1985) argues that people instinctively and constantly develop 
alternative plans for the future. The mind (or more specifically the frontal cortex 
of the brain) has an innate capacity to preserve concepts of the future. Further, 
humans can be conscious of these concepts and constantly rehearse them, but 
generally we integrate only those factors that are relevant to our perception of the 
future. As Ingvar (1985) says:
"It is only by access to serial plans for future behavior and cognition, i.e. access 
to our “memory of the future”, that we can select and perceive meaningful 
messages in the massive sensory barrage to which our brains are constantly 
exposed” (pp. 127-136).
In other words, Ingvar postulates that concepts and serial programs of the 
future act as templates. When we receive information we compare the 
messages with these templates. If the messages correspond, the meaning of the 
message is “perceived” and selected. This process is reflected, at the 
organisational level, in Argyris’ (1982) concept of double looped learning. Here, 
organisations adjust their behavior based on the messages that they have 
perceived and selected, rather than attempting to maintain their preferred 
conditions. Their actions are driven by the feedback they have received from 
experience.
This theoretical stream suggests that human minds relate concepts to 
‘elements of temporally organized schemas’ (van der Heijden, 1996), thus 
retaining them as what Ingvar calls ‘memories of the future’. The individual 
provides contextual frameworks to organize their observations of past and 
present, and the future implications that they conjecture. The concept of
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“schemata” closely resembles that of Bartlett (1932) who postulates that they are 
"active organizations of past reactions and experiences” (Jeeves, 1983, p. 3). 
Stotland and Canon also agree:
“Persons operate relatively abstract and generalizable rules, called schemata, 
regarding regularities in relationships among events ... [which] guide behavior... 
and influence the manner in which new information is assimilate” (Stotland and 
Canon, 1972, p. 67).
This process of operating relatively abstract schemata, which regard regularities 
in relationships among events, is closely associated with the concept of context 
embodied in the Latin verb contextere, to weave together. Our “inner future” 
(Melges, 1982), which consists of our concepts of future events and the future 
consequences of behavior in the past and the present (Ingvar, 1985), is the result 
of our cognitive capacity to ‘program anticipatory goal-directed behavior and 
cognition’ and to construct action plans, based on a ‘weaving together’ of 
assumptions, beliefs, experiences, mythologies, routines, stereotypes, symbols 
and so on. Individuals can reconstruct memories of the past. The plans that we 
make about the future can be remembered in great detail and recalled. The 
present thus consists of both concepts (memories) of the past and of the future. 
As GIddens says:
“Because schemata are anticipations, they are, as one author put it, ‘the medium 
whereby the past affects the future’, which is ‘identical with the underlying 
mechanisms of memory’” (Giddens, 1984, p 46).
Because the present is both ‘inherently related to cognitive concepts of the past 
and the future’, it is contextual in nature (Lundh, 1983, pp. 127-136). To 
summarize Ingvar’s research in his own words:
“Human memory operates not only with past experiences, but also with 
alternative, semantically meaningful sequences of events which are located in an
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anticipated future. These sequences are remembered and can be recalled often 
in detail, in spite of the fact that the events have not taken place” (Invar. 1985).
As exhibit 7.4 shows, the individual lenses that people peer through, their 
assumptions, beliefs, ideology, experiences, cultural myths, routinised behavior, 
and stereotypes, and symbols influence memories of the past. These in turn 
influence peoples viewpoints, presumptions and the selection and quality of 
information that people process in the present. The future flows from the present 
and the past and is therefore influenced by foresightful thinking flaws, the 
counterfactuals that people generate and their memories of the future.
Exhibit 7.4 Foresightful Thinking in Time
Past
" M e m o r ie s  
O f  th e  
F u t u r e ”
> Future + > Present
Memories 
of the past
Experience 
of actual 
events 
in the 
present
Concepts of future 
behaviour and 
cognition: concepts 
of events that have 
not take place.
In fluenced by:
• Foresightful 
thinking 
flaws
•Counter- 
factual pasts
• memories of 
the future
In fluenced by:
• viewpoint
• bias
• direct or indirect 
involvement
• quality of 
information
In fluenced by:
• individual 
lenses
• experiences
• ideology
• cultural myths
• routines
• stereotypes
• symbols
Source: Author
Foresight is thus a product of the constant oscillation between analysis in the 
present of the past and conjecture into the future. If left unchecked and untested, 
the assumptions and perceptions underpinning foresight can lead to logical path- 
dependencies that flow from the past, through the present and into the future. As 
Neustadt and May say:
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"In thinking of time as a stream, the preeminent challenge is to judge whether 
change has happened or is happening or will. The imperative need is to get that 
reasonably right. This mode of thought contributes to the chances of doing so by 
continuously posing comparisons of present with past and future” (1986, p. 257).
Being conscious of the use of “if then” reasoning, reasoning by analogy, 
stereotypes, assumptions and presumptions, for instance, can be an effective 
way of improving the quality of hindsight, and by extension foresight. Again to 
quote Neustadt and May:
“So “if/then” is a warning sign, and all presumptions phrased in the contingent 
form become prime targets for testing" (1986, p. 140).
Testing our counterfactuals, presumptions, assumptions and perceptions is one
key to unlocking our understanding of the future.
7.5 Guarding Against Foresightful Thinking Flaws: De-biasing Techniques
Despite the existence of a few ‘positive externalities’ to bias, for the most 
part they are disruptive to information processing, and ultimately, to effective 
foresight. Several researchers have attempted to eliminate the hindsight bias in 
their studies. In an experiment by Arkes et al. (1988), a de-biasing procedure 
similar to one used by Koriat et al. (1980) et ai. was applied, in an attempt to 
reduce the overconfidence that people portrayed in their answers when asked 
general knowledge questions. Arkes et ai. (1988) felt that the same procedure 
might be used to the end of countering the hindsight bias (p.305). In the study 
conducted by Koriat et ai. (1980), for instance, participants were given two 
alternative questions such as “The Sabines were part of (a) Ancient India or (b) 
Ancient Rome.” Participants in the study were asked to indicate which answer
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they thought was correct and also their confidence in their answer. Before 
indicating their confidence in their chosen answer, participants in the 
experimental groups were required to indicate why each of the answers might be 
incorrect and why they might be correct. Koriat et al. (1980), found that control 
groups were found to have far greater confidence than their levels of accuracy, 
whereas participants in the experimental groups were found to have “manifested 
significantly less overconfidence than did control group subjects” (Arkes, 1988, p. 
305). Using a similar methodology, Arkes et al. (1988) applied the procedure to 
the diagnoses of 194 professional neuropsychologists. Three hindsight groups 
were given a case history and told that one of three diagnoses was correct. They 
were then asked to assign the probabilities to the differing diagnoses as if they 
were making the original diagnoses. Foresight participants, on the other hand, 
were given a case history and were subsequently asked to ' estimate the 
probability of three different diagnoses. Hindsight and foresight “reasons” groups 
were asked to indicate their confidence in what they felt were “correct” diagnoses 
and also to list their reasons for why each of the other diagnoses may have been 
correct. Consistent with the results of Koriat et al. (1980), listing reasons for 
other possible diagnoses diminished the frequency of participants in the hindsight 
reasons groups succumbing to the hindsight bias (p. 305). This has led Arkes et 
al. (1988) to conclude:
'The practical consequences of this de-biasing procedure should prove beneficial 
and may extend beyond the hindsight bias alone. Physicians, psychologists, and 
other diagnosticians often inaccurately claim they “knew it all along" when told 
the true diagnosis. The hindsight bias thereby reduces what the diagnostician 
can learn from the outcome information, because he or she thinks the outcome is 
already so obvious" (p. 307).
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They go on to suggest:
“Having the diagnostician list or generate reasons why other outcomes might 
have been expected should heighten appreciation of the difficulty of the case, the 
plausibility of other diagnoses, and the information value of the correct answer. 
Under these circumstances the correct answer will more likely be seen as truly 
informative, and alternative possibilities may be given their just due” (Arkes, 
1988, p. 307).
The hindsight bias can formally be differentiated from “creeping determinism"
by its consequences. While the hindsight bias is a psychological phenomena
that leads people to believe that “I knew-it-all-along", creeping determinism is a
phenomena that leads one to believe that “it couldn’t have happened in any other
way". In other words, creeping determinism focuses on the causal chain of
events, whereas the hindsight bias suggests that one knew that the causal chain,
or outcome that the causal chain leads to, was as predictable in foresight before
the event as in hindsight after the event. As Wasserman et al. state:
“[The hindsight bias is] a projection of new knowledge into the past accompanied 
by a denial that the outcome information has influenced judgments” (Wasserman,
1991, p. 30).
The hindsight bias, in some senses, might be better phrased the over­
confidence bias, as the research clearly shows over-confidence in hindsight is a 
major catalyst for the hindsight bias and prevents meaningful learning from taking 
place (Christensen-SzalanskI and Willham, 1991; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990 
Fischhoff, 1975a). Antecedents are linked to an outcome or an event through 
causal inferences engendered from the selective recall of information that is 
consistent with an event’s outcome (Schkade and Kilbourne, 1991; Wasserman 
et al., 1991). The information selectively recalled is integrated into a schemata 
representation of the past (Fischhoff, 1975a).
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A pervasive element in people’s socio-cognitive functioning, research in 
social and cognitive psychology has shown, is imagining alternative versions of 
past events (Miller and McFarland, 1990), or simply put, asking ‘what if s’ about 
the past. Past research into counterfactual reasoning has demonstrated that 
counterfactual reasoning can reduce the hindsight bias, creeping determinism 
and over-confidence. In one study, Fischhoff exhibits evidence that when 
participants consider alternatives to an outcome, their confidence in the certainty 
of the outcome diminishes (Fischhoff, 1976). In another study, Slovic and 
Fischhoff (1977) note that when participants were asked to consider alternatives 
to an outcome in a published experiment, the participants felt less confident that 
the experiment could be replicated. Consequently, Kahneman and Varey 
(Kahneman and Varey, 1990) suggest that: “X is neither necessary nor inevitable 
if it can properly be said that Y almost happened instead of X ” (p. 1103), thus 
observing that there is an “intriguing tension’’ between the hindsight bias and 
counterfactual reasoning. This “intriguing tension” reflects findings by Sherman 
(Sherman, 1991), who argues that:
“To the extent that counterfactuals are easily and spontaneously generated, the 
past seems less inevitable: Other outcomes were clearly possible" (Sherman,
1991, p. 182).
It is interesting to note that in the recent study of Brill’s Content, a journal that 
critiques the media, they found that since August 1998, many of televisions 
political pundits have generally been “gloriously and publicly” wrong as much, in 
some cases more, than they’ve been right. The time and effort of the experts 
fabricating reasons why they were “basically right” has led Tetlock to the
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conclusion that the more wrong they are the more learning takes place 
(Rothstein, 1999, pp. 10-11) and alludes to a “knew-it-all-along” hindsight bias 
phenomenon.
There is ample evidence validating the hindsight hypothesis. As Wasserman 
et a/. (1991) state:
“Events in the past usually appear simple, comprehensible, and predictable in 
comparison with events in the future. Everyone has had the experience of 
believing that he or she “knew all along” the outcome of a legal trial, business 
investment, political election, or football game. And everyone has reacted with 
skepticism to similar claims from someone else” (Wasserman et al., 1991, p. 30).
This begs the question: Do some events trigger the hindsight bias more than 
others? If so, do some events cause the hindsight bias or moderate its effects? 
Wasserman et a i (1991) found that this is indeed the case. When people 
attribute an outcome to “chance” factors that were unforeseeable, such as an 
earthquake, the hindsight effect was all but eliminated. However, participants in 
the Wasserman et ai studies cited “deterministic” causes, such as a lack of 
human skill, there was considerable hindsight bias. These findings lead the 
researchers to the conclusions that the evidence supports Fischhoffs (1975a) 
“creeping determinism” theory, and that the hindsight bias is a by-product of 
adaptive learning from feedback (Wasserman et ai, 1991). Furthermore, they 
point out that the “creeping determinism” explanation is the most consistent 
explanation in the hindsight literature and it is also consistent with cognitive 
process accounts from legal judgments (Casper et ai, 1988; Hans and Doob, 
1975) to the role of explanation in predictions of social events (Sherman, 1981) 
to subjects inability to discount information once it has been integrated into an
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impression of another person (Wyer and Budesheim, 1987; Schui and Burnstein, 
1985).
In two studies conducted by Carll (1999), evidence was found that suggests 
that reconstructive memory contributes to the hindsight bias. Forming causal 
links between the events leading up to an outcome and the outcome itself has 
been well documented (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990). Carll’s findings have gone 
even further by showing that people may apply stereotypical causal links that 
were not part of the scenario given to them. This corroborates research that has 
suggested that people will embellish or alter their memories based on personal 
schemas:
“That is, when a schema is invoked, people systematically misremember 
information that is consistent with that schema” (Carll, 1999, p. 967).
Indeed, in a theoretical investigation on the effects of expertise, counterfactual 
reasoning and evaluative feedback on marketing management decisions, 
Mahajan (1992) came to the conclusions that (1) “humbling” feedback increases 
accuracy and lowers overconfidence, (2) overconfidence from being “blind sided” 
can be reduced by counterfactual reasoning and (3) “richness” of experts’ mental 
representations results in higher overconfidence (Mahajan, 1992, p. 329).
The literature on the hindsight bias consistently shows that generating 
alternative outcomes for the past, and thus scenarios for an event is an effective 
way of eliminating the hindsight bias. Furthermore, the research of Nario and 
Branscombe (1995) has concluded that alternative scenarios is an effective way 
of eliminating the perseverance effect, which can be described as "the 
inappropriate persistence of a belief even when the evidential basis for that belief
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has been completely discredited." As Nario and Branscombe (1995) suggest: 
“Similar to the hindsight phenomenon, perseverance may be mediated by a 
selective search for causal antecedents capable of explaining events observed” 
(Nario and Branscombe, 1995, p. 1245).
Nario and Branscombe (1995) designed their investigation to examine 
whether biased causal attributions and hindsight effects “prevail as a 
consequence of the selective comparisons that perceivers generate when 
explaining the occurrence of a particular outcome” (Nario and Branscombe, 
1995, p. 1252). Using 183 female and 195 male undergraduate students, the 
researchers found that when an event is explained in terms of events that 
preceded it, participants become convinced that an outcome “was inevitable". 
They conclude that:
“The deliminating conditions necessary for replication and elimination of the 
hindsight bias include a scenario that is sufficiently rich, in terms of the predictive 
antecedents available, to be assimilated as part of subjects’ causal 
interpretations of the outcomes they consider" (Nario and Bransbombe, 1995, p.
1252).
They also conclude that judgments of outcome likelihood and attributions of 
causality are constrained by the context of which the event takes place (Nario 
and Branscombe, 1995, p. 1254).
Early research (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990) has shown that people forming 
causal links between outcomes and the events leading to those outcomes cause 
the hindsight bias. As Agans and Shaffer (1994) states:
"In hindsight, conditions leading to the outcome become relatively available to 
memory and therefore more difficult to ignore than with foresight" (Agans, 1994 
quote in Carll, 1999).
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Carll (1999) has furthered this research to show that reconstructive memory also 
contributes to the hindsight bias. As Carll argues, people alter and embellish 
their memories, adding antecedents that were not necessarily present, to be 
consistent with their schemas. In two studies, one where participants read a 
scenario that ended in a rape or a marriage proposal, and one where participants 
read identical scenarios that either ended in a rape or had no ending, add 
evidence for this hypothesis. As Carll states: “Participants’ memories of the 
events in the story were reconstructed to be stereotypically consistent with 
whichever ending they received" (Carll, 1999, p. 966). Those participants that 
received a scenario that ended in a rape, for instance, re-wrote the story to be 
consistent with that outcome.
7.51 Counterfactual Generation Bias: Dysfunctional Attributes Revisited
Counterfactual reasoning, however, may not be the panacea that 
conventional wisdom (e.g. Sherman, 1991; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; Slovic 
and Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff, 1975a) suggest that they are. As Roese and 
Olson (1996) and Sherman and McConnell (1995) illustrate, counterfactual 
generation, and the hindsight bias may in fact be mutually reinforcing, under a 
preexisting set of conditions, if those conditions are left untested:
“In other words, the more a person Is certain that outcome A was predictable 
under condition X, the more sure the person is that a change in condition X 
would have led to a change in outcome. Just as the person “knows” after the fact 
that bringing in the relief pitcher was bound to bring up the pinch hitter who would 
then hit the home run, the person "knows" equally well that leaving in the starting 
pitcher would have led to a strikeout and a different outcome” (Sherman and 
McConnell, 1995, p. 221).
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Consequently, under a preexisting set of conditions where one sees an outcome 
as inevitable, Sherman and McConneil argue, counterfactuals might actually 
enhance the hindsight bias and over-confidence. In future situations, the theory 
follows, counterfactual generation might be a dysfunctional bias, and these two 
biases might go hand in hand, thus resulting in a change to strategy. The result 
can be Impaired decision-making. As Sherman and McConnell state:
“The fact is that the hindsight assessment and the inference about the 
counterfactual world are both likely to be incorrect. The outcome was not as 
predictable from antecedent conditions as people think (hindsight bias). Nor was 
an alternative outcome based on the mutation of some antecedent condition as 
likely as people think (counterfactual generation bias). Yet these two biases in 
judgment can combine, and they have the potential for turning good decisions 
into bad ones" (1995, pp. 221-222).
Research by Roese and Olson (1996) finds that spontaneous counterfactual 
thinking heightens the intensity of the hindsight bias. They attribute this 
phenomenon to the causal inferences that are made. Their research has also 
been interpreted to show that spontaneous causal inferences mediate the 
facilitative effect of counterfactual thinking on the hindsight bias (Roese, 1996, p. 
197). In short, the two primary assertions that Roese and Olson make are that 
“if-then” counterfactual conditionals, labeled “rejudgement” by Hawkins and 
Hastie (1990) increase the magnitude of the hindsight bias and the causal 
inferences attributed to counterfactual reasoning and yield information increasing 
the explanatory value and clarity value and thus leading to increased hindsight 
bias (p. 198).
In three experiments, Roese and Olson sought to de-bunk past theory and 
research, which has suggested that counterfactual thoughts weaken the 
hindsight bias. In the first experiment, the researchers used 100 students
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enrolled in introductory psychology classes at the University of California in 
Santa Barbara. The students were given the following scenario:
“Sarah is a freshman student in university. She is a typical student in most 
respects, getting grades that average around 70% in her first quarter. Sarah has 
an important midterm exam coming up in her psychology class. She begins to 
prepare about a week before the exam date, intent on getting at least her 
customary grade (70%). As she always did before an important exam, Sarah 
went to the library to look over some extra reference material. Three nights 
before the exam, Sarah was invited out by old friends from high school. Because 
she hadn’t seen them for several months, she decided to go, even though she 
had planned to study that night. Two days before the exam, Sarah happened to 
run into an old friend, Lynn, who had taken the same psychology course the year 
before and had copies of last year’s exams. Sarah studied some of these exams 
closely to get an idea of the kinds of questions that might be on her exam. Just 
before sitting down to take exams, Sarah usually swallows a pill prescribed by 
her doctor for the panic attacks she often suffers. Sarah almost always takes a 
pill before exams, and it often seems to make her feel better [even though it 
raraely seems to make her feel better]. On the day of her psychology exam, 
however, she forgets to take her pill. Sarah does her best on the exam. A week 
later, she learns that her grade on the exam is 70% [55%, 40%].”
On 9 point scales, the students were then asked to rank the predictability of 
Sarah’s grade on the exam, how inevitable Sarah’s grade on the exam is and the 
causal potency of the antecedents e.g. how big an effect did forgetting to take 
her pill have on Sarah’s grade. The students were then asked to rate how much 
control Sarah had over her grade, and how large an effect her actions had on the 
grade that she received. This experiment demonstrated that counterfactuals 
heighten the hindsight bias due to the effects of counterfactuals on causal 
inferences.
Again, the second experiment used 85 students enrolled in introductory 
psychology at the University of Western Ontario. The students were asked to 
read the following scenario:
“During the first month of the First World War (1914 -  1918), hundreds of lives 
were lost during the Battle of the Frontiers. At this time, the Germans fought the 
French and the British along side the border between Germany and France. In 
these early weeks, the Germans quickly acquired a reputation for being ruthless
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and harsh, particularly as they burned and terrorized villages in Belgium and 
France,
During the battle, a small British force accidentally encountered a much larger 
German force. The British were forced to retreat into a small village, putting all 
the peaceful villagers into extreme danger of attack. The villagers were mainly 
farmers, and among them were many children. Unfortunately, the British 
commander (Lt. Dorian Moore) was slow. Inexperienced, and indecisive. Moore 
ordered his troops to stay in the village, and to simply wait for a German attack.
This spelled certain doom for the village.
One British soldier was Thomas Jensen. He was only 20 years old and, 
although somewhat shy and uncertain of himself, he was bright and had already 
involved himself in several minor military decisions for the British. He saw a way 
of luring the Germans away from the village, thereby saving the village from 
destruction. The more he worked on his plan, the more he became convinced 
that he could save the village, as well as his fellow soldiers. The problem was: 
since he was so young, it was very unlikely that Moore would listen to him.
Jensen faced a difficult decision. As he saw it, he had three alternatives: 1)
He could simply forget his plan and follow the orders Moore had already given.
2) Since he was well-liked, he could organize his fellow soldiers to disobey 
Moore’s orders, and to follow his plan instead. 3) He could carefully explain his 
plan to another officer, and have that officer tell Moore. With luck, Moore might 
order the troops to follow the plan.
Of these three choices, choice 1 was the least attractive (since it meant 
certain doom for the village). Choice 2 was the riskiest to Jensen himself (he 
could be tried and shot for mutiny if his plan failed) but was the most likely to 
save the village (assuming that the troops were willing to follow Jensen’s plan). 
Choice 3 was safer for Jensen (his conduct could not be questioned). After a 
sleepless nigh, Jensen decided on choice 2 [3]. The result was that the British 
troops were not convinced to follow Jensen’s plan and the village was destroyed 
(The result was that the British troops followed his plan and the village was 
saved].
First, participants were then divided into three groups, each reading a version 
of the scenario where only the last two sentences changed to one of the choices, 
or another, or none at all. On a nine-point scale, participants rated their 
agreement with two statements: 1) “It was predictable in advance that the
village would be saved" and 2) "... that the village would be destroyed.”
Second, participants were asked to allocate percentages to indicate the 
probability that the village was destroyed with some survivors, destroyed with no 
survivors, that the village was saved.
Finally, using a nine-point agree/disagree scale, participants were asked to 
rate their agreement with three prescriptive statements. They included: A) The
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likelihood that the village would have been saved had Jensen chosen option 1, 2, 
or 3. B) “should have” judgments for avoiding the negative outcome, following 
the form, “Jensen’s best decision would have been option [1, 2, 3].
Roese and Olson (1996) found that in experiment 2, “post-outcome 
elaboration of the causal linkage between an antecedent and outcome is 
essential for the hindsight bias,” and they also found that, “this bias may be 
redefined to include post-outcome certainty regarding “what should have been” 
as well as what it was.” They thus reason that once sensemaking cognitions are 
triggered from an unexpected or negative event (e.g. counterfactual reasoning), 
the hindsight bias will be heightened only to the extent that the antecedents can 
be explained. They suggest that the positive correlation between the hindsight 
bias and counterfactual reasoning, which runs against the prevailing wisdom e.g. 
(Sherman, 1991; Kahneman and Varey, 1990; Slovic and Fischhoff, 1977; 
Fischhoff, 1975a) that counterfactuals reduce the hindsight bias and over­
confidence, may well be the default. However, they do concede that 
counterfactuals may well reduce the hindsight bias and over-confidence in 
situations where there antecedent inferences “weaken causal potency” [Roese, 
1996 #145]. In other words, if the causes, or antecedents to an outcome can be 
explained as to why something should have happened differently, that in itself 
leads to the hindsight bias.
Thus, to quote Roese and Olson:
"Thus, by extension, the hindsight bias may also represent an enhanced post hoc 
certainty that another outcome could have, or perhaps should have occurred.
This extension of hindsight “certainty” to counterfactual alternatives may form the 
basis for the "armchair quarterback.” When sports fans watch their favorite team 
lose, they may demonstrate the classic hindsight bias in noting that the loss was
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predictable and inevitable, given, for example certain foolish decisions made by 
the coach. But note that this same post hoc certainty may also apply to 
decisions the coach should have made and that would have resulted in victory.
That is, fans may believe that the team certainly would have won if only the 
coach had made different decisions. Both types of certainty, one directed to 
what was and the other to what should have been reflect the output of active 
attempts to “make sense” of the past, and both are rooted in post hoc 
attributions” (1996, p. 202).
These findings are consistent with previous research (Branscombe and Weir, 
1992; Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Macrae, 1993), which suggests that:
“An outcome preceded by an exceptional rather than a routine act heightened 
counterfactual thinking and, accordingly, perceptions of the causal potency of 
that act. Exceptional preceding circumstances also heightened the hindsight 
bias relative to routine circumstances” (Macrae, 1993, p. 221).
A criticism of these experiments is the methodology that Roese and Olson 
(1996) use. Each one of their experiments involves groups of students reading 
carefully crafted scenarios and then asking them to answer systematically 
designed questions to test whether there is a positive correlation with the 
hindsight bias and over-confidence, rather than testing ways to reduce it. It may 
be possible that if a methodology is used that asks students to consider a range 
of both upward and downward counterfactuals, or to list reasons for their views, 
or to consider negative outcomes for each one of the outcomes provided, that the 
hindsight bias and over-confidence might be reduced. However, even if Roese 
and Olson (1996) are correct, and people default to spontaneous counterfactuals 
that positively correlate with foresightful thinking flaws, then these findings are 
important because it highlights the importance of finding ways to over-ride the 
short-circuiting effects of spontaneous defaults in order to improve foresight. As 
stated, one way of doing this is by considering a range of elaborative
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counterfactuals that reduce the causal potency of antecedents leading to an 
outcome.
7.52 Elaborative versus Automatic Counterfactuals: Creative Destruction?
Kahneman (Kahneman, 1995) emphasises the difference between elaborative 
counterfactuals and automatic counterfactuals. Automatic counterfactuals occur 
spontaneously and are a cognitive heuristic (Sherman and McConnell, 1995; 
Miller, 1990; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). However, they may have some 
dysfunctional implications for foresight and decision-making, such as a “short- 
circuiting” in the counterfactual assessment process depending on how questions 
are framed (Dunning and Madey, 1995; Dhar and Simonson, 1991), systematic 
biases in interpretations of causal relations and events (Sherman and McConnell, 
1995), the use of simplified heuristic principals for mutating event features and 
outcomes (Sherman and McConnell, 1995), and in certain circumstances, 
depending on the counterfactuals generated, enhancing the hindsight bias, 
creeping determinism and over-confidence (Roese and Olson, 1996).
Much research to date suggests that counterfactuals play a preparatory 
function for adaptive learning, and behavioral intentions for the future 
(Kahneman, 1995; Gleicher et al., 1995; McMullen et al., 1995; Seelau et al., 
1995; Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Sherman, 1991; Wells et al., 1987). 
Counterfactuals involve mental simulations (Kahneman and Miller, 1982), which 
is a form of elaborative thinking. Elaborative thinking involves: “[imagining] the 
unfolding of a sequence of events, from an initial counterfactual starting point to
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some outcome” (Kahneman, 1995, p. 378). Simulations are governed by causal 
knowledge that is, “implicit in the rules that govern the simulation,” but, “there is 
no magic in mental simulation and no guarantee that it correctly represents the 
causal relationships of the real world” (Kahneman, 1995, p. 380). The difference 
between automatic, or spontaneous counterfactual generation, and elaborative 
thinking used in historiography and the social sciences Is the application of the 
rules that govern the simulations of counterfactuals. That is because we 
conceptually blend together assumptions, beliefs, experiences, historical 
knowledge, mythologies, stereotypes, symbols and so on, by selectively 
recruiting, “from our most favored patterns of knowing and thinking” (Turner, 
1995, p. 293), or information that corresponds with our cognitive schemas 
(Ingvar, 1985), and we develop the blend, “through [the elaboration of] 
imaginative mental simulation according to the logic in the blend” (Turner, 1995, 
p. 293). The hindsight gained from these imaginative simulations is, 
consequently, biased (Turner, 1995), and has dysfunctional implications for 
foresight.
The sort of hindsight that can be gained from elaborative counterfactual 
thinking in historiography and the social sciences, however, can control for these 
biases and from the systematic distortions introduced into counterfactual 
reconstructions (Olson et al., 1996) that have been identified in psychological 
research (Roese and Olson, 1996; Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Miller et al., 
1990; Kahneman and Miller, 1986). This may be because of different principals 
guiding the two types of counterfactual thinking (Olson et al., 1996).
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Counterfactual thought experiments within history and the social science are 
deliberate, self-conscious (Olson et aL, 1996), and, if methodological criterion are 
articulated (Lebow, 2000b; Ferguson, 1997; Tetlock and Belkin, 1996; Breslauer, 
1996; Nash, 1991), rigorous. Research reviewed in psychology can also help to 
improve the standards of rigor that epistemological communities hold 
counterfactuals accountable to. For instance, research shows that upward 
counterfactuals (comparing an outcome to a better alternative) serve a 
preparative function, are useful for learning (Roese, 1994; Markman et al., 1993), 
sensemaking (Roese and Olson, 1996) (especially when in response to a 
negative event), and can be taken as schemas for future action (Sanna, 1996). 
Downward counterfactuals (comparing an outcome to a worse alternative) tend 
to be more useful for consoling, feeling better and relief (Roese, 1994; Johnson 
and Sherman, 1990) but may also provide more useful information for “potential 
survival and successful coping” (Taylor and Schneider, 1989, p. 573). Ensuring 
that a range of counterfactuals are reconstructed, and that default 
counterfactuals (Roese and Olson, 1996) that can enhance foresightful thinking 
flaws such as the hindsight bias, creeping determinism and over-confidence, are 
avoided, may be effective ways of improving the quality of foresightful hindsight.
7.6 Scenario Thinking
Neustadt and May (1986), in their study of the uses of history for U.S.
decision makers, have shown that decisions are frequently based on analogies 
rooted in past experiences, events and perceptions of the past. Analogies, either 
for argumentation and persuasion, or for decision-making support, represent a
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potent force for influencing thinking and perceptions. They can be captivating 
and irresistible in argumentation and this can result in decision-makers failing to 
hedge ‘by light of the uncertainty', or by acting on the basis of one, often ‘worst 
case' scenario, rather than preparing for a range of scenarios. Projecting 
analogies from past contexts onto present or future situations can be a risky 
business as contexts change over time. Consequently, they argue that thinking 
must be done in time-streams. They state:
"To link conventional wisdoms to the present with past counterparts and future 
possibilities: to link interpretations of the past -  all these mean to think relatively 
and in terms of time, opening one’s mind to possibilities as far back as the story’s 
start and to potentialities as far ahead as relevant... That entails seeing time as 
a stream. It calls for thinking of the future as emergent from the past and of the 
present as a channel that perhaps conveys, perhaps deflects, but cannot stop 
the flow” (Neustadt and May, 1986, p. 246).
Neustadt and May argue for a more rigorous use of history in decision-making
and for the placement of thinking in the context of time-streams. They argue
that:
“History can stimulate imagination: Seeing the past can help one envision 
alternative futures” (Neustadt, 1986, p. xv).
Their argument is based on the analysis of both the successful and unsuccessful
use of history and past experience in events as diverse as the decision to defend
South Korea in 1950, the handling of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the 1976
swine flu scare and the 1983 social security reform in the United States. They
argue that analogies, based on personal experience or the experience of others,
play an influential role in decision-making, but often go unchecked. What they
don’t say, but their analysis clearly suggests, is that the analogies that decision-
takers often use in their decision-making are generated from counterfactual
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reasoning. As research in social and cognitive psychology shows, lessons and 
analogies generated from spontaneous counterfactual thinking, if left untested, 
can lead to mis-interpretation and maladaptive strategies. Analogies are always 
context-dependant, and if the context changes, analogies may not be appropriate 
for underpinning logic.
Neustadt and May (1986) propose several ‘mini-methods’ for controlling for 
perceptual distortions generated from the various elements comprising 
foresightful thinking flaws. Based on their experiments with the use of history by 
American decision-makers, Neustadt and May argue that decisions are often 
made using analogies drawn from history. Rarely are analogies dissected, 
critiqued and tested. Why, for instance, were the ‘lessons from the thirties’ so 
powerful? They propose a simple, but powerful ‘mini-method’ for testing 
analogies. Closely reflecting the successful ‘de-biasing’ techniques utilized in the 
research of psychologists, they argue that analogies and assumptions must be 
broken down into what is ‘known’, what is ‘unclear’ and what is ‘presumed’, and 
testing for stereotypes. This need not be a complicated, or even a time- 
consuming process.
7.61 Operationalising Counterfactual Reasoning within Scenario Thinking
Returning to the Iraq case, leading up to hostilities between the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Australia and Spain on one side, and Iraq on the other, 
which commenced on 20^ " of March 2003, a divided world debated the legality 
and justice of a second Gulf War. On both sides of the debate, history was
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frequently invoked to underscore the logic of either pro-war or anti-war 
arguments. Twelve leading historians were asked by Seaton (2003) to analyse 
the analogies. Some historians found the analogies compelling; others did not. 
Applying this data to a de-biasing matrix, based on the ‘mini-tests’ developed by 
Neustadt and May, can add value to the scenario thinking process (exhibit 7.5).
Exhibit 7.5 The Analogy Matrix -  Appeasement in the 1930s and the Iraq conflict
Uncertain
• Is Iraq an imminent threat?
• Is Iraq building weapons of mass destruction?
< A 'stealthy' dictator is acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction?
• The United Nations Is proving as ineffectual as the 
League of Nations was after Poland was Invaded
• Rumsfeld seems to think that Churchill advocated a 
pre-emptive' war against Hitler.
Likeness.
■ Hussein has Invaded his neighbour's (as Hitler did)
• Hussein has gassed his political and raaal enemies (as 
Hitler did)
• Hussein has tortured and brutalised his own people (as 
Hitler did)
• If Iraq does have weapons of mass destruction, is there 
any indication that he will use them
» Will the Iraqi people be thankful for liberation?
■ Is securing oil supplies (vs the anti-colonisation of the 
Elsenhower years) a factor?
• Post-war settlement?
■ Hitler had tanks, the allies had tanks. Defeat Hussein, 
does It fuel Islamic fundamentalism? The threat Is not 
clear.
.D ifferences
• us Isolationism
• Britain had to consider world empire
■ Hitler was known to be building weapons
■ Germany had Invaded a sovereign territory
• Iraq has not invaded a sovereign territory (as in 1991 )
• In 1939 the Third Reich was the most militarily capable 
state in the world
• Shape of Islamic fundamentalism -  "A movement that hat- 
modernity but is equipped with modern weapons" - Scharr
Known
Source: Based on data from Seaton, Matt (2003, February 19). "Blast from the past". The Guardian.
What is ‘presumed’ resembles what many scenario thinking practitioners call 
‘the official future’ (van der Heijden, 1996; Schwartz, 1991), and also requires 
testing. Presumptions project into the future. But presumptions are often “shot 
through with perceptions of the past -  often muddled, sometimes mistaken” 
(Neustadt and May, 1986, p. 136). Presumptions can also be generated from 
belief systems and cultural nuances. The question is, how can busy decision­
makers, whose reaction to a ‘situation’ is often to come up with policy options 
without testing their cognitions for biases, check their presumptions, and in 
particular, how can facilitators, when interviewing or conducting workshops for
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scenario studies, control for foresightful thinking flaws. As Neustadt and May 
contend:
“First, sort out the facts: Identify the Known, Unclear and Presumed. Second, 
dust away analogies that may cloud vision of exactly what the current situation is 
and what concerns it gives rise to. Do so by quickly noting Likenesses and 
Differences with “now”. Third, look back into the issue’s history; seeing where 
concerns came from helps define where to go and also possibly sheds light on 
options” (Neustadt and May, 1986, p. 156).
Neustadt and May acknowledge that they do not have a model to accomplish 
this end; they merely offer several ‘mini-methods’ developed from their 
experiments with the use of history in decision-making. However, using their 
“mini-methods" in methodologies for scenario thinking and cognitive approaches 
to facilitating group strategic decision taking will allow for more robust strategic 
thinking.
The “mini-methods" used by Neustadt and May [Neustadt, 1986 #398] are 
very similar to “debiasing” techniques used in social and cognitive psychology 
research. Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980), to reduce the 
overconfidence that people have to general knowledge questions, developed a 
“de-biasing" procedure. They presented participants with two alternative general 
knowledge questions, had them list their answers and their degree of confidence 
with their answer. Control group subjects were found to be far less accurate than 
their level of confidence indicated. Participants in the experimental groups were 
asked to list the reasons why their answers may be correct and may be incorrect 
in advance of indicating their confidence in their answers. Participants in the 
experimental groups were found to have far lower levels of confidence (Koriat et 
a/., 1980; Arkes et al., 1988 #134].
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Similar methodologies were applied to a study conducted by Lord, Lepper, 
and Preston (1984) to participants who either did or did not favor capital 
punishment. Two pieces of research were fabricated and participants were 
asked to consider each. After considering the information, those that were 
opposed to capital punishment were found to be more so, and proponents of 
capital punishment were also found to be more in favor of capital punishment 
after consideration of the research. However, when asked to consider the 
opposite stance and evaluate information accordingly, attitude polarization 
diminished (Lord et al., 1984).
Again, using an adaptation of the Koriat et al. (1980) study, Arkes et al. (1988) 
applied a similar methodology to 194 neuropsychologists who were asked to 
read a case study and estimate the probability of three varying diagnosis. As 
hypothesized, the research showed that, after listing pieces of evidence to 
support the diagnosis, hindsight biases were reduced. The authors conclude 
that:
"Having the diagnostician list or generate reasons why other outcomes might 
have been expected should heighten appreciation of the difficulty of the case, the 
plausibility of other diagnoses, and the information value of the correct answer.
Under these circumstances the correct answer will more likely be seen as truly 
informative, and alternative possibilities may be given their just due" (Arkes eta!.,
1988).
Although it is important to be conscious of research provided by Roese and 
Olson (1996), and Sherman and McConnell (1995), which suggests that “default” 
counterfactuals may enhance foresightful thinking flaws by creating the 
perception that if certain antecedents leading to a cause had been added or 
subtracted, then the outcome would have surely been different, one can
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conclude that their nnethodological design was so narrowly focused that had they 
simply asked participants to consider more counterfactuals using different 
guidelines e.g. upward and downward, additive and subtractive, the hindsight 
bias could have been reduced.
7.7 Chapter Conclusion
As research in psychology demonstrates, the way individuals perceive the
past and generate action strategies for the future are also influenced by the “if
only[s]”, “if then [s]” and “what if [s] that we ask ourselves. Carefully testing, and
at times constructing counterfactual pasts cannot only help to control for
foresightful thinking flaws, but sensitize us to alternative possibilities in the future
and the weak cues-to-causality that are often missed when they do not
correspond to a causal field. As Kahneman says:
“Scenario thinking has considerable appeai in evaluating both the past and the 
future, and It sometimes yields knowledge that is not accessible in other ways" 
(Kahneman, 1995, p. 381).
Context, when defined as a noun, can be defined as a setting, or the 
circumstances in which an event takes places. As a noun, context is a static 
concept that is independent of cognitive processes. It is a state, surrounding, or 
set of circumstances. But when context is considered as a verb, contextere, it 
becomes a dynamic concept, generated through cognitive processes, to 
contextualise an event, action or argument. It is a process that relies on 
interpretation and action. This perspective resonates with Smircich and Stubbort 
[1985] who argue that the words ‘organization’ and ‘environment’ “create a
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dichotomy that profoundly shapes thinking about strategic management” (p. 724), 
but that this dichotomy may be a false one. Consequently, the relationship 
between organization and the environment should be reconceptualized as a 
reflexive relationship in an enacted world. In an enacted world, separate and 
independent contexts (i.e. environments) do not exist and are partially created by 
the patterns of activity of the organization and the concomitant "inteilectual 
efforts” to interpret these actions through sensemaking.
If contexts remained static and were independent of human perception, short­
term, single-point forecasts and elaborate econometric models would be effective 
tools for understanding environmental contexts. Furthermore, tools such as 
Porter's Five Force framework and SWOT analysis would be sufficient 
environmental scanning techniques. In an enacted world, however, our 
assumptions need to be tested through the consideration of multiple contexts. 
This also necessitates the rethinking of constraints, threats and opportunities 
[Smircish and Stubbart, 1985]. In an enacted world, one can conclude, strategic 
thinking with a counterfactual component will add value to strategic management. 
However, even scenario methodologies can fail to pick up the weak signals and 
small patterns in changing environments. Controlling for the past thus results in 
a more robust understanding of environmental contexts and adds value to 
scenario thinking.
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T^octonal (^ »netuàio*t
“At the beginning of my journey, I was naïve, i didn't yet know that the answers vanish as 
one continues to travei, that there is only further complexity, that there are still more 
interrelationships and more questions.”
~ Kaplan, 1986
“Luck favors the prepared mind.”
~ Louis Pasteur, 1822 - 95
“There is no need to know the future, but to be prepared for the future.”
~ Pericles, 495 BC -  429 EC
8.0 Chapter Introduction
Hindsight is not always 20/20. it does, however, play an important role in
foresight. Counterfactual history within historiography and the social sciences
is controversial. It has its detractors (e.g. Loewen, 1995; Carr, 1990; Thompson,
1978; Fisher, 1970; Croce, 1966) and its proponents (e.g. Lebow, 2000b;
Cowley, 1999; Keegan, 1999; Ferguson, 1997; Tetlock and Belkin, 1996.
However, psychological research demonstrates that counterfactual
reconstruction is a principal function of hindsight (Roese and Olson, 1996;
Sherman, 1991; Miller et a!., 1990; Wells at al., 1987; Kahneman and Tversky,
1-982), and influences foresight (Kahneman, 1995; Gleicher at al., 1995; Seeiau
at al., 1995; McMullen, 1995 at a/.; Roese and Olson, 1995a; Roese, 1994;
Markman at al., 1993; Sherman, 1991). While counterfactuals are an important
heuristic for learning and foresight, they also have dysfunctional implications
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(Roese and Olson, 1996; Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Dunning and Madey, 
1995; Dhar and Simonson, 1991; Wells eta!., 1987; Kahneman etal., 1982b).
Some scholars (Loewen, 1995; Carr, 1990/1961; Thompson, 1978; Croce, 
1966) might believe that they are “relatively immune to the factors that bias the 
counterfactual thoughts of everyday perceivers” (Olson et al., 1996; p. 296). 
Arguments that counterfactuals are a “red-herring” [Carr, 1961/1990 #140] or 
“unhlstorical shit” (Thompson, 1978), or a ‘methodological rathole’ (Fisher, 1970) 
may fit a conception within mainstream history and social science, which is likely 
the product of scholars training:
“Scholars are trained in scientific methods and are socialized Into epistemic 
communities in which they are held accountable for certain standards of 
evidence and proof (Olson etal., 1996, p. 296).
Despite epistemic communal socialising forces that dispute the legitimacy of 
counterfactual analysis, the arguments do not hold sway because, as has been 
demonstrated (Lebow, 2000b; Breslauer, 1996; Tetlock and Belkin, 1996), 
rationalisation within historiographical and social science scholarship, and with 
decision-makers (Neustadt and May, 1986), for why something happened is 
often based on flawed perceptions of history and traces of the reasons why 
something didn't happen. It is, therefore, not just an alternative between implicit 
and explicit counterfactuals, but also between dysfunctional and functional 
counterfactuals. As Webber states:
"The ‘big-miss’ errors that make social scientists feel helpless, and that 
sometimes underlie massive decision-making errors by governments, firms, and 
individuals, are usually driven more by misaligned perceptions and obsolete 
world views than by poor tactics or marginal errors of measurement in variables.
To change tactics is relatively easy; to change perceptions is much harder. 
Counterfactuals used in scenarios can help with this task” (Weber, 1996, p. 287).
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Hindsight plays an important role in foresight. To improve foresightful hindsight, 
it is thus necessary to use insights gained from psychology to supplement 
criterion developed for making counterfactual analysis an explicit, rigorous 
process within scenario thinking.
8.1 Chapter Purpose and Contribution
The first purpose of this chapter is to summarize the research in this doctoral
thesis and to extract conclusions in light of the research question: What role does
hindsight play in foresight? and secondary questions stemming from the primary
research question, which include: How does the hindsight bias and creeping
determinism influence foresight? Can counterfactual reasoning be used as an
antidote to biases generated in hindsight? Can research in psychology and
debates in history add explanatory value to strategy literature? How can the role
of hindsight be made explicit in scenario thinking and building methodologies?
The learning underpinning this corpus of research, and the resultant
conclusions summarized in this chapter, make several epistemological
contributions to academia and practice.
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Exhibit 8.0 Doctorai Thesis Map
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However, there were some limitations to the research, and the second purpose 
of this chapter is to elaborate on them. The third purpose of this chapter is to 
outline several areas for further research.
8.2 Chapter Structure
This chapter begins by summarizing the research, findings and conclusions of
this doctoral thesis. It then analyses the limitations to the doctoral research in a
counterfactual reasoning framework. The chapter goes on to construct scenarios
for future research and, finally, epistemological contributions to academia and
practice.
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8.3 Research Conclusions
Reactions to events and what we learn from those events in hindsight, as
Dunning and Madey (1995) point out, requires both knowledge of what happened 
and also knowledge of what did not happen. Research into the “what might have 
beens” and “what failed to happens", when people spontaneously use 
hypothetical alternative worlds for comparison and which alternative world people 
will choose to compare (Dunning and Madey, 1995), has been shown by 
researchers (Miller et al., 1990; Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Wells eta!., 1987) to 
give meaning to experiences.
Dunning and Madey (1995) argue that in order to render a counterfactual 
assessment, there are other cognitive tasks that people must employ, which 
goes beyond simply choosing a counterfactual alternative. Their research shows 
that people must first simulate chosen counterfactual alternatives, rolling them 
out in detail and generating the potential outcomes that their alternatives might 
produce. The second phase consists of comparing what is known about present 
circumstances with the simulation -  the counterfactual road foregone (Dunning 
and Madey, 1995, pp. 103-104).
Counterfactual history within historiography and the social sciences is 
controversial. It has its detractors (e.g. Loewen, 1995; Carr, 1961/1990; 
Thompson, 1978; Fisher, 1970; Croce, 1966) and its proponents (e.g. Lebow, 
2000b; Cowley, 1999; Keegan, 1999; Ferguson, 1997; Tetlock and Belkin, 1996). 
However, psychological research adds explanatory value to the strategy 
literature by highlighting the flaws in arguments proposed by opponents of 
counterfactual use in history and the social sciences. Research in psychology
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demonstrates that counterfactual reconstruction is a principal function of 
hindsight (Roese and Olson, 1996; Sherman, 1991; Miller and McFarland, 1990; 
Wells et al., 1987; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), and influences foresight 
(Kahneman, 1995; Gleicher et al., 1995; Seelau et al., 1995; McMullen et al., 
1995; Roese and Olson, 1995a; Roese, 1994; Markman et al., 1993; Sherman, 
1991). While counterfactuals are an important heuristic for learning and 
foresight, they also have dysfunctional implications (Roese and Olson, 1996; 
Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Dunning and Madey, 1995; Dhar and Simonson, 
1991; Wells et al., 1987; Kahneman et al., 1982b). However, counterfactual 
thinking can be controlled, and for this reason it is: “A flexible and exceedingly 
practical cognitive tool" (Seelau etal., 1995, p. 75).
Counterfactual reasoning is an important component of scenario thinking 
because it is through this form of cognitive processing that people sense-make 
from their environments. As Roase and Olson state:
“Whether automatic or explicit, such cognitive processing embraces general 
attempts to make sense out of the environment, to form causal theories 
explaining specific outcomes, and to generate expectancies for future outcomes 
based on these theories" (1995c, p. 17).
This is not because people simply seek knowledge for knowledge’s sake, but 
because there is a latent goal of attaining knowledge for the effective 
management of oneself and one’s environment (Kelley, 1972, p. 22).
Some scholars (Loewen, 1995; Carr, 1990; Thompson, 1978; Fisher, 1970; 
Croce, 1966) might believe that they are “relatively immune to the factors that 
bias the counterfactual thoughts of everyday perceivers" (Olson et al., 1996, p. 
296). Arguments that counterfactuals are a “red-herring” (Carr, 1961/1990) or
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“unhistorical shit” (Thompson, 1978) may fit a conception within traditional 
mainstream history and social science of what history is, and may also be 
applied to strategy researchers. As Powell (2001) states:
"What Carr (1990, pp. 98-99) has said about historians applies equally to 
strategy researchers: we do not render a photographic copy of the real world, but 
instead select, out of the infinite ocean of facts, the minute fraction that best 
supports our purpose" (p. 686).
Criticisms of counterfactual reasoning can be countered on the grounds that it 
has been demonstrated (Lebow, 2000b; Breslauer, 1996; Tetlock and Belkin, 
1996) that the process of constructing rational arguments within historiographical 
and social science scholarship, and in policy decisions (Neustadt and May, 1986) 
are often based on a misaligned perception of history and the reasons why 
something didn’t happen, or should have happened. It is not just about how to 
use counterfactuals, but also how not to use counterfactuals in our reasoning. 
As Grinyer (2000) states:
“Managerial perceptions are notoriously prone to distortion by sometimes 
perverse psychological and social processes" (2000, p. 31).
As research in psychology demonstrates, hindsight can be a trip-wire for 
foresight, distorting the assumptions (Sheldon, 1980; Grinyer and Spender, 
1979b) beliefs (Sheldon, 1980; Grinyer and Spender, 1979b), experiences (Hurst 
et al., 1989; Sheldon, 1980), understanding of history (Pettigrew, 1977), 
language, (Pettigrew, 1977), myths (Johnson, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977), politics 
(Pettigrew, 1992; Pettigrew, 1977), routines (Porter, 1991; Johnson, 1988; Cyert 
and March, 1963), and symbols (Johnson, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977) through 
perverse foresightful thinking flaws such as the hindsight bias (Carll, 1999;
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Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991; 
Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; Fischhoff, 1975) and creeping determinism 
(Fischhoff, 1975; Florovsky, 1969). These biases may result in a calcifying of the 
paradigms (Johnson, 1988; Sheldon, 1980), recipes (Grinyer and Spender, 
1979a) and dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) that strategy scholars 
have identified as influencing perception, decision-making and foresight in the 
literature. Hence the importance of ‘undoing the past to learn for the future' 
(Starkey and McKinlay, 1996; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984).
One heuristic for undoing the past to learn for the future and for developing a 
foresightful state of mind is de-coupling our perceptions from their anchorage in a 
hindsight perspective (Fischhoff and Tversky, 1982) through counterfactual 
reasoning (Roese and Olson, 1996; Sherman and McConnell, 1995; Gleicher et 
al., 1995; Markman et al., 1993; Mahajan, 1992; Wasserman etal., 1991; Miller 
etal., 1990; Wells etal., 1987; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982).
Whether counterfactual reasoning can be used as an antidote to biases 
generated in hindsight is controversial. Some researchers have found 
counterfactuals to be an effective technique for de-biasing hindsight perspectives 
(Mahajan, 1992; Wasserman et al., 1991). Other researchers have found that 
spontaneous counterfactual reasoning may also have dysfunctional implications 
for foresight, such as a “short-circuiting” (Dunning and Madey, 1995; Dhar 
Simonson, 1991), systematic biases in interpretations of causal relations and 
events (Sherman and McConnell, 1995), the use of simplified heuristic principals 
[Sherman, 1995 #71], and even, in certain circumstances enhancing the
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hindsight bias, creeping determinism and over-confidence (Roese and Olson, 
1996).
The dysfunctional implications of spontaneous counterfactual generation is in 
itself an important finding because it adds empirical evidence to the argument 
that spontaneous counterfactual generation can lead to maladaptive strategies 
for the future (Sherman and McConnell, 1995) and flawed logic in scholarship. 
However, this dissertation takes the position that there is an important distinction 
to be made between spontaneous counterfactuals and elaborative 
counterfactuals. Spontaneous counterfactuals, if left un-monitored, as Sim and 
Morris (1998) points out, may result in a counterfactual bias and benighted 
strategies Kahneman, 1995; Sherman and McConnell, 1995). Elaborative 
counterfactuals (Kahneman, 1995), which are used by counterfactual writers of 
history, if applied judiciously and rigorously through the application of tests and 
using variations in the assessment criteria outlined by Lebow (2000b), Ferguson 
(1997), Tetlock and Belkin (1996), Breslauer (1996) Hawthorn (1991) and Nash 
(1991), can be a trigger for reducing foresightful thinking flaws such as path- 
dependent logic (Booth, 2003; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990), and hindsight biases 
(Lebow, 2000b; Tetlock and Belkin, 1996; Breslauer, 1996; Roese and Olson, 
1996), and challenging assumptions (Cowley, 1999). This dissertation thus 
concludes that counterfactual reasoning, if made explicit through elaboration, can 
be used as an antidote to biases generated in hindsight and affecting foresight.
Scenario thinking thus consists of both a backwards processing of events and 
a forward processing of future possibilities (Sanna, 1996). As both a cognitive
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learning heuristic, and a methodology for evaluating past events and future 
possibilities (Weber, 1996; Kahneman, 1995), counterfactual reasoning has 
considerable appeal. Using variations of the criteria outlined by Lebow (2000b) 
Ferguson (1997), Tetlock and Belkin (1996), Breslauer (1996), Hawthorn (1991) 
and Nash (1991) for constructing elaborative counterfactuals, as well as mini­
methods developed by Neustadt and May (1986), and integrating them with 
scenario thinking methodologies for understanding future uncertainty, a 
counterfactual reasoning element in scenario thinking theoretically has 
considerable potential for enhancing understanding of future uncertainty and 
reducing the “big miss errors” (Weber, 1996) that have resulted in scenario 
thinking failures.
The challenge of disciplined imagination, Schoemaker (1997) argues, is to 
reduce the things we do not know we do not know about the future by improving 
foresight through scenario thinking (see Exhibit 8.1). This doctoral research 
concludes that challenging the hindsight perspective is an important step in 
improving reception of the weak signals in the environment.
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Exhibit 8.1 What do we know about the Future?
□ What we don't know we 
don't know
□ What we know
□ What we know we don't 
know
Reducing what we don’t know we don’t know thus requires both counterfactual 
scenario thinking and prefactual scenario thinking.
Hindsight plays an important role in foresight. To improve foresightful 
hindsight, it is thus necessary to use insights gained from psychology to 
supplement criterion developed for making counterfactual analysis an explicit, 
rigorous process within scenario thinking.
8.4 Epistemological Contributions of Doctoral Research
Pierre Wack (1985b) argues that a manager’s perception of the world is a
construct; rarely does it mirror reality. Managers find it extremely difficult to
break out of their worldview while they are operating within their ‘microcosm’.
Their microcosm is: “shaped by the past and sustained by the usual types of
forecasts [which are] inherently suspect and inadequate” (Wack, 1985b). As
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such: “Forecasting is a dangerous tool particularly when you are right” (Pierre 
Wack, quoted in Collyns, 1991). The reason is that the more that forecasts are 
right the more their artificial worldview will be reinforced and the more a false 
sense of security is fostered. It is precisely this false sense of security and 
parochial view that elaborative counterfactual and prefactual reasoning should 
help to dispel.
This dissertation argues that hindsight plays a role in foresight, and hindsight 
may account for the ‘big miss’ errors (Weber, 1996) that studies such as the 
Hart-Rudman Commission (2000) have found to be prevalent in scenario thinking 
studies.
Hindsight influences foresight through a naturally occurring counterfactual 
heuristic, which can lead to a biased perception of history, and a concomitant 
misaligned view of the future if left unchecked. Equally, if counterfactual 
reasoning is rigorously and elaboratively applied as an analytical technique, they 
can challenge assumptions that underpin people’s microcosms (Lebow, 2000b; 
Cowley, 1999).
8.31 Contribution to Academia
This doctoral research makes several epistemological contributions to 
academia generally, and strategic management as a canon of knolwedge more 
specifically.
First, counterfactual reasoning debates in both history and psychology have 
not been written into strategic management. The counterfactual gap in the
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literature is important to fill because research in psychology demonstrates that 
counterfactual reasoning is a heuristic that influences strategic thought. To re­
iterate Sanna:
“Simulating alternative outcomes, both before and after an event, appears to be a
pervasive if not ubiquitous human tendency” (Sanna, 1996, p. 1020).
Research in psychology thus has much to teach strategy (Mintzberg, 1998) and, 
to use Chia’s (2002) words, offers another lens for understanding ‘the workings 
of the strategic mind.’
Second, there seems to be sufficient consensus in the strategy literature on 
learning that assumptions (Sheldon, 1980; Grinyer and Spender, 1979b) beliefs 
(Sheldon, 1980; Grinyer and Spender, 1979b), experiences (Hurst et al., 1989; 
Sheldon, 1980), understanding of history (Pettigrew, 1977), language, (Pettigrew, 
1977), myths (Johnson, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977), politics (Pettigrew, 1992; 
Pettigrew, 1977), routines (Porter, 1991; Johnson, 1988; Cyert and March, 1963) 
symbols (Johnson, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977) paradigms (Johnson, 1988; Sheldon, 
1980), recipes (Grinyer, 1979a) and dominant logics (Prahalad, 1986), influence 
strategy and decision-making, albeit in differing ways. It seems that there is 
enough similarity between these insights to suggest that they form, to use 
Johnson’s (1988) metaphor, a web that constrains perception of the surrounding 
strategic environment. By binding them into a conceptual foresightful thinking 
flaws framework and turning to research in psychology and debates in history on 
the hindsight bias, creeping determinism, and counterfactual reasoning as 
sources of explanation for how they may interact, ways of de-biasing
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perceptions, challenging assumptions, and broadening perspective can be 
developed.
Third, in the scenario literature there are passive references to foresightful 
thinking flaws such as the hindsight bias and creeping determinism (e.g. Van der 
Heijden, 2002), but there has not been an in depth analysis of how these biases 
may arise, nor on how they might affect adaptive behaviour, foresight, or 
strategic learning. The literature on both scenarios and strategy appears to be a- 
historical in this way. This dissertation sets the theoretical foundations for the 
role that hindsight, and by logical extension, history plays in foresight and 
strategic thinking, and emphasises the importance of making history and 
counterfactual reasoning explicit within debates.
Fourth, injecting research findings on counterfactual reasoning in psychology 
into debates on the legitimacy, role and usefulness of counterfactual analysis in 
history and the social sciences adds a new dimension to the debate. 
Counterfactual reasoning is a pervasive cognitive function that influences 
reasoning, and as such, is often used implicitly in scholarship when constructing 
arguments on the rationale of one line of reasoning or another, particularly when 
referring to causality. The argument proffered by opponents of counterfactuals, 
such as Carr (1990), Thompson (1978), and Fisher (1970), can be countered 
with empirical evidence that counterfactuals already do play a role in reasoning.
Fifth, the research findings in this doctoral thesis have drawn on the 
epistemological foundations of cognitive approaches, and the corresponding 
positivistic view of reality, with a more constructionist position immanent to
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counterfactual history. While Tsoukas (1993) has likened Hassard’s (1991) 
argument that there are analytical openings between different paradigms to 
changing a shirt, this research would suggest that there is value in combining 
approaches to shed new light on a research question and to make a contribution 
to knowledge.
Specifically, drawing on the epistemological foundations of cognitive 
approaches to understanding counterfactual reasoning, and the corresponding 
positivistic view of reality, and combining that with constructionist approaches 
underpinning counterfactual history, allows for an enrichment of strategy 
processes, whether cognitive or methodological. Tsoukas’ (1993) argument that 
analytical openings between different paradigms are like changing a shirt does 
not hold up. The burden of hindsight is not something that can be shifted purely 
through a positivist psychological approach or a constructionist historical 
approach, but through a combination of the two.
Finally, environmental context forms the backdrop for strategic management. 
However, its links with process and content have not been researched 
systematically. Indeed, even the activity-based view of micro-strategy and 
strategizing recently proposed by Johnson, Melin and Whittington (2003) appear 
to neglect these links. However, in complex and quickly changing contemporary 
environments, how sense-making occurs, whether objective, perceived or 
enacted (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985), and the linkages between context, 
content and process is an important research challenge.
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This research contributes to understanding the linkage between process and 
context. How environments are enacted, and equally, how contexts are created 
is fundamentally a question of reflexive cognitive sensemaking and action. 
Smircich and Stubbart (1985) encourage strategic management to consider 
multiple realities, testing and experimenting as a means of expanding managerial 
capacity in an enacted world. The research in this doctoral thesis argues that 
this already happens naturally and it outlines the processes for how this occurs, 
and both its facilitative and dysfunctional implications. It thus contributes to 
understanding the strategizing processes that are used, and can be used, for 
managing in an enacted world.
8.32 Contribution to Practice
The contributions to practice made by this doctoral research are on several 
levels. At the individual level, being conscious of the influence that 
counterfactual reasoning and biases have on foresight is an optimal way of 
preventing the otherwise disruptive effects that these cognitive processes can 
have. Simple procedures, such as breaking analogies down on paper or on a 
matrices, listing the rationale for assumptions on paper, testing counterfactual 
thoughts using the checklist provided in this dissertation, are all ways of 
improving perceptions, foresight, and ultimately, decisions in a time efficient way.
At the methodological level, scenario thinking exercises based on the Shell 
tradition generally begin with a process of scoping the project and diagnosing a
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focal issue or decision. The process then enters into a data-collectlon phase. 
When the collection of data has been completed, it is tested for type one errors 
(data that is included but should not be) and type two errors (data that is not 
included but should be). Subsequently, a series of scenario building workshops 
are held. The workshops begin by identifying the key driving forces in the 
organisation's environment. These forces can be political, economic, social, 
demographic, technological, environmental or legal. Once the forces have been 
identified they are ranked according to their importance and their uncertainty. 
Once the ranking process has been completed, the scenario logics are chosen 
and ‘rolled-out’ over time. Each one of the scenario logics will form the basis for 
a scenario. Finally, the scenarios are ‘wind-tunnelled’ to test for consistency, 
plausibility, surprise and gestalt. They are also tested for type one and type two 
errors.
The scenario building process begins with diagnoses, which consists of 
determining the context, objectives and scope of the study. This is usually done 
through a preliminary meeting with the client or steering group. It then 
progresses on to the collection of data. This begins with a choice of 
methodologies and can be done using a variety of methods including 
documentary analysis, single person interviews, group interviews with ‘experts’, 
and web-based research. The next step is the analysis of the data and the 
building of the scenarios. The final step is the testing of the scenarios.
The impact of bias on the scenario thinking value chain, while a theoretical 
conceptual framework, is consistent with the criticisms levied against scenario
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analysis in general (e.g. Hodgkinson, 2002; Economist, 2001, October 13; Hart 
and Rudman, 2000), and methodological approaches that are derivatives of the 
“Shell” method in particular. One of the objectives of scenario studies is to elicit 
divergent beliefs and perceptions of the future and to discover “seeds” that may 
eventually influence societal change. It seems likely that the spontaneous, 
untested role of biases in peoples’ cognitions at both the individual and groups 
levels distort foresight.
Adding a counterfactual element to the scenario process can control the 
spontaneous cognitive use of counterfactuals, and the various biases that are 
associated with them. This involves two things. The first is that when 
counterfactuals are used to underpin rationale, exploring the logical consistency 
of the stream of thought can either validate or invalidate their use.
The second is through a disciplined probing of ‘if then’ and ‘what if questions 
during single interviews and in facilitated group workshops, the data suggests 
that elements comprising foresightful thinking flaws can be reduced and 
individuals will formally review experiences and perceptions of the past, thus 
sensitizing them to a wider breadth of possible futures and deepening trend 
analysis.
Analogies from the past and used in the present should be compared and 
contrasted against the current situation by listing what the ‘likenesses’ are 
between the two situations and what the ‘differences’ are. Similar matrices can 
be used to test what is ‘known’ from what is ‘unclear’ and ‘likenesses’ from 
‘differences’.
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Scenario thinking and group facilitation can be improved by rigorously probing 
assumptions and counterfactual statements using the methods described while 
also providing an antidote for hindsight biases that can impair foresight. An 
awareness of counterfactual statements and statements based on assumptions 
will allow facilitators to probe them. As facilitation is as much craft as science, 
probing assumptions and counterfactual statements is not something that can be 
prescribed, but some of the methods discussed in this dissertation can provide 
some guidance.
Counterfactuals are scenarios into the past. As scenarios are often described 
as post-cards written by an analyst describing future environments and sent back 
through time so that they can be read in the present, there is some scope for 
applying the criteria for testing counterfactuals to scenarios, as if they were a 
counterfactual exercise, and thus wind-tunneling the scenarios.
Weber (1996) and Tetlock and Belkin (1996) allude that some of the value in 
considering counterfactual pasts is that counterfactuals sensitize individuals to 
contingency, whether that contingency is a technological surprise, the 
emergence of a new idea, or a sudden change in public opinion, thus changing 
perceptions and sensitizing and focusing minds on what is possible in the future 
and raising awareness about self-imposed constraints. Counterfactuals can 
initiate creative destruction on, or an ‘undoing’ of official pasts and if integrated in 
scenario thinking frameworks, can support scenarios in challenging official 
futures and the resultant “big-miss” (Weber, 1996, p. 287) errors that leave social 
scientists, policy-makers, executives and strategists feeling helpless.
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Third, counterfactual exercises in themselves, the research suggests, are a 
worthwhile exercise for enhancing the quality of strategic thinking. The 
assumptions (Sheldon, 1980; Grinyer and Spender, 1979b), beliefs (Sheldon, 
1980) Grinyer and Spender, 1979b), experiences (Hurst et al., 1989; Sheldon, 
1980), understanding of history (Pettigrew, 1977), language, (Pettigrew, 1977), 
myths (Johnson, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977), politics (Pettigrew, 1992; Pettigrew, 
1977), routines (Porter, 1991; Johnson, 1988; Cyert and March, 1963), symbols 
(Johnson, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977), paradigms (Johnson, 1988; Sheldon, 1980), 
recipes (Grinyer and Spender, 1979a) and dominant logics (Prahalad, 1986) that 
received research suggests influences strategy and decision-making, can be 
challenged through counterfactual exercises. This is particularly the case where 
they are calcified by the hindsight bias and creeping determinism.
8.4 Research Limitations: A Counterfactual Analysis
This doctoral thesis is a multi-disciplinary dissertation that draws on several 
subject areas. The cross-polonisation that results from such an approach is 
valuable in putting ideas together in new and novel ways. However, such an 
approach does have limitations.
First, bringing in different cannons of knowledge into a discipline means that 
one can’t explore the complexities of the paradigmatic debates as fully as one 
might desire. The analytic openings into paradigmatic debates that Hassard 
[Hassard, 1991 #648] argues exist allow for new understandings and may even
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catalyze paradigm shifts. However, there are limitations to the depth, as 
contrasted with breadth of inquiry possible when working with different 
paradigms.
A related limitation that is immanent to trans-disciplinary research, in this case 
conflating debates in history and psychology with strategy, is that many of the 
related debates are glossed over due to time restrictions. As a consequence, 
there are quite likely things that have been missed.
A third limitation of trans-disciplinary research generally, and this doctoral 
thesis specifically, is that one’s cultural capital in the canons of knowledge being 
written into strategy is modest. In other words, someone who is a connoisseur of 
wine will be able to detect differences in the wines that they taste that someone 
who is not a connoisseur would not be able to. The connoisseur, for example, 
will be able to detect subtle differences in the smell, texture and taste of the wine, 
while to the non-connoisseur wine simply tastes like wine. Likewise, there may 
be aspects of debates or flaws in methodologies used in psychology and history 
that a psychologist or a historian will pick up on, and of which a non-psychologist 
and a non-historian will miss.
Fourth, because research pertaining to strategic thinking, such research into 
scenario thinking for instance, has generally been case-based, much of the 
literature, by its applied nature, is virtually a-theoretical. Where traditional Ph.D.s 
in strategy generally (although not always) draw on a body of theory and then 
proceed with an empirical study, the applied nature of scenario thinking as a sub­
discipline of strategy makes it an unusual place to do a theoretical Ph.D., and do
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to the theoretical limitations of the discipline itself, must import theories from 
other disciplines.
While it is tempting to argue that these limitations should have been foreseen 
before beginning the doctoral thesis (indeed, some of them were), and that the 
thesis could not have been written in any other way because of the limitations, 
both points of view are vulnerable to the hindsight bias (Carll, 1999; Sherman 
and McConnell, 1995; Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991; Hawkins and 
Hastie, 1990; Fischhoff, 1975a) and creeping determinism (Fischhoff, 1975a; 
Florovsky, 1969).
To focus in on the use of counterfactual reasoning in strategic thinking, for 
instance, there would have required a world where a theoretical body of 
knowledge exists in the discipline. As there is not, this counterfactual world 
would have been theoretically inconsistent with the discipline and uncotenable 
due to the necessity of a massive re-write of the historical evolution of research 
directions in the discipline. A counterfactual world drawing on counterfactual 
debates in history to epistemologically underpin phenomena in scenario thinking 
would meet the criterion of being clear, plausible, historically consistent (as not 
many changes to the doctoral thesis methodology would have been necessary), 
but not theoretically consistent with strategy literature. A second order 
counterfactual that could ‘bounce’ the history of this counterfactual world back on 
track would be having to fill the gap in the counterfactual debate in the literature 
and the theoretical gap in the scenario thinking literature anyway, which could 
have manifested in a thesis very similar to the one presented here. .
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A counterfactual world where counterfactual debates in psychology were 
explored in greater depth may meet the criterion of clarity, plausibility, historical 
consistency and theoretical consistency with the history of the dissertation. 
However, the lack of cultural capital in psychology would, as a second order 
counterfactual, have likely bounced the history of the dissertation back on track 
by forcing the author to draw on other disciplines, such as history, anyway.
Does this therefore lead one to the conclusion that this dissertation could not 
have been done any differently than it was? There are counterfactual 
alternatives that are clear, plausible, and theoretically consistent and meet the 
minimum re-write rules. For instance, it is counterfactually possible to have 
placed different emphasis on the areas of research. The use of counterfactual 
analysis as an evaluative tool for assessing previous scenario projects is a clear, 
plausible, theoretically consistent counterfactual that would have required 
minimum historical re-writes, such as placing less emphasis on counterfactual 
reasoning as a de-biasing technique for foresightful thinking flaws, and more 
emphasis on the applied possibilities of counterfactuals within scenario thinking.
A second counterfactual possibility for this dissertation is an empirical study 
that analysed the influence of counterfactuals within the data-collection stages of 
real-world scenario studies. This would have required a compressed and 
focused literature review of counterfactual reasoning research in psychology and 
a scenario study to have been beginning at the time that the research review was 
ending, but both minimal re-writes are clear, plausible, and theoretically 
consistent (although possibly not historically consistent with what was known.
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unknown, and uncertain about the research at the beginning stages of this 
research).
From the beginning of the dissertation, for instance, it was known that there 
lacks a substantive theoretical framework for scenario thinking, that there has 
been little exploration of the role of hindsight in foresight and that counterfactual 
debates (either in history or psychology) had not been written into strategy. What 
were unknown were the linkages between counterfactual thinking and scenario 
thinking. The assumption that this thesis began with is that hindsight does play a 
role in foresight, but what role hindsight plays is uncertain. To explore these 
uncertainties, using concepts elaborated on by Mintzberg and Waters [Mintzberg, 
1985 #168], a deliberate strategy was initially employed to explore different fields 
in order to develop a theory on the role of hindsight in foresight. However, the 
reality is that the exploratory nature of the research project resulted in an 
emergent process. An emergent process is slightly messier and more time 
consuming than if a very deliberate and traditional approach had been adopted 
where a bound theoretical framework was drawn on, an empirical study was 
conducted and conclusions reached. Such a limitation confines the 
counterfactual alternatives that are plausible.
Nevertheless, even with these caveats, both counterfactual worlds are 
plausible, clear, and theoretically consistent. Had one or the other come to pass, 
it is likely that both worlds would have changed the outputs and possibly the 
conclusions of this dissertation. For instance, one can imagine coming to the 
conclusion that counterfactuals do influence the way people think about the world
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in scenario studies, as the psychology literature suggests, but that, given what is 
plausibly achievable within the duration of a doctoral dissertation, this finding 
would have been at the expense of conclusions on the linkages between 
literature in strategy, counterfactual debates in psychology, and in history. It is 
also less likely that substantive conclusions on the role of hindsight in foresight 
would have been achievable given time limitations. These counterfactuals do, 
nevertheless, trigger several scenarios for future research.
8.5 Scenarios for Future Research
This doctoral research highlights several scenarios for further research.
Psychology research that relies on “simple, un-involving scenario studies,” and
“simple paper-and-pencil ratings” (Roese and Olson, 1995c), do not necessarily
reflect realistic situations. As researchers in psychology have suggested (Roese
and Olson, 1995b; Roese, 1994; Davis et ai, 1995; Markman et ai, 1995;
Markman, 1993), to progress the counterfactual paradigm further, research
needs to be carried out using more realistic scenarios.
One scenario for further research is using a scenario study to account for
people’s counterfactual beliefs when being probed about their views of the future
in scenario studies. This could take the form of designing a study that analyses
interview transcripts for evidence of counterfactual reasoning when assigning
causality to an event, underpinning the logic of an argument, or in persuading
others of a point of view. A corollary to this could be to look at the relationship
between power and counterfactual reasoning in a scenario study. Such a study
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could also control for variables such as differences in educational background, 
gender and profession, to see whether people of a certain educational 
background, gender or profession are more inclined to use counterfactuals than 
others.
A second scenario for further research is to conduct an ethnographical study 
focused on how hindsight is used in foresight generally, and counterfactual 
reasoning specifically in an organisational context. Studying the use of hindsight 
and counterfactuals in organisational decision-making has the potential to yield 
results about their impact on managerial decisions in everyday life. The 
advantage of an ethnographic study is that it has the capacity to break away from 
the simple ‘vignette studies’ (Sanna, 1996) of counterfactual reasoning in 
controlled situations, and to provide scientific description of the role of hindsight 
in foresight in managerial decision-making in real-time.
A third scenario for future research is on operationalising counterfactual 
thinking within scenario methodologies. Weber (1996) and Tetlock and Belkin 
(1996) suggest that some of the value in considering counterfactual pasts is that 
counterfactuals sensitize individuals to contingency, whether that contingency is 
a technological surprise, the emergence of a new idea, or a sudden change in 
public opinion, thus changing perceptions. It sensitizes and focuses minds on 
what is possible in the future and raises awareness about self-imposed 
constraints that can lead to “the big miss errors” (Weber, 1996, p. 287). As 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) state:
“Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain
events such as the outcome of an election, the guilt of a defendant, or the future
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value of the dollar. These beliefs are usually expressed in statements such as “I
think t h a t “chances are...,” “it is unlikely that...,” and so forth" (p. 3).
The heuristics that people use to simplify a complex world, particularly when 
relying on intuitive processes, can lead to biases. More empirical research and 
studies that are designed to generate knowledge on exactly how counterfactual 
reasoning can aid scenario thinking is needed so that more precise tools can be 
developed to aid strategic thinking, decision-making and judgments in situations 
of uncertainty.
Finally, there may be other effective de-biasing tools that can reduce 
foresightful thinking flaws. In experiments by Hodgkinson et al. (1999), for 
example, cognitive mapping was used as a means of overcoming cognitive 
biases arising from the framing of strategic management decisions. Cognitive 
mapping is normally used as an aid for making sense out of complex problems 
and developing problem structures (Eden and Ackerman, 1998; Eden and 
Spender, 1998). However, the researchers found that cognitive mapping also 
“provides an effective means of limiting the damage accruing from [the framing] 
bias” (Hodkinson et al., 1999, p. 977). Despite other findings that simpler 'think- 
harder' manipulations can remove this bias, and criticisms that in terms of 
experimental design and ecological validity cognitive mapping may not ‘provide 
an effective means for limiting the damage accruing from this bias’ [Wright and 
Goodwin, 2002], the salient point remains that experimenting with tools such as 
cognitive mapping provide fertile ground for future research in the area of bias 
and correction in foresight.
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8.6 Chapter Conclusion
Processes are often shaped by cognitive information processing limitations
and strategies of simplification that allow people to make sense of the world
around them (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Simon, 1957). People will use a
limited number of heuristic principles to simplify a complex world and
environmental uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p. 3). As Roese and
Olson state:
“Whether automatic or explicit, such cognitive processing embraces general 
attempts to make sense out of the environment, to form causal theories 
explaining specific outcomes, and to generate expectancies for future outcomes 
based on these theories” (1995, p. 17).
And Kelley concurs:
“The attributor is not simply ...a seeker after knowledge; his latent goal in 
attaining knowledge is that of effective management of himself and his 
environment” (1972, p. 22).
This doctoral research concludes that hindsight is not always 20/20. The 
cognitive heuristics that we use to make sense of the past and plan for the future, 
however useful, can lead to severe and systematic errors. Perceptions of 
history, whether cognitive, scholastic or strategic, must be rigorously tested, as 
should perceptions of the future. Hindsight plays an important, and often 
unrecognized role in foresight, often setting the parameters for how people 
perceive the future. The elements comprising foresightful thinking flaws are 
rooted in hindsight and tacitly constrain perceptions, strategies and decisions for 
the future. In order to correct for these biases and for the dysfunctional 
repercussions of hindsight and counterfactual reasoning if left unregulated, 
hindsight has to be made explicit in foresightful strategic formulation and
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decision-making at both the individual and group levels. Hindsight, as Dunning 
and Madey (1995) point out, requires both knowledge of what happened and also 
knowledge of what did not happen. Counterfactual thinking as a heuristic for 
generating knowledge of what did not happen is: “A flexible and exceedingly 
practical cognitive tool” (Seelau et al., 1995, p. 75). It is this controllable 
component that has the capacity to allow counterfactual thinking to be a useful 
de-biasing technique for avoiding foresightful thinking flaws, and as such, to be a 
flexible and exceedingly practical strategic tool in a scenario thinking framework. 
This is not to argue that one can ever have ‘full information,’ or that they can step 
out of their biographical or ontological histories. It is to argue that bounded 
rationality, while a constraint on decision-making, can be improved.
This dissertation has invoked positivistic research to support construtionism. 
Some might argue that using positivistic research in support of constructionism is 
incommensurable. I disagree. The two are not mutually exclusive. Thre are 
instances where positivism and constructionsim are commensurate, such as with 
psychological processes that closely reflect reconstructions of history.
Fischhoff (1977b) and Benson (1972) argue that the past cannot be treated in 
isolation. If the past is going to be made to serve the future, the same rules that 
are used to explain the past must also be used to understand the future.
In conclusion, as was stated in the New Line Cinema film Magnolia:
“We may be through with the past, but the past ain’t through with us.”
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The Problem of Predicting the Future: The Crack in the Crystal Bail
The implications of chaos theory for the social sciences are profound. From 
politics to economics, chaos theory helps to explain why forecasts are frequently 
wrong. As Kay (1995, September 29) has pointed out, 'simple systems do not 
necessarily possess simple dynamic properties’, and consequently, economic 
models that use linear equations to forecast into the future are frequently wrong. 
Prediction in any discipline is rather a dicey proposition; but everyone dreams of 
having access to a crystal ball that foretells the future. For many years forecasts, 
based on extrapolating ‘hard data’ from the past and projecting it into the future, 
have been used, rightly or wrongly, as a type of ‘crystal ball’. The economists, 
political pundits, experts, gurus and statisticians that we so frequently turn to are 
our soothsayers. But there can be cracks in the crystal ball, and as Rothstein 
states, the whole concept of expertise itself is coming under question:
“When it comes to predicting the future, pundits and pundettes alike have been so 
wrong lately that reader-TV views must be questioning the concept of expertise 
itself."
Perhaps there is a fair amount of truth in the Romanian playwright Eugene 
Ionesco’s line: “You can only predict things after they happen.” Our culture has 
rarely heeded his counsel. In a recent study by Brili’s Content, a journal that 
critiques the media, they found that many of televisions political pundits have
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generally been ‘gloriously and publicly wrong’ as much, in some cases more, 
then they’ve been right since August 1998 (Rothstein, 1999).
Many management pundits have made a good living from offering advise on 
how executive and leaders can cope with uncertainty and innovate. Gary Hamel, 
the business pundit touted by The Economist as “the worlds reigning strategy 
guru” in Leading the Revoiution (Hamel, 2000) describes Enron as being driven 
by “grey-haired revolutionaries” and he writes: “As much as any company in the 
world, Enron has institutionalized a capacity for perpetual innovation”. Michaels 
et a/.’s War for Taient (2001), and Foster and Kaplan’s Creative Destruction 
(2001), both showcased Enron. As Donkin of the Financiai Times ponders, it will 
be interesting to see how Hamel amends his conference performances. 
Management gurus cannot lose, he cynically adds:
"If a company they have praised to the hilt goes under, academics need only 
analyze its’ mistakes which then become "learning experiences" (Donkin, 2001, 
December 06).
Of course, learning experiences have a real human cost -  and it normally does 
not take its toll on either the management gurus or the top management!
Corporate hubris doesn’t stop with management gurus. Indeed, the media 
and CEOs themselves have much to account for. CEOs are often victims of their 
own corporate success, being placed on the front of magazines and journals, 
portrayed as heroes.
Consider the following:
• Jean Monty, chief of BCE Inc. described his firm’s convergence strategy in an issue of 
Maclean’s: “I believe we have the right recipe. What is not known is whether, with these 
pieces together, will the sum be greater than the parts?" Heavy losses have been 
suffered by BCE on their investments in Bell Canada International Inc., Excel 
Communications Inc. and Teleglobe Inc (Olive, 2001, p. E3).
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Fortune (May 15, 2000) asks: “Two questions about Cisco: Is John Chambers the best 
CEO on Earth? Is it too late to by his stocks?” Shares in Cisco quickly lost about 75 
percent of their value.
John Roth, the CEO of Nortel Networks Corp. and Report On Business Magazine’s Most 
Respected Company (April 2000) and the Canadian paper National Post Business 
magazine’s CEO of the Year (August 2000), was quoted in the spring of 2000, when 
Nortel’s shares were trading at $110, as saying: “Shows you how the stock market 
creates heroes. But I do love it, the respect this company is earning. The skeptics know 
who we are now. We’re getting dangerous.” Soon after, Nortel stocks deteriorated to 
trading at $11.42. John Roth has retired.
Forbes December 11, 2000 issue declared that: “Yahoo: Tim Koogle is building a killer ad 
machine -  and unleashing It on a $200 billion industry.” Koogle was fired three months 
later after Yahoo’s shares plummeted. Donald Trump in his book The Art o f the Deal 
(1988) writes: “While my friends (in college) were reading the comics and sports pages of 
newspapers, I was reading the listings of FHA foreclosures.” Trump has since had 
several high-profile closures of his own (Olive, 2001, p. E3).
Roger Enrico, author of his memoir The Other Guy Blinked: How Pepsi Won The Cola 
Wars (1987) and who was at the time was CEO of Pepsi Co. wrote: “After 87 years of 
going eyeball to eyeball, the other guy Just blinked. Coca-Cola is withdrawing their 
product from the marketplace and is reformulating Coke to be more like Pepsi." Coke is 
now out-selling Pepsi by a significant margin (Olive, 2001, p. E3).
Tetlock, an Ohio State political scientist who, for twelve years has collected 
more than 5,000 separate predictions from 200 experts in various fields, has 
determined that most experts spend far less time analyzing why they are right 
when their predictions turn out to be accurate, and far more time fabricating 
reasons why they ‘shouldn’t be considered wrong' when their predictions turn out 
to be inaccurate. Consequently, as Tetlock points out, some of the best work 
that the experts do is in the counterfactual explanations that they create to 
explain why they were ‘basically right’. So, this, as Tetlock postulates, “suggests 
a curious conclusion: the more often experts are wrong, the wiser they become” 
because the more that they are wrong, the more counterfactuals they must 
develop, the more learning takes place. Again, to quote Rothstein: “the real 
threat to the development of what we call expert judgment appears to come from 
being right” (Rothstein, 1999).
Appendices
Counterfactual Reasoning in Strategy Context 292
Those that thought they knew ...
“They couldn’t hit an elephant at this dist “ General John B. Sedgwick, last 
words. Battle of Spotsylvania, 1864.
“The phonograph ... is not of any commercial value.” Thomas Edison, inventor of 
the phonograph, c. 1880
“Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible.” Lord Kelvin, British 
mathematician, physicist, and president of the British Royal Society, c. 1895.
“X-rays are a hoax.” Lord Kelvin, 1900
“The worldwide Demand for automobiles will not exceed 1 million because of the 
limited number of available chauffers.” Mercedes-Benz market forecast, 1900.
“Not within a thousand years will man ever fly.” Wilburt Wright, 1901.
“That idea is so damned nonsensical and impossible that I’m willing to stand on 
the bridge of a battleship while that nitwit tries to hit it from the air.” U.S. 
Secretary of War Newton Baker, responding to the suggestion by Brigadier 
General Billy Mitchell that airplanes might sink battleships by bombing them.
“A severe depression like that of 1920-1921 is outside the range of probability.” 
The Harvard Economic Society, 16 November 1929
“Atomic energy might be as good as our present-day explosives, but it is unlikely 
to produce anything more dangerous." Winston Churchill, 1939
“No matter what happens, the U.S. Navy is not going to be caught napping.” 
Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, 4 December 1941.
“I think there is a world market for about five computers.” Thomas J. Watson, 
President of IBM, 1948.
British Foreign Office Researcher between 1903 and 1950; “Year after year the 
worriers and fretters would come to me with awful predictions of the outbreak of 
war. I denied it each time. I was only wrong twice.”
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“We don’t like their sound. Groups of guitars are on the way out.” Decca 
Recording Co. executive, turning down the Beatles in 1962
“But what ... is it good for?” Engineer at the Advanced Computing Systems 
Division of IBM, 1968, commenting on the microchip
“With over fifty foreign cars already on sale here, the Japanese auto industry isn’t 
likely to carve out a big slice of the U.S. market for itself.” Business Week, 2 
August 1968
“There is no reason anyone would want a computer in their home.” Ken Olson, 
president, chairman and founder of Digital Equipment Corporation, 1977.
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War with Iraq: The Use of Historical Analogies in Decision-making and
Rhetoric
Twelve historians were asked by Seaton (2003, February 19) to assess the 
plausibility of historical analogies used by politicians to legitimize and de- 
legitimize War with Iraq. The data has been used in this dissertation to illustrate 
de-biasing techniques for hindsight. The twelve historians include:
1. Michael Burleigh, Kratter visiting professor in history at Stanford 
University, California.
2. Linda Colley, Leverhulme research professor at LSE.
3. Norman Davies, fellow of the British Academy at Wolfson College, Oxford.
4. Richard Evans, professor of modern history at Cambridge.
5. Eric Hobsbawm, emeritus professor of history at Birkbeck College.
6. Paul Kennedy, professor of history and director of international security 
studies at Yale University.
7. Ian Kershaw, professor of modern history at Sheffield University.
8. Mark Mazower, professor of history at Birkbeck College, London.
9. Richard Overly, professor of history at King’s College, London.
10. Andrew Roberts, author of Hitler and Churchill: Secrets of Leadership.
11. Simon Schama, professor of art history and archaeology, Columbia 
University.
12. Avi Shlaim, fellow of St Antony’s College and professor of international 
relations at the University of Oxford.
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World War I: Failing to Think the Unthinkable
Thinking the unthinkable, Herman Kahn reasoned, could help society reduce 
the possibility of sliding into a nuclear Armageddon. Generating scenarios, Kahn 
concluded, is a technique for exploring the potential ramifications of such events 
(Kahn, 1978). Did Kahn have a point? One of the most telling descriptions of the 
origins of the First World War was recorded in the memoirs of Prince Bernhard 
von Bulow, the German Chancellor between 1900 and 1909. Von Bulow, shortly 
after the war broke out, went to see Bethmann Hollweg, his successor and 
Germany’s wartime Chancellor, at the Chancellor’s palace in Berlin. His 
recollection is as follows:
“Bethmann stood in the center of the room; shall I ever forget his face, the look in 
his eyes? There is a picture by some celebrated English painter, which shows 
the wretched scapegoat with a iook of ineffable anguish in its eyes, such pain as 
1 now saw in Bethmann’s. For an Instant we neither of us spoke. At last I said to 
him, “Well, tell me, at least, how it all happened." He raised his long, thin arms to 
heaven and answered in a dull, exhausted voice: "Oh, if 1 only knew!” In many 
later polemics on war guilt 1 have often wished it had been possible to produce a 
snapshot of Bethmann Hollweg standing there at the moment he said those 
words. Such a photograph would have been the best proof that this wretched 
man had never wanted war” (Bernhard, 1932).
The causes of World War I are numerous and complicated. They include a 
confluence of social Darwinist thinking, complacency towards peace, the rise of 
German power and domestic problems within Germany, an arma race, 
inflammatory speeches in the Reichstag, the decline of two empires due to a rise 
in nationalism, increasing rigidity in the bi-polar alliance system, the personalities
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of the leaders, the reckless support of Austria by Germany in their dealings with 
Serbia, and, of course, the precipitating cause, the assassination of archduke 
Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist in August 1914. Many in the German high 
staff, including Foreign Secretary Jagow and General von Moltke, believed that 
war with Russia was inevitable and that, if Germany were to win, would have to 
be sooner than later. Germany's battle plan, the Schlieffen Plan, called on 
Germany to sweep through Belgium, violating Belgium’s neutrality, and defeat 
France before swinging east to fight the Russians. The Schlieffen Plan could 
only work if the assumption that Russia would take longer to mobilize than 
France, held. However, Russia was building railroads with French money, 
cutting the time required to mobilize, and endangering the viability of the 
mechanized Schlieffen Plan (Nye, 1993, pp. 62-63).
When Bismarck defeated Austria in 1866 there were 36,000 casualties. By 
the end of World War I some 15,000,000 were dead, Europe was no longer the 
center of global power, Russia was under Communist rule, which set the stage 
for the ideological battles that would characterize most of the 20^ Century, the 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires had disintegrated, and Japan and the 
United States had emerged as major global players (Nye, 1993, p. 58).
The War that caused these upheavals was, arguably, catalyzed by unchecked 
conceptions of the past, concomitant assumptions and beliefs about the present 
and misaligned perceptions of the future, which led to ignorance of the possible 
repercussions of war, misaligned strategies, reckless behavior, and ultimately 
poor decision taking.
Appendices
Counterfactual Reasoning in Strategy Context 297
The causes and consequences of World War I illustrate a case where failure 
to check the past context and consider the future impaired hindsight and crippled 
foresight. Some might argue that the First World War was over-determined. 
However, there is ample evidence, including the peaceful resolution of several 
crises before the outbreak of war, to suggest that the war need not have 
happened had there been sober, rational and accurate thinking about the past, 
present and the future at the time.
The World War I example serves to illustrate acutely the important role that 
hindsight plays in foresight. Strategic planning disasters in the public sphere 
rarely result in numerous deaths, but the quality of strategic decision-making can 
be the difference between the survival and the extinction of a firm. 
Understanding the role of hindsight in foresight thus becomes an important 
element in enhancing the quality of strategic thinking and improving reception of 
the weak signals that can be prescient of the unthinkable coming to pass.
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